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ABSTRACT 
The study examines the potential for community participation in peacemaking and conflict resolution 
processes, with particular emphasis on the nature and level of that participation. The researcher 
adopted an exploratory, qualitative research design. The Acholi region of Northern Uganda was 
targeted for this case study because of its history as a conflict affected region. The study involved 
twenty-six (26) key informants and one hundred and sixty-nine (169) participants who were involved 
in thirteen (13) focus groups. The key informants were selected using the purposive sampling method, 
while the focus group participants were selected using a mixture of snowball and purposive sampling 
methods. 
 
The most significant findings of this study were that: 
 Key participants included the government of Uganda (GoU) peace team; the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) peace team; appointed and elected political leaders; civil society representatives; the 
Acholi cultural institutions, and religious leaders. 
 The community was represented at the peace talks by religious and cultural leaders. However, 
there is some ambiguity as to whether or not these leaders truly represented the local 
communities. 
 Unclear selection criteria and ambiguous mandates of representatives caused problems of 
legitimacy. 
 Women representatives/participants in the peace process were only given ‘observer status’. 
 Religious and cultural leaders initiated the peace process and acted as informal mediators. 
 There was a lack of communication, and community members were not fully informed of the 
developments taking place during the Juba peace talks. 
 The Acholi traditional conflict resolution practices were not optimally utilized since the elite 
negotiators adopted the western model of peacemaking processes.. 
 Mato-oput (an indigenous conflict resolution practice) which emphasises truth telling is effective 
only in specific cultural settings and may not be suitable for addressing more serious conflicts 
such as war crimes.  
 
The following recommendations emanate from this study: 
 
 Structures to ensure legitimate representation of community members should be set up. 
 Various levels of community participation should be a feature throughout the conflict resolution 
process. 
 Middle range leaders and intermediaries should be given much more leverage during the peace 
process. 
 Women should be especially included in the peace process since they have strategic contributions 
to make from their perspective. 
 Legitimate community representatives should inform their constituencies of the developments 
taking place at the peace talks through various communication channels.. 
 Strategies should be adopted to address those specific impediments to community participation 
such as socio-economic and/or political factors.. 
 Training, financial support and other costs of participation should be factored into the peace 
process as necessary for the overall peace dividend. 
 Formal and traditional justice systems should be synchronized to ensure that they mutually 
reinforce peace in culturally appropriate and relevant ways. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TOTHE UGANDAN CONTEXT AND THE 
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the reader firstly to the Ugandan context and highlights the 
geographical location. Also, the following contextual information is provided: Uganda’s 
political and conflict profile with special reference to Northern Uganda; a brief about the 
Acholi people; a brief on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and the Juba Peace Process. 
The researcher deliberately set out aspects of the complexity of the ethnic-political conflict at 
the very beginning (rather than shift this analysis to the second chapter) to contextualize this 
study for anyone unfamiliar with Uganda’s contested political background. The focus of this 
study (research problem) follows after this analysis. 
 
1.1 The Ugandan Context 
Uganda’s context should be seen from a regional perspective, considering that all but one of 
Uganda’s neighbours have experienced violent conflict. The accompanying conflict mapping 
of Uganda, especially Northern Uganda helps to focus this study more specifically. Uganda is 
located in the Great Lakes region of East Africa. It is neighboured by the DRC in the West, 
Rwanda in the South West, Tanzania in the South, Kenya in the East and Sudan in the North. 
Uganda is a landlocked country (i.e. it is entirely enclosed by land), and has limited access to 
the sea through its neighbours, Tanzania and Kenya. The country covers an area of 241,551 
sq. km. Uganda attained independence on 9 October 1962. By June 2009, the country had a 
population of 30.7 million people, of which 51% were females, while 49% were males, with 
a literacy rate of 69% and life expectancy of 49 years for males and 51 years for females 
(UBOS, 2009:7). The country is ranked 143rd on the Human Development Index (HDI) 
(2012)1, 20th on the Failed States Index (FSI) (2012)2 and the 98th on the Global Peace Index 
(GPI) (2012).3 Figure 1:2 shows the geographical location and administrative units of 
Uganda. 
 
                                                 
1The Human Development Index can be found at www.hdr.undp.org/en. 
2 The Failed States Index can be found atwww.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates. 
3 The Global Peace Index can be found at: 
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index 
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Figure 1: Map of Uganda 
 
Source: Relief Web 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/uganda.pdf(Accessed on 4 
September 2009) 
 
1.2 Uganda’s Political and Conflict Profile 
When Uganda attained independence in 1962, it was one of the most promising countries in 
Africa, in terms of its political and economic development. The first few years after 
3 
independence gave hope and optimism to the country’s citizens, but this hope started to wane 
following successive episodes of conflict and economic difficulties. These challenges were 
complicated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic that greatly affected the country, political turmoil, 
involvement in conflicts within the Great Lakes region, and unprecedented levels of 
corruption (Shaw & Mbabazi, 2007). Further, more than twenty years of political strife, 
economic mismanagement and armed conflict have left it devastated, with most of its social 
and physical infrastructure destroyed. During the five decades of the post-independence 
period, the country has already been ruled by ten leaders4 (Shaw & Mbabazi, cited in Nhema 
& Zeleza, 2008a:214). 
 
Uganda had periods of turbulence and insecurity right from the pre-colonial days. Kingdoms 
rose and fell through violent struggles. There were wars between the various dominant ethnic 
communities, such as between Buganda and Bunyoro, Bunyoro and Tooro, Bunyoro and 
Nkore, Buganda and Busoga. Violence and unrest have been an integral part of the pre-
colonial social and state formation period (Mushemeza, 2001). However, these conflicts and 
wars were not as devastating as the ones that Uganda experienced after independence. 
Uganda’s political journey is synonymous with political violence and civil conflict. 
Constitutional rule has not been observed. In attempting to explain the numerous wars, 
rebellions and military coups that have characterised Uganda, Epelu-Opio (2009:1) argues 
that Uganda’s political problems can be mainly attributed to the fact that its constitution was 
not upheld. This author asserts that a country that upholds its constitution will have relatively 
good and democratic governance5, coupled with regular, free and fair elections of leaders, 
and civil wars, rebellions or military coup d’états would be contained. This has clearly not 
been the case in Uganda. 
 
In the past two decades, violent conflicts have taken a toll on Africa’s development. Almost 
half of all African countries, and over one in three African people, are affected directly or 
                                                 
4 The current President, Yoweri Museveni, has been president for 25 years uninterrupted, having come to power 
in 1986. President Amin ruled for 9 years while President Obote ruled for 2 five-year terms; he was overthrown 
twice. 
5 Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised in a country. This 
includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for 
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. Source: World Bank: available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. 
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indirectly by conflicts (World Bank, 2002:1). These conflicts are attributed to both long-term 
and short-term factors. The World Bank (2002:2-4) identifies long-term factors as 
exclusionary policies and discrimination, mismanagement of economic rents, erosion of the 
state, sub-regional instability and easy access to small arms. Some of the short-term factors 
identified are linked to historical issues, illiteracy and unemployment, amongst others. 
Further, although the overall number of conflicts in Africa has decreased (Human Security 
Centre, [HSC], 2006), most contemporary wars are of protracted duration, occurring 
intrastate, fought by irregular armed groups, and fuelled by economic opportunities and 
ethnic rivalry (Spiegel et al, 2010:341). 
 
Identifying the root causes of conflict in Uganda, therefore, is an essential element in 
understanding and addressing the current conflicts that exist throughout the country 
(Coughlin, 2010:9).Uganda has experienced a series of violent conflicts since independence 
in 1962, with each successive regime facing a wide range of dissident groups. The first such 
event was the overthrow of the first President, Sir Edward Mutesa, by Apollo Milton Obote 
in 1966. Thereafter, Obote was deposed by Idi Amin in 1971. He was in turn removed from 
power by a pro-Obote rebel group supported by the Tanzanian Army. The Obote regime was 
toppled for the second time in 1985 by Tito Okello Lutwa. Those turbulent years were 
characterised by turmoil, bloodshed, widespread human rights violations, economic 
destruction and political instability (Mushemeza, 2001). Since independence, there has been a 
change in government nine times, four of which were military regimes (Government of 
Uganda [GoU], 2007:7). Further, Coughlin (2010:9) suggests that the high level of ethnic 
based violence is indicative of a lack of national identity. What appear to be ethnic, religious 
or resource based conflicts may in fact be unresolved national questions, which are at the 
heart of Uganda’s state formation (Mushemeza, 2001). It can thus be argued that Uganda as a 
state is too heterogeneous and diverse, ethnically and historically, to form a single, cohesive 
state. 
 
Following the contested general elections of 1980, the current President Yoweri Museveni 
led a five-year rebellion, eventually coming to power in 1986. Since then, there has been a 
relatively stable and functioning government with functional institutions of state. Some 
economic improvements, improvements in human rights observance, plus social and political 
transformation have taken place in most parts of the country (International Crisis Group, 
[ICG], 2004). Nonetheless, between 1986 and 2006, Museveni faced considerable opposition 
5 
from many of the 56 different ethnic groups throughout the country, in the form of more than 
27 armed insurgencies6 (Hovil & Lomo, 2004; Hovil & Lomo, 2005). 
 
During the past two decades, Uganda has experienced other internal wars and seen the 
disbandment of several rebel groups. The Uganda People's Army (UPA), a rebel group 
recruited primarily from the Iteso people (an ethnic group in eastern Uganda) was active 
between 1986 and 1992, and its activities were ended through the mediation of the Teso 
Commission7 (Epelu-Opio, 2009). 
 
Another group is the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a rebel group that is also opposed to 
the Ugandan government. It was based in western Uganda with other bases in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). It began as a minor group in the forested Rwenzori mountain 
range along the DRC border in 1996, but expanded its activities over the next several years. It 
was reported that by 2004, the rebel group had been largely destroyed by the Ugandan army. 
Another rebel group is the People's Redemption Army (PRA) which was reportedly defeated 
by the Ugandan Army. However, the existence of this rebel group is disputed by analysts 
although the Uganda government has asserted its existence for several years. This rebel group 
is allegedly based in the eastern DRC, and it was estimated as having approximately 2,000 
rebel fighters in 2004 (ICG, 2004). 
 
The Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) was a Ugandan rebel group that existed between August 
1986 and November 1987. It was led by Alice Auma, a spirit-medium who claimed to receive 
direction from the spirit called Lakwena, who directed her to form the HSM in 1986. The 
rebel leader was an ethnic Acholi herself and started the HSM in Acholi. This rebel group 
later transformed into the present-day LRA after the leader of the HSM was defeated by the 
Ugandan army and exiled to Kenya, where she died in 2007. 
                                                 
6 These include rebellions by: Action Restore Peace, Allied Democratic Forces, Apac rebellion, Citizen Army 
for Multiparty Politics, Force Obote Back, Former Uganda National Army, Holy Spirit Movement, the Lord’s 
Army, Lord’s Resistance Army, National Federal Army, National Union for the Liberation of Uganda, Ninth 
October Movement, People’s Redemption Army, Uganda Christian Democratic Army, Uganda Federal 
Democratic Front, Uganda Freedom Movement, Ugandan National Democratic Army, Uganda National Federal 
Army, Ugandan National Liberation Front, Ugandan National Rescue Fronts I and II, Ugandan People’s Army, 
Ugandan People’s Democratic Army, Uganda Salvation Army, and the West Nile Bank Front. Compiled from 
Hovil and Lomo (2004) & Hovil and Lomo (2005). 
7 This Presidential Commission, made up of 6 Commissioners – all them coming from the Teso sub-region, was 
established to manage the conflict, promote peace and reconciliation in this sub-region (Epelu-Opio, 2009:IX). 
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The Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) was a rebel group composed of former 
supporters of former Ugandan President Idi Amin (1971-1979). The group was made up of 
two former armed rebel groups in the West Nile region of Uganda. The first UNRF was 
formed to oppose President Apollo Milton Obote during his second term (1980-1985) as 
president of Uganda. The second UNRF was a rebel group that broke from the West Nile 
Bank Front (WNBF) in 1996, and included members of the original UNRF who did not make 
peace with President Museveni’s government. On December 24, 2002, the UNRF II signed a 
formal ceasefire with the GoU, and a battalion of UNRF II soldiers were incorporated into the 
Ugandan army (Branch, 2005). 
 
Other smaller rebel groups included the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), a rebel 
group that operated in Northern Uganda from March 1986 to June 1988, and the WNBF 
which led a campaign against the GoU between 1995 and 1997, during which time it had 
bases in Sudan and the DRC. 
 
One significant rebel group that has neither been completely defeated nor disbanded is the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). It is a sectarian/religious and military group that was based 
in Northern Uganda for most of the time, with bases in South Sudan. The group was formed 
in 1987 and was engaged in an armed rebellion against the Ugandan Government in what has 
been described as one of Africa’s longest and deadliest conflicts. The LRA is accused of 
widespread human rights violations, including murder, abduction, mutilation, sexual 
enslavement of women and children, and forcing children to participate in hostilities (Branch, 
2005). Following the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) signed with the GoU, the 
LRA is now reported to be operating in parts of Sudan, CAR and DRC. The rebel group was 
recently listed among terrorist groups by the US government and has been brought into global 
focus by Invisible Children, an NGO that targeted Kony, the leader of this group. 
 
Since this study was located in Northern Uganda, further discussion about the Northern 
Uganda context will follow. 
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1.3 The Acholi People and the Acholiland Context 
The Acholi are a collection of small ethnic groups brought together by the Luo migration8. 
They are part of a bigger Luo group found in Kenya where they are closely related to the 
Joluo people, and in South Sudan, where they are closely related to the Nuer and Dinka 
people (Nzita & Niwampa, 1993:86). Their origin can be traced from Rumbek in South 
Sudan from where natural calamities9 forced them to move in search of new areas of 
settlement (Nzita & Niwampa, 1993:87). While some groups of Acholis moved to Ethiopia, 
others moved to Uganda. Those who moved to Uganda intermarried and assimilated with 
some sudanic-speaking people in Northern Uganda, thus producing the Acholi (Nzita & 
Niwampa, 1993:87-88). Historically, the Acholi had a centralized system of government, 
although colonialists preferred to rank them among the stateless societies. They were 
organized into chiefdoms, each with a hereditary ruler known as the Rwot, who was a central 
figure with executive, judicial and legislative powers (Nzita & Niwampa, 1993:96). In terms 
of the economy, the Acholi participated in mixed farming and hunting (Nzita & Niwampa, 
1993:96). When the peasant production of cotton was introduced under colonialism, it 
defined the Acholi’s primary role in the colonial economy. 
 
The current state of affairs in Acholi can be traced to the early 1960s when Acholi was a 
marginal area. Since it was dry and sparsely populated, it attracted limited interest on the part 
of the colonialists, who were more interested in Buganda, a region in central Uganda 
(Atkinson, 1994:4). During the British reign, typical methods of indirect ruling were adopted 
which meant that power was allocated to the Buganda people of the central region. Northern 
tribes, predominantly the Acholi and Langi, were predominantly members of the military 
(Nannyonjo, 2005:475). It is from the Acholi that recruits were drawn into the colonial army 
and police force. The Acholi also provided the much needed migrant labour for the more 
populous and ‘developed’ south. By the end of the colonial war in 1962, 5,600 Acholi were 
serving in the army. Demobilization after the war saw most of these men discharged, 
although enough of them remained in the armed forces making them the Ugandan tribe with 
the highest number of soldiers (Atkinson, 1994:7). 
                                                 
8
 History has it that the Luo migrated to East Africa from the Anuak tribe of South-Western Ethiopia 
(http://luounite.net/2009/04/03/the-luo-migration-and-the-chollo-kings/). 
 
9 These calamities included human and animal diseases, droughts, floods, and external pressure from the Galla 
tribesmen and internal conflicts (Nzita & Niwampa, 1993:87). 
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To the colonialists, the Acholi had little to contribute to the ‘development’ of the colonial 
economy, since they were physically far away from central Uganda, with a sparse population 
living on land with limited productive capacity (Atkinson, 1994:4-5). In addition, early 
colonialists perceived the Acholi to be “naturally lazy, inferior and averse to work.”10 The 
Acholi were also seen to have had a relatively small-scale and decentralized nature of 
political organization, and thus the colonialists viewed them as neither a feared enemy nor a 
valued ally (Atkinson, 1994:5). Although the colonialists recognized Acholi as one of the 
colonial districts in the Ugandan protectorate by 1902, political authority there was 
restructured; the political system of governance and chiefdoms used in the region was 
imported from central Uganda and imposed on them (Atkinson, 1994:5). 
 
1.3.1 Political history of Acholiland: 
The Acholi have played a significant role in Uganda’s pre and post-independence political 
process. During Uganda's colonial period, the British encouraged political and economic 
development in the south of the country, in particular among the Baganda. In contrast, the 
Acholi and other northern ethnic groups supplied much of the national manual labour and 
came to comprise a majority of the military, creating what some have called a military 
ethnocracy. Due to a changing economy, after the 1950s, fewer Acholi were recruited to the 
armed forces, but continued to be associated with them in popular memory and stereotypical 
references (Atkinson, 1994). 
 
Regarding Uganda’s and indeed Acholi’s political history, the current social problems 
experienced in the country are based on the way the political elite have used ‘ethnic 
groupings’ to divide the population since independence. In fact, one of the structural causes 
of the two-decade conflict in Northern Uganda is said to be the diversity of ethnic groups 
which have different parent-client relationships with the state, as a result of relative 
difference in the levels of socio-economic development and political ideology. 
 
The political and armed conflicts in Acholi can be traced to the early leaders of post-
independence Uganda. President Apollo Milton Obote, Uganda’s first leader after 
independence came from Northern Uganda and relied on Acholi and Langi Luo people in 
                                                 
10 The initial Acholi response to peasant cash cropping and labour migration was not particularly enthusiastic. 
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government. President Idi Amin, also from northern Uganda, overthrew Obote's government 
and established a dictatorship, ultimately suppressing and killing 300,000 persons, including 
many Acholi. General Tito Okello, also an Acholi, came to power in a military coup. He was 
defeated in January 1986. Despite the years of leadership by men from the North 
(Acholiland), that region continued to be marginalised economically after independence, and 
has suffered higher rates of poverty than other areas of the country (Latigo, 2006). Moreover, 
the cultural identity of the Acholi people has undergone changes, becoming reshaped by 
conversions to Christianity and the impact of modernity. Young people, who had been born 
during the times of conflict (1986 - 2006), did not grow up experiencing the older traditional 
practices. Some Acholis were exposed to life in the towns or in diasporas (Wasonga, 
2009:37). 
 
This political history, coupled with the unique socio-cultural and economic profile of the 
Acholi people, seems to have contributed towards the development of “Acholi 
exceptionalism” (Francis, 2012; Cooper et al, 2011). Thus the Acholis’ unique set of 
circumstances, their marginalisation despite producing some key leaders and occupying 
positions in the army and the police, being ruled by the south; all contribute to their  being 
regarded quite differently from other ethnic groups. 
 
1.3.2 Political economy of Uganda and Northern Uganda 
The political economy of Uganda is influenced by a number of social-economic, cultural, 
legal, political and institutional factors that determine the creation and distribution of wealth, 
including the laws governing its production and distribution. The state’s ability to put in place 
functional governance systems that ensure the creation and equitable distribution of wealth 
among all its citizens is also dependent on the reigning political ideology and economic 
development strategies of the state (Robinson, 2006). 
 
Over the last three decades, Uganda’s political economy has tended to focus on a capitalistic 
ideology, having been more inclined to socialism and communism in the early years after 
independence. In this regard, it has been argued that Uganda’s political economy is one 
characterised by weak governance systems, one devoid of equitable regulation and one that is 
not governed by institutionalised mechanisms (Oloka-Onyango & Barya, 2007). This context 
has complicated the creation and implementation of progressive public policy in Uganda. 
This situation is partly rooted in Uganda’s violent political history where more than two of its 
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five post-independence decades have been characterised by civil wars, many of them internal. 
The country has been ruled by dictatorships and quasi-civilian regimes that lacked 
legitimacy. To this end, rulers practiced politics of divide and rule in order to build coalitions 
and win over the uncooperative sectors of the country. 
 
In this regard, Northern Uganda - and Acholi region in particular, having lost political power 
in 1986, has been opposed to the new government of the National Resistance Movement for 
most of the past three decades of President Museveni’s rule. This opposition has meant that 
several armed groups have emerged and got support from some sections of the population in 
Acholi region with the hope that they would stand a chance to regain political power. As a 
result of the existing neo-patrimonial governance system, a number of wars have been 
produced and reproduced over the past two decades, thereby affecting the region’s socio-
economic performance, in addition to affecting the region’s education, health and other 
sectors. The region has, thus become the most under-developed in the country. The region 
has complained about marginalisation and exclusion from central governance, and was 
described by Shaw & Mbabazi (2007) as the most underdeveloped region in Uganda. The 
recently ended war which affected the region for more than two decades and displaced more 
than 1.8 million people has left an indelible scar on the region, which is marked by poverty, 
disease, low literacy, high HIV prevalence and unemployment (Nannyonjo, 2005). 
 
1.3.3 Patterns of Conflict in Acholiland 
The Lord’s Resistance Army, hereafter referred to as LRA, has committed numerous 
atrocities against the people of Acholiland and neighbouring populations, including 
enslavement, murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and sex slavery (Allen, 2005). The LRA’s 
cruelty and coercive methods led people to question the LRA leader, Kony’s goals, denying 
him blessings from Acholi elders and support from the broader Acholi population. The LRA 
therefore turned their weapons on their own people in Acholi, looting homes, destroying 
villages, and abducting boys and girls as young as eight or nine (Finnstrom, 2003). The 
conflict in Northern Uganda is complex and it is difficult to state who was really fighting on 
behalf of the Acholi’s cause, because both the LRA and UPDF have committed atrocities 
against the Acholi people (Wasonga, 2009). 
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1.3.4 The Northern Uganda Conflict (1987 – 2006) 
For 21 years, Northern Uganda suffered the effects of a conflict between the GoU and the 
LRA, a rebel group that has its origins in Northern resistance movements formed in the mid-
1980s, in response to the rise to power of the country’s current president, Yoweri Museveni. 
The conflict evolved into a brutal insurgency that directly targeted the civilian population. 
According to Schomerus (2007:12), the LRA has been something of an unknown entity for 
many years, attracting wide speculation about its motives and the strength of its fighting 
forces. The LRA’s tactics included the looting of villages, massacres, indiscriminate killings, 
mutilation, and the abduction of children who have then been forced to serve as soldiers or 
sex slaves (Oxfam International, 2007:5). According to Schomerus (2007:10), the conflict has 
been marked by barbaric brutality, political manoeuvring and propaganda on both sides. 
 
The ICG (2004:i) notes that the conflict had four main characteristics. Firstly, it was a 
struggle between the GoU and the LRA and, secondly, it was the predominantly Acholi11 
LRA combatants and the wider Acholi population, who bore the brunt of violence. This 
violence appears to have been aimed at coercing the Acholi to support them and discrediting 
the GoU locally and internationally. Thirdly, the conflict was fuelled by animosity between 
Uganda and Sudan, who supported rebellions in each other's territory. Finally, this conflict 
seems to be a continuation of the North-South conflict that has marked Ugandan politics and 
society since independence. On the international scene, the US government accuses the LRA 
of killing, raping, and mutilating the people of central Africa; stealing and brutalizing their 
children; and displacing hundreds of thousands of people. Its leadership has been indicted by 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity. The LRA has no agenda 
and no purpose other than its own survival and it is filling its ranks of fighters with the young 
boys and girls it abducts (United States Government, 2010). 
 
The roots of the conflict in Northern Uganda date back, mostly to the colonial period (Doom 
& Vlassenroot, 1999). Since the colonial period, there has been an ongoing rivalry between 
the Acholi people and the southern tribes (Jackson, 2002). The LRA’s two-decade long 
conflict in Northern Uganda, Southern Sudan, and most recently the DRC is one of the most 
violent imaginable, yet it is still not clear why it is fighting this war (Vinci, 2007:337). The 
                                                 
11 Acholi is an ethnic group from the present-day districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Amuru and Pader in Northern 
Uganda, an area commonly referred to as ‘Acholiland’. 
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conflict has not had the structure of a traditional civil war or ethnic conflict. The LRA leader 
is described more aptly as a warlord and his militia consists of significant numbers of 
abducted children and youth. Acholi communities are treated as a resource base for food and 
abducted fighters (Veale & Stavrou, 2007:275). The contemporary LRA lacks any obvious 
political motivations that might be used to explain the conflict. It has no realistic political 
demands that it communicates to the outside world. LRA’s complete lack of indigenous 
support has meant that there is not a basis for political dialogue between themselves and GoU 
on which to negotiate political goals (Vinci, 2007:342). The LRA has also been said to be 
void of political content and rationale; it has no autonomous political logic and no political 
agenda; its dedication to meaningless violence is the prerequisite for it to be simply an 
instrument of others, hence the difficulty to negotiate with them (Branch, 2005:4-5). The 
LRA has argued that they want Uganda to be governed in accordance with the Christian Ten 
Commandments (BBC, cited in Branch, 2005:4). 
 
However, some see the conflict as a means of bringing about political change, such as the 
overthrow of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government; providing economic 
gain, or fulfilling the strategic objectives of Sudan (Vinci, 2007:344, 348). Other observers 
propose that the LRA is simply a bizarre movement that is a proxy in a war between Uganda 
and Sudan (Prunier, 2004:359). The LRA may have begun its war for instrumental goals, 
such as to create political change, but these goals have largely been replaced by existential 
goals: in a sense, the LRA is fighting in order to continue providing security and a vocation to 
its members, which would be lost by a return to wider society (Vinci, 2007:337). 
 
The LRA quite literally provides for the survival of its members. It also provides for 
secondary existential needs, such as vocation12, and a sense of belonging (Vinci, 2007:346). 
For some, it is nothing more than a survival strategy – survival by the gun (ICG, 2004), 
whereas for others, those who live comfortably in the bush, it is rebellion as career and hence 
its perpetuation (Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999:36). It seems that Kony is no longer interested in 
winning the conflict, but that violence has become both a means and an end in itself. 
 
                                                 
12
 Such as some form of engagement and employment away from the normal life they would otherwise lead in 
their communities of origin. 
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However, the LRA’s lack of a political agenda is not universally accepted among some 
academics and analysts who argue that the LRA might have a political agenda, which it has 
simply not articulated effectively (Refugee Law Project [RLP], 2004b; Finnstrom, 2008). 
According to Finnstrom (2008), the LRA has consistently demanded the end of the war 
through negotiations, the dismantling of IDP camps, the national political integration of the 
Acholi on an equal basis with the rest of the country, an end to the genocide of the Acholi, 
reparations for lost cattle, free and fair elections, and a multi-party state. Significantly, these 
demands match the grievances of the Acholi population. However, there are irreconcilable 
differences between the LRA and the Acholi population because of the LRA’s violent 
methods which negates any claims that it may be a legitimate champion of Acholi grievances 
(ICG, 2004:9). 
 
Also, the LRA has separated itself from the greater Acholi society and this is the root of its 
reluctance to end the war (Vinci, 2007:347-348). In fact, because guerrilla warfare is 
basically derived from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if 
it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation (Tse-Tung, cited in Vinci, 
2007:347), which seems to be the situation with the LRA rebellion at the moment. Although 
it is argued by some that the LRA is a widely accepted mouthpiece of the Acholi people who 
were on the verge of genocide (Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999:22), the fact is that it has lost a lot 
of its legitimacy and is no longer seen as the armed representative of the Acholis. Rather, it 
now represents itself, which is based on specific initiation and inclusion practices. As such, 
its political goal is to continue existing as a separate unit, which necessitates continual 
warfare (Vinci, 2007:338). Other observers agree that the LRA violence is too extreme to be 
seriously considered as a legitimate force pursuing the realization of any political goals 
(Branch, 2005:7). 
 
Despite the aforementioned analysis, there are suggestions that the arguments against the 
LRA violence – the fact that it is religiously driven; that it lacks a political agenda; that its 
violence levels are in excess of a political goal; that it engages in human rights abuses and 
that it lacks open support – are not enough to dismiss it politically (Branch, 2005:8). The 
LRA movement is almost entirely organized around its leader, Joseph Kony, who is believed 
by many Acholi to be possessed by powerful spirits (Allen, 2005). Kony’s war has ironically 
turned against the very same civilian population he claims to be fighting for, inflicting 
inhumane acts and causing widespread despair and hopelessness (Maina, 2009a:48). 
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1.3.5 Major Causes of the Conflict 
There are numerous explanations as to the root causes of the various rebellions in Northern 
Uganda (Kasaija, cited in Nhema & Zeleza, 2008b:52). For example, it is suggested that the 
conflict was a struggle by Acholis who have borne the brunt of many successive conflicts; 
that it was fuelled by animosity between Uganda and Sudan, which support rebellions in each 
other’s territory; and that it is a continuation of the north-south conflict, which has marked 
Ugandan politics since independence (ICG, 2004). In particular, it is suggested by Pham & 
Vinck (2010:8), that the uprising resulted from the long-standing political divide between the 
North and South of Uganda, and that it was a direct response to President Yoweri Museveni’s 
NRM and its efforts to consolidate control over the Northern part of the country. To add to 
this, Schomerus (2007:14) suggests that the lack of political representation from the northern 
region, repeated human rights violations at the hands of the military, nationwide 
socioeconomic underdevelopment, and government corruption all lie at the heart of the 
Northern Uganda conflict. The Refugee Law Project (RLP, 2004a) contends that there are 
two major causes of this war: Firstly, there is a history of recurring violence and the 
marginalisation of the northern region, characterised by the existence of a north-south divide, 
which is explained by the economic imbalance that was created during the colonial era. 
Secondly, it is proposed that the LRA rebellion is a competition for resources, since the LRA 
has been fighting the Museveni-led government since his rule began in 1986. 
 
In addition, Coughlin (2010:9) suggests that regional and ethnic discrimination, a lack of 
national identity, a culture of violence, and a level of insecurity add to the conflict. Moreover, 
this situation induces tension, incompatibility and injustice, while propagating hatred. To add 
to this, active LRA fighters have argued that they are marginalised, abused and excluded 
from Uganda’s development by an oppressive regime (Schomerus, 2007:12). 
 
Further, the major causes of the conflicts in Uganda, and Northern Uganda in particular, can 
be divided into two sets of factors, namely: political/ historical and security/ socio-economic. 
Political and historical factors include poor representation, marginalisation from central 
institutions, a regional divide between the north and south, divisive colonial policies and 
corruption. Security factors include impunity by armed groups against unarmed civilians, 
human rights abuses, criminalisation, proliferation of small arms and weak border controls. 
Socio-economic factors include imbalances in public investments and fiscal transfers, 
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underdevelopment, weak social service provision, competition over scarce resources and land 
disputes (GoU, 2007:8). Nonetheless, analysts and observers argue that the LRA insurgency 
lacks any clear (and negotiable) political objective. Although some of the objectives of the 
LRA include the need to overthrow President Yoweri Museveni; the restoration of the order 
of legitimacy in Uganda; the need to cleanse and purify Uganda through establishment of a 
government that rules in accordance with the Ten Commandments of God; and the 
restoration of Acholi culture, the actual driving logic of the LRA rebellion remains unclear 
(Mabikke, 2011:3-4).Vinci (2007:342-344) identifies the major motivations as being 
political, economic and the Sudan factor. Nonetheless, the goals of the conflict remain 
unclear: 
 
“Throughout the conflict, neither Kony, nor any other member of the LRA, has 
produced a clear, sustained description of the realistic goals of the organisation. 
Moreover, it is not immediately obvious from the nature of the LRA’s attacks exactly 
what its goals and motivations are. However, one can only speculate about some of 
the possible motivations behind the ongoing conflict” (Vinci, 2007:342). 
 
Nonetheless, rebellion can typically be explained by severe grievances, such as inequality, 
lack of political rights or ethnic and religious differences in society (Collier et al, 2009; 
Collier & Hoeffler, 2001). In this connection, Jackson (2002) contends that, although the 
LRA initially fought to establish their rule based on the Ten Commandments and also to 
liberate the people living in occupied Northern Uganda, these political motivations became 
less important over time. Also, the clarity of grievance declined, as the conflict progressed. 
 
1.3.6 Impact and consequences of LRA on Acholiland 
The conflict in Northern Uganda has led to extensive loss of life and property. It is estimated 
that approximately 100,000 deaths had occurred by the end of 2006, in addition to the 
increased number of orphans, estimated to be about 25%-28% of the population of Northern 
Uganda by 2006. Moreover, the number of households headed by children and widows 
constituted 12% of the population in Northern Uganda (ICG, 2006b). Furthermore, many 
more people have died as a result of preventable diseases and malnutrition. A study by Civil 
Society Organisation for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU) showed that one in five 
children in Northern Uganda had lost either one or both parents. One in three young men, and 
one in six young women, have been abducted by the LRA at some point in their lives, 
(CSOPNU, 2007:5). 
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Also, the over dependence on the natural environment has led to environmental degradation, 
particularly deforestation and charcoal burning, which have significantly affected the quality 
of the physical environment. The challenges faced by internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
across several indicators varied not only from one IDP camp to another, but also from district 
to district, even in the same region. However, in general, the Northern region has become the 
poorest in the country, primarily because of the LRA’s activities (GoU, 2004b:100). 
 
In addition, there have been abductions of up to 60,000 children (12,000 in 2004 alone), 
population displacement (over 2 million people by the end of 2006), food insecurity caused 
by the fact that 78% of the population has limited access to productive land, and total 
dependence on emergency humanitarian aid by 84% of the displaced people (CSOPNU, 
2007). Besides the disruption of basic social services, increased incidences of violence 
especially against women and children, poverty, loss of livelihoods, loss of productivity 
estimated at US$ 100 million annually there was a higher prevalence of HIV (8%) compared 
to the national average, which is 7% (GoU, 2012b). Findings of a survey on HIV prevalence 
among IDPs by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the 
World Health Organization (WHO) released in March 2007 indicated that HIV prevalence 
rates in Northern Uganda, which was home to an estimated 1.8 million IDPs, were over 8% 
(UNAIDS & WHO, 2008).13 Thus, the war resulted in increased levels of poverty, insecurity 
and lawlessness (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 2006). 
 
During all the years of conflict, the northern region of the country missed opportunities for 
economic and social development, and thus the region remains under-developed. The impact 
of the armed conflicts has in fact led to a humanitarian crisis.14 The conflict not only led to a 
loss of life of tens of thousands of people, significant destruction of property and breakdown 
of the social, economic and other infrastructure and networks, but also the massive 
population displacement into IDP camps (UNDP, 2007b:9). To illustrate the severity of the 
                                                 
13 The national average of HIV prevalence in Uganda by the end of the conflict was 6.2% (2006) while it was as 
high as 11.9% for Northern Uganda. 
14 A crisis is defined as: “An unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending, 
especially one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome” (Webster’s 9th Collegiate 
Dictionary, 1987). 
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conflict, the then UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland made 
the following statement on his visit to Uganda in November 2003: 
 
“Where else in the world have there been 20,000 kidnapped children? Where else in 
the world have 90% of the population in large districts been displaced? Where else in 
the world do children make up 80% of the terrorist insurgency movement? For me, 
the situation is a moral outrage… A much bigger international investment is needed 
— in money, in political engagement, in diplomacy and also more concerted efforts to 
tell the parties that there is no military solution… there is a solution through 
reconciliation, an end to the killing and the reintegration15 and demobilization of the 
child combatants” (UN, 2004). 
 
In addition, a study done in 2007 study reported that 19% of children who returned from the 
war suffered from PTSD.16 This report showed that former LRA child soldiers who had 
symptoms of PTSD were more likely to experience feelings of revenge even after the war had 
ended, confirming reports of isolated cases of violence encountered in rehabilitation centres 
for LRA ex-combatants in Gulu (Daily Monitor, 2 August 2007). PTSD is defined as 
experiencing three types of persistent symptoms following a traumatic event: re-experiencing 
the event through intrusive memories, dreams, or flashbacks, or feeling distress upon 
exposure to trauma-related stimuli; avoidance of people, places, or things that remind the 
person of the traumatic event; numbing of feelings or detachment from others; increased 
arousal, including increased heart rate and muscular tension, restlessness, difficulty sleeping, 
irritability, poor concentration, feeling on guard or hyper vigilant, or having an exaggerated 
startle response (Yehuda, 2002:108). Further, 26% of adults had a severely depressed mood, 
20.4% of whom had developed suicidal behaviour. At the same time, 11.9% of them were 
dependant on alcohol. 
 
                                                 
15 Reintegration is the process of helping former combatants return to civilian life and readjust both socially and 
economically (Machel, 2001:14). 
16 Witnessing or executing shootings, witnessing someone being wounded, and having been seriously beaten. 
After abduction, all the children reported having undergone brutal initiation into rebel life. Often they were 
compelled to beat or hack to death fellow child captives who were attempting to escape (See “Ex-child soldiers 
could seek revenge”, Daily Monitor 2 August 2007, pp. 3). 
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Regional imbalances have occurred as a result of the long-term conflict, and the population of 
Northern Uganda have been unable to make any remarkable progress towards achieving the 
MDGs17 (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2007a). 
 
Joseph Kony, leader of the LRA, continues to abduct children to conscript into his rebel 
forces; the boys are used as soldiers, and the girls are used by him and his fellow rebels as 
their wives, as carriers of supplies and even as soldiers. Kony and his troops continue to 
perpetrate brutal atrocities against the people of Northern Uganda (Quinn, 2009:56). 
Although the scale of abduction is a matter of speculation due to insufficient monitoring, it is 
estimated that between 30,000 and 45,000 children have been abducted by the LRA (Allen, 
2005:iii). Tens of thousands of civilians have been forcibly recruited by the LRA, over two 
decades of war – two thirds of them children under the age of 18, many of whom have since 
escaped and asked to be reunited with their communities (Blattman & Annan, 2008:1). Given 
the impact of the war and its consequences, it is understandable that the Acholis’ support 
systems and other institutions such as health, welfare, education and beliefs all require some 
measure of reconstruction (Wasonga, 2009:37). 
 
It is important to note that the conflict in Northern Uganda has also affected the other regions 
of the country. The British Parliament (2006:12) estimates that NGOs and the international 
community have spent approximately US$200 million per year to support IDPs. Although 
these substantive funds have in many ways contributed to the survival of IDPs in the region, 
much more could have been done to rebuild the social/moral fabric of these people through 
transformative conflict resolution processes that take cognisance of their cultural practices 
aimed at healing. The conflict in Northern Uganda continues to retard Uganda’s economic 
development efforts. At the end of 2002, it was estimated by CSOPNU (2002:2) that a 
cumulative total of US$ 1.33 billion, equivalent to 3% of Uganda’s GDP or 100 million US$ 
was spent annually on the conflict. 
 
                                                 
17 MDGs are eight goals to be achieved by 2015 that respond to the world's main development challenges; they 
are: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality 
and empowering women, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating  HIV/AIDS, malaria 
and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a global partnership for development 
(www.un.org/millenniumgoals/). 
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1.3.7 Internal displacement: the global, regional, national and Acholi context 
The United Nations (UN) defines IDPs as “people or groups of people who have been forced 
or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result 
of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, 
violations of human rights or natural or human-induced disasters, and who have not crossed a 
recognized international border” (GoU, 2004a:X). Conflict situations are generally 
complicated by large numbers of IDPs (Thomas, 2009). The phenomenon of IDPs is 
relatively new, having received international attention in the early 1990s. In 2007, close to 
half of the people internally displaced by conflict worldwide were in Africa, spread across 20 
countries, and Uganda alone hosted more than one million of them (Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre [IDMC], 2008:23). 
 
At the end of 2010, an estimated 15.4 million people sought refuge from conflict outside their 
home countries, and another 27.5 million were displaced internally (Thomas, 2009). By the 
end of 2011, more than twenty-six million people had been internally displaced by conflict 
and violence across the world; more than one third of these were in Africa, the region with 
the highest number of IDPs, and outnumbering refugees by five to one (Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre [IDMC] & Norwegian Refugee Council [NRC], 2012:3). 
Three of the world’s top five countries with the largest populations of conflict-induced IDPs 
are in Africa: Sudan with an estimated 4.9 million IDPs; the DRC with over one million 
IDPs; and Somalia with an estimated 1.5 million (Solomon, 2009:1). Armed conflicts are the 
primary cause of internal displacement in the Great Lakes region, and particularly in 
countries such as Sudan, the DRC and the CAR (Kalin, 2007:1). 
 
By May 2009, approximately 823,000 (60%) of IDPs in Uganda had returned to their villages 
of origin, while a further 244,000 (18%) were in transit sites (Interagency standing committee 
[IASC], cited in Mallett, 2010:35). With an estimated 90% of its population displaced over 
the last two decades, Northern Uganda’s Acholiland has been the country’s worst affected 
region (Mallett, 2010:34). One of the global challenges of handling the concerns of IDPs is 
the absence of adequate international regimes to protect and advocate for their rights. Unlike 
their refugee counterparts, who are protected by the International Refugee Convention of 
1951 and other legislations, IDPs are deemed to be the business of national governments 
(Thomas, 2009). 
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As a result, the phenomenon of IDPs is a new challenge because governments often lack 
proactive and comprehensive local and national systems and mechanisms to deal with their 
concerns. In some countries, IDPs are not a national priority, while other countries lack the 
resources required to deal with their unique needs. As a result, many IDPs have tended to 
consider themselves as ‘a hopeless and marginalised group of people’, and in many areas, the 
absence of adequate state structures, combined with pervasive lawlessness, expose IDPs, 
particularly women and children, to extremes of violence and abuse (Thomas, 2009; Mallett, 
2010). 
 
In the case of Uganda, there remains the challenge of assisting urban IDPs, currently 
estimated to be between 300,000 and 600,000 (Mallett, 2010:34). IDPs that live outside 
camps who are not registered and of whom not much is known. Such challenges in 
identifying them make it difficult for the government and the humanitarian actors to address 
their needs (Refstie et al, 2010:32). In particular, while the urban poor and IDPs face similar 
challenges, these are exacerbated in the IDPs’ case by psychosocial vulnerabilities stemming 
from their conflict-related experiences, weak support networks in the urban areas and, in 
some cases, language differences between the IDPs and the local communities (Refstie et al, 
2010:32-33). Considering the abject conditions of many Ugandan IDP camps, urban 
destinations may appear advantageous but the reality can be very different (Mallett, 2010:34). 
 
Internal displacement is a humanitarian, human rights, peace building and development 
challenge (IDMC & NRC, 2012:3). In fact, while forced displacement is a humanitarian 
crisis, it also has significant developmental impacts affecting human and social capital, 
economic growth, poverty reduction efforts and environmental sustainability. Forced 
displacement has an important bearing on meeting the MDGs, since displaced populations 
tend to be the poorest and often find it difficult even to access basic services (World Bank, 
2011). For instance, the lives of IDPs in urban areas are characterised by a lack of amenities, 
inadequate housing, high morbidity and mortality levels, in addition to low employment 
prospects (Mallett, 2010:35). 
 
In view of the aforementioned, the involvement of IDPs in peace processes albeit challenging 
given their circumstances can be justified by the fact that most IDPs have become party to 
conflict, and that their inclusion is therefore necessary for conflict resolution (Koser, 
2007:13). In the absence of opportunities for participation, conflict-affected communities can 
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lose trust and confidence in a peace process that does not solicit their input, and where actors 
in the peace process do not consult or inform them about processes and progress of the peace 
initiative. In the case of Northern Uganda where the community already has little trust in 
government because it failed to protect them adequately from violence, forcing them into IDP 
camps, and not even providing adequately for their most basic needs during displacement, 
such a situation can grossly undermine any prospect for sustainable peace (CSOPNU, 2004). 
Against this background, one can understand the need to include these ‘voices from the 
periphery’ who were actually at the centre of the conflict. Bearing this in mind, the Juba 
Peace Process will be briefly discussed. 
 
1.3.8 The Juba Peace Process 
The Juba peace process, and in particular the peace talks, started in July 2006 and ended in 
April 2008. Several accords, based on the five-item agenda were signed by all parties, but the 
Final Peace Agreement (FPA) was never signed. However, even when peace agreements are 
reached, peace processes may take years, or even generations, before they are finalised; 
examples of Northern Ireland and Sudan illustrate this point (Irwin, 1999:305). The most 
formal process to resolve the violent conflict in Northern Uganda has become known as the 
Juba Peace Process, because the peace talks were held in Juba, the capital city of South 
Sudan. During the peace talks, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) played the role of 
mediator. The process was widely seen by many stakeholders as the best hope for a peaceful 
and negotiated settlement of the 21-year-old conflict. In particular, the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) (2008) described the peace talks as the best chance and hope, ever, 
for peace in Northern Uganda. The peace process was described as being long overdue and 
was partly precipitated by the indictment of five top LRA leaders by the ICC for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity in October 2005 (UNSC, 2008:2). 
 
The peace process followed a protracted military engagement between the GoU and the LRA, 
which persisted from 1986 until 2006, when both parties eventually agreed to hold peace 
talks. From a purely rational point of view, this decision could have been seen as a tacit 
admission by all the parties that the conflict could not be resolved through military might or 
any other exercise of coercive force, but rather in searching for common ground (Muhereza et 
al, 2009:18). Using William Zartman’s phrase, the time when all parties agreed to talk peace 
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was considered to be that ‘ripe moment’18 for peaceful conflict resolution (Zartman, cited in 
Miall et al, 1999:162). Indeed, many Ugandans now believe that the peace process was 
possibly the only ‘soft landing’ for both parties in the conflict (Quinn, 2009:68). 
 
However, after more than four of the LRA leader’s failure to sign the FPA, it is still not 
absolutely clear as to why he has refused to do so.  One cogent argument is that since the ICC 
indictments were in force during the peace process, these could have affected the negotiation 
process, as the LRA leadership faced an uncertain future due to their gross human rights 
abuses. During the peace talks, most of the international attention was focused on questioning 
the legitimacy, mandate, and knowledge of the LRA peace delegation, which was composed 
mostly of diaspora members, many of whom were no longer active combatants or political 
representatives of the LRA (ICG, 2006b). It was also argued that the peace talks were marred 
by a poor organisational framework, an often slow or ambiguous international response, and 
a general lack of trust in its validity – as well as the continuing war propaganda coming from 
both the LRA and GoU (Schomerus, 2007:39). Nevertheless, Schomerus (2007:45) contends 
that, its shortcomings and obstacles notwithstanding, the Juba peace process presented an 
opportunity to negotiate a much needed peace agreement that could lead to a cessation of 
violence and the beginnings of development. 
 
                                                 
18 Zartman postulates that many conflict resolution attempts fail because conflicts are not ripe for negotiated 
settlement and because parties to the conflict have not yet reached what he calls ‘a mutually hurting stalemate’; 
he defines mutually hurting stalemate as that moment when both sides realize that it is irrational to continue 
with the conflict, as they cannot achieve their aims by further violence and that it is too costly to go on 
(Zartman, cited in Miall, et al, 1999:162). 
Figure 2: The Key Actors and Participants in the Juba Peace Process (2006
Source: Barrigye, 2013 study findings
 
From Figure 2:23, it appears that one of the challenges of the Juba peace process was the 
elites’ lack of connection with the ordinary citizens. The top
GoU and the LRA, plus the mediation team seem to have done little to engage ordinary 
people and community leaders in the peace process, and as such, there was limited 
opportunity for building peace from below (Lederach, 1997:45; Ramsbotham 
2005:215). 
 
1.3.9 The Conflict Resolution Model Adopted in the Juba Peace Process
Violent conflict has a significant negative impact on economic and social development and 
frustrates the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Igwe, 2011). As a 
result of conflict, both local and national economies are negatively affected (World Bank, 
2002). Burton (1988) suggests that an analysis of conflict requires a study of human 
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In Northern Uganda, real peace remains elusive, as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
remains active in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic 
(CAR) and the new nation of South Sudan (Conciliation Resources, 2013). Further, the 
structural impediments to lasting peace and stability in Northern Uganda have yet to be 
addressed. The perception that peace has been attained when guns fall silent is misleading, 
since one would have only attained a relative peace or negative peace (Fisher & Keashly, 
1991). To resolve violent conflicts, several peacemaking and conflict resolution processes 
have to be undertaken, ranging from informal to formal ones. While informal conflict 
resolution  processes have tended to be more participatory and inclusive, formal ones have 
predominantly been elitist, involving mainly high-level representatives and often excluding 
civil society and ordinary citizens (Botes & Van Rensburg, 2000:43). Supporters of the 
informal approaches claim that indigenous approaches to peacemaking are participatory and 
relationship-focused and that the peaceful outcomes are more sustainable since they have a 
higher degree of community adherence than template-styled western-oriented peacemaking 
(Mac Ginty, 2008:139-140). 
 
Proponents of the formal approach to intervention in a conflict situation have particularly 
advocated for mediation, which was the dominant approach used during the Juba peace 
talks19 aimed at resolving the conflict in Northern Uganda. As a strategy for conflict 
resolution, mediation has received growing recognition over the years (Fisher & Keashly, 
1991:29). In particular, third party intervention involves interventions by credible and 
competent intermediaries who assist the parties in working towards a negotiated settlement 
on substantive issues through persuasion, the control of information, the suggestion of 
alternatives, and in some cases, the application of leverage (Fisher & Keashly, 1991:30). Also 
gaining prominence in theory and practice is Bloomfield’s complementarity approach to 
conflict management (1995) which has emerged as a viable, yet still contested model in the 
field of conflict studies and in practice. The mediation approach places emphasis on the direct 
involvement of conflicting parties themselves as they attempt to resolve their conflict. It is 
clear that different mediation models can be used in tandem if need be and that innovative 
                                                 
19 The talks are popularly called the Juba Peace Talks because they were held in Juba, the capital of South 
Sudan. 
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strategies that are inclusive and culturally sensitive would be more acceptable to the parties 
concerned. 
 
Bloomfield’s complementarity approach to conflict management is viewed as an effective 
strategy of addressing internal conflicts where major actors are relatively well known and 
familiar with each other, and where the issues at the centre of the dispute are clearly known 
by the parties (Bloomfield, 1995:152). Bloomfield seems to build on the views of Fisher and 
Keashly (1991) who advocate for ‘an eclectic’ or contingency model of third party 
intervention. In Northern Uganda, the application of a particular mediation model during the 
Juba peace process was instrumental in fostering peace and stability in the region, and both 
approaches were applied more or less simultaneously, with some positive results. The major 
parties to the conflict – the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the LRA rebels – were already 
known to one another, they were mutually aware of the magnitude of the problem they were 
trying to solve, and they seemed to have mutual knowledge of the intended outcome of the 
peace process, although they needed an external, mutually agreed-upon facilitator to steer 
them towards that destination (Bloomfield, 1995:153). 
 
Before engaging an external facilitator (mediator), representatives of both parties held 
informal, secret meetings and agreed on issues to bring to the agenda once the formal peace 
talks began; this appears to have constituted what Stein (cited in Fisher & Keashly, 1991:37) 
describes as pre-negotiation.20 These ‘behind-the-scenes’ consultations were helpful in 
dealing with some of the substantive and problematic issues, as well as the high levels of 
miscommunication and mistrust that existed between the parties before formal negotiations 
went into the public domain. There was mutual complementarity between mediation and 
consultation at different levels, notably between the key parties to the conflict, and between 
states that had a high stake in the LRA insurgency, such as Sudan, United States of America 
(USA), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and others. At the pre-negotiation stage, 
there was involvement of both the elite and the middle-range actors, particularly influential 
and respected religious and cultural leaders (Lederach, 1997:44-45). As a result of the 
confidence built between representatives of the key parties to the conflict and the middle 
                                                 
20 Pre-negotiation is defined as the process that begins when one or more parties consider negotiation as an 
option and communicate this intention to other parties; pre-negotiation ends when one party abandons 
negotiation as a policy option or when the parties agree to formal negotiations (Stein, cited in Fisher & Keashly, 
1991:37). 
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range actors, the key parties to the conflict retained these  ‘middle –range actors’  and 
involved them in the formal peace talks. 
 
The relative success of the mediation process can be partly attributed to this approach, which 
is in line with ideas of Prein (cited in Fisher & Keashly, 1991:33). Appropriate third party 
intervention, by the mediator and other influential personalities, such as the Paramount Chief 
of the Acholi people, also occurred whenever hostilities escalated intermittently, or whenever 
the peace talks threatened to break down, or when there was a stalemate. These actions and 
processes reflect aspects of the contingency approach advocated by Fisher and Keashly 
(1991:36). On this basis, it can be said that the Northern Uganda conflict resolution process, 
particularly the Juba peace talks, was a classic example of third party international mediation 
and consultation. 
 
Both the GoU and the LRA were under pressure – from victims and survivors, as well as 
from the international community – to end the conflict. Although they later engaged a 
mediator, they took responsibility for the outcome of the peace process; this is keeping with 
Bloomfield’s (1995:152) assertion that conflicting parties will cooperate to redefine their 
conflict and find an integrative solution. It can also be said the Northern Ugandan peace 
process was based on the complementarity model, where both negotiation and facilitation 
were concurrently applied and where a range of actors were drawn in, albeit on a selective 
basis. Nevertheless, the grassroots were not extensively engaged in this process. 
 
1.3.10 Indigenous Conflict resolution and peace building practices 
Endogenous conflict resolution mechanisms refer to those methods that exist within a 
particular cultural context for dealing with disputes and exist in every community in Africa, 
Asia, Europe and the Americas (Jacobs, 2005; Mutisi, 2009). In Uganda, there are several 
indigenous methods of dispute resolution; they include Mato Oput of the Acholi, Kayo Cuk 
of the Langi, Ailuc of the Iteso, Ajupe of the Kakwa, Ajufe of the Lugbara, Aja of the Alur, 
and the ToluKoka of the Madi, among others. Across Africa, similar traditional justice 
mechanisms include Inkundla in South Africa, Gacaca in Rwanda21, Magambo in 
                                                 
21
 Gacaca is a traditional mechanism of conflict resolution originally practiced among the Banyarwanda, who 
use it to resolve disputes at the grassroots level through dialogue and a community justice system (Mutisi, 
2009:17). 
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Mozambique, the gadaa22 system for the Oromo people of Ethiopia, the guuirt23 system of 
Somaliland and Bashingantahe in Burundi (Ogora, 2009:1; Mutisi, 2009). In this regard, 
Zartman (2000) asserts that conflict resolution mechanisms can only be labelled endogenous 
if they have been practiced for an extended period and have evolved within African societies 
rather than being the product of external exportation. In contrast to the more formalistic and 
legalistic conventional peacemaking approaches, traditional and indigenous methods tend to 
focus on consensus decision making, a restoration of human and resource balance, and 
compensation or gift exchange designed to ensure reciprocal and ongoing harmonious 
relations between groups (Mac Ginty, 2008:144). To this end, Lederach (1995) asserts that 
endogenous methods of healing and reconciliation are based on the premise that 
understanding conflict and developing appropriate models of handling it will necessarily be 
rooted in, and must respect and draw from, the cultural knowledge of a people. 
 
Many indigenous conflict resolution and peace building mechanisms use local actors and 
traditional community-based judicial and legal decision-making mechanisms to manage and 
resolve conflicts within or between communities. Local mechanisms aim to resolve conflicts 
without resorting to state-run judicial systems, police, or other external structures (Ogora, 
2009). In many parts of Africa, and Acholi in particular, indigenous mechanisms of conflict 
resolution are used to resolve community disputes before they escalate to large-scale violence 
or to prevent a resumption of violence after a period of calm. 
 
In some cases, however, indigenous forms of mediation and legal sanctioning often appear in 
the aftermath of widespread conflict when no other mechanisms for social regulation exist or 
when existing ones are either inadequate or when they are biased. In most cases, indigenous 
conflict resolution mechanisms are effective in dealing with interpersonal or inter-community 
conflicts. This approach has been used at the grassroots level to settle disputes over land, 
water, grazing-land rights, fishing rights, marital problems, inheritance, ownership rights, 
                                                 
22
 The Gadaa is a system of age-grade classes that succeed each other in assuming political and social 
responsibilities. A complete gadaa cycle consists of five age grades. The authority held by elders is derived from 
their position in the gadaa system. 
 
23
 The guuirt is the highest-level council of elders in Somaliland and the highest traditional authority. Each 
council consists of a body of elders who represent the lineages in the clan and is headed by clan leaders, or 
Sultans. 
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murder, bride-price, cattle raiding, theft, rape, banditry, and inter-ethnic and religious 
conflicts (Wasonga, 2009: Mutisi, 2009). 
 
Conflict management mediators from the local community are generally more sensitive to 
local needs than outsiders and are immersed in the culture of the violence-afflicted 
community. Their activities are rooted in the context of the conflict, address some of its 
immediate causes, and can bring long-term solutions. They can draw people away from the 
conflict, breaking its momentum. Thus, many communities perceive conflict resolution 
activities directed by outsiders as intrusive and unresponsive to indigenous concepts of 
justice, and therefore prefer to resolve conflicts within their own community (Lederach, 
1997). 
 
Indigenous conflict management and resolution mechanisms aim to resolve conflicts locally, 
preceding or replacing external dispute resolution and thereby reducing reliance on external 
structures. Traditional mediation helps the community keep control over the outcome of the 
dispute. Implementing this approach does not require sophisticated party structures or 
expensive campaigns; it provides a low-cost, empowering means of resolving conflicts within 
a relatively short timeframe. Mac Ginty (2008:151) nonetheless contends that it is not wise to 
rely exclusively on traditional methods of conflict resolution as these may reinforce the 
authority of those who hold the power whilst at the same time imposing social/cultural 
conformities that may in itself be violent. 
 
Indigenous conflict resolution and peace building strategies need to be understood in its 
proper context. For example, in the Acholi language, the word mato means ‘drinking’ and 
oput is a type of tree with bitter herbs. Hence mato-oput literally means ‘drinking of bitter 
herb’ made from leaves of oput tree. The drinking of the bitter herbs symbolically means that 
the two conflicting parties accept the bitterness of the past and promise never to taste such 
bitterness again (Wasonga, 2009:33). As a practice, mato-oput is a process requiring the 
participation not only of the victims and the perpetrator’s communities, in restoring a broken 
relationship caused by an intentional murder or accidental killing (Liu Institute for Global 
Issues, Gulu District NGO Forum and Ker Kwaro Acholi, cited in Wasonga, 2009:33). 
 
Traditionally, the offender’s community was required to pay ten heads of cattle for an 
unintentional murder. Compensation could also be done by taking a human being in exchange 
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if it was proved that the murder had been a deliberate act. Then in such a case, the offender’s 
community would be required to give one of their young daughters to the victim’s 
community. Culturally acceptable compensatory practices could foster reconciliation between 
the two parties and bring them together again (Wasonga, 2009:34). However, from a human 
rights perspective, the surrendering of a young female as compensation could be considered 
as a gross violation of that child’s tights since she is being given as ransom for the offender’s 
community and has to pay the price for the notion of ‘collective responsibility”. To the 
Acholi, however, such compensation is not a punitive measure, but part of a process for 
healing and re-enhancement of life within the community (Wasonga, 2009:35). 
 
The Acholi people also believe in Jok, the divine spirit of ancestors who guide the Acholi 
moral order. When a wrong is committed, the ancestors send cen, the spirit of the dead person 
in the form of misfortune, unless the elders and the offender take appropriate action to restore 
the broken relations (Liu Institute for Global Issues, Gulu District NGO Forum & Ker Kwaro 
Acholi, cited in Wasonga, 2009:32). In terms of family and cultural practices, the Acholi are 
known for the traditional concept Kaka. Kaka is a patriarchal lineage of close relatives, 
especially those related through the maternal side. Among the modern-day Acholi, the Kaka 
identity is an enormously important symbol around which loyalty revolves. Kaka is used to 
establish who is to be trusted and who is not. Kaka is known for its powerful socio-political 
and ideological utility in bringing together Acholi clans, families and kins that are spread all 
over Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. 
 
Kaka is a powerful and influential organisational and mobilisational framework for Acholi 
activism, hence a potentially powerful forum for conflict prevention, although its potential 
was not maximised during the Juba peace process. The Kaka concept is not exclusively used 
by the Luo speaking Acholi; but it is used by other tribes such as the Madi of Northern 
Uganda. Kaka could be seen to be a much older form of ethnic grouping that predates the 
notion of a tribe (Atkinson, 1996:475). 
 
According to advocates of traditional methods, the Acholi community interprets punishment 
more broadly. In traditional Acholi society, shame, mockery, jeering, social rejection and 
compensation are adequate forms of punishment. The nature and practice of mato-oput as an 
instrument for conflict resolution and reconciliation among the traditional Acholi are based 
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on the Acholi’s understanding of conflict as a life-threatening phenomenon (Wasonga, 
2009:31). 
 
At the global level, the relevance of endogenous approaches to post-conflict reconciliation is 
now widely recognized. The inadequacy of eurocentric and other western models to 
effectively address healing requirements within societies in Africa is increasingly evident. 
For example, endogenous Gacaca courts24 were revived in post-genocide Rwanda to promote 
peace, justice and reconciliation as well as to end a culture of impunity while promoting 
accountability (Mutisi, 2009:17). However, critics of endogenous approaches assert that these 
methods are neither completely adequate nor practical in advancing healing and post-conflict 
reconstruction (Mutisi, 2009:17). Indigenous approaches, especially in Africa, are very much 
patriarchical with a strong gender bias resulting in women being excluded from most decision 
making structures. In particular, critics of the Gacaca court system argue that in its pre-
colonial form, the system was used to moderate particular disputes concerning land user 
rights, cattle ownership, marriage, inheritance rights, and petty theft, among other 
interpersonal disagreements but could not deal effectively with bigger crimes and mass 
murder (Werchick, 2001). In fact, more serious crimes, that is, those involving perpetrators 
with responsibility for organising and executing genocide-related atrocities, are processed 
through the formal judicial system (Mutisi, 2009:20). On the other hand, the proponents of 
Gacaca courts argue that endogenous methods represent a model for alternative or restorative 
justice that fosters healing and reconciliation. Also, a key advantage of the Gacaca system is 
that it has given the people in Rwanda an opportunity to talk about Genocide, and in so 
doing, the system offers a visible form of justice in which community members have a voice 
and opportunity to participate in solving their country’s problems (Mutisi, 2009). 
 
In many societies, traditionally mediated resolutions are generally accepted and respected by 
all concerned parties. However, documentation on the effectiveness of grassroots conflict 
prevention mechanisms is inconsistent, yet indicates that indigenous mediation may be 
powerless to address some of a conflict’s root causes—centrally-instigated conflict, predatory 
behaviour linked to exploiting the community for economic advantage and external meddling 
(Mutisi, 2009). 
                                                 
24
 Gacaca is a distinctly traditional Rwandan practice although it has been instrumentalized and infused with 
some European-based ideas about justice. 
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Indigenous mediators often bring important social influence but may lack the power and the 
means to enforce the resolutions adopted. Advice is only accepted when both parties agree to 
it, and both parties must feel their concerns were properly addressed. The power of traditional 
structures to prevent the re-occurrence of violence may in some cases be rather limited. It 
could thus be argued that complementary/integrated approaches that are culturally sensitive 
and which incorporate facets of the formal justice system could lead to better and more 
sustainable peace settlements. In the final analysis one is searching for a ’just peace’ that 
balances both human and cultural rights. 
 
1.3.11 Explaining the Continuity of the War 
The continuity of the war in Northern Uganda for more than two decades leaves more 
unanswered questions. For example, a study by Dolan (2005) sought to explain why the war 
continues, despite all the efforts of local, national and international actors. A similar question 
is raised by Branch (2005:2): 
 
First, why has the Ugandan government been unable or unwilling to end the war for 
nineteen years? Second, why has the LRA chosen to use extreme violence against the 
Acholi instead of trying to build popular support? 
 
Some analysts have attributed the government’s failure to end the war not to apathy but to 
intention, to the fact that the government has been unwilling to end the war, partly because it 
serves the interests of various factions within the Ugandan government and military. 
Consequently, it is argued that both the Ugandan government and the military have political 
and economic interests in maintaining the conflict (Branch, 2005:2-3). In addition, the LRA 
continues the conflict too, because it serves as a profit-making enterprise for those involved, 
and certainly, the LRA’s primary source of survival is through looting (Vinci, 2007:343). 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that the LRA has three pertinent concerns that contribute to the 
prolongation of the war: mistrust of the GoU; fear of retribution and revenge for atrocities 
against the Acholi population, which leads to uncertainty about their safety and security if 
they were to end the rebellion; fear of ceasing the rebellion, which has been their way of life 
for more than two decades; and uncertainty with regard to the rebel group’s economic future 
(Vinci, 2007:345-347). These justifications have been identified and documented in similar 
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conflict contexts, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone where, during their civil wars, 
youth joined the rebel military units for excitement, money, loot, sex slaves and bribes (Boas, 
2004:212). Other explanations for the failure to end the war include low capacity and training 
of the Ugandan military; low morale of the Ugandan military; corruption; involvement in 
regional conflicts (such as DRC, Somalia, Sudan); the Sudan factor (Sudan being a major 
external factor in the war); and apathy and government’s unwillingness to end the war 
(Branch, 2005:2-3). 
 
Furthermore, military incompetence and corruption, the army’s economic interests, the 
government’s political interests, and American and European interests have all converged to 
create a situation in which this war has been maintained. All the parties with political or 
economic power have aligned themselves so that the continuation of the war either serves 
their purposes or at least does them no significant damage (Branch, 2005:3). 
 
The LRA still continues its reign of terror and its motivations for not only continuing, but 
actually spreading the conflict must be explained now more than ever.25 In understanding the 
precise motivations behind the conflict, one may be able to gain some insight as to why 
negotiations continue to fail and what it will take to end this conflict (Vinci, 2007:337). 
 
1.3.12 Prospects for Peaceful Conflict Resolution 
Over the years, a number of peace talks and negotiated settlements have been attempted 
between the GoU and the LRA. These include the Pece Stadium Accord of 1988, the Addis 
Ababa Accord of 1990, and a series of peace talks in 1994, all of which failed (Quinn, 2009). 
Talks held in 2005 under chief negotiator, Betty Bigombe, were also forced to stop. All such 
efforts undertaken over the years have broken down (Quinn, 2009:59). Further, because Kony 
and his top commanders have been largely absent from the talks, there is speculation that they 
have little to do with the talks at all, although it was Kony who led the delegation on 
rapprochement (Integrated Regional Information Networks [IRIN], 2006a). As many of the 
LRA peace team members do not live in Uganda, it is debatable whether they even have the 
influence to negotiate on behalf of the LRA leadership in the bush (BBC, 2007). In the rigidly 
hierarchical LRA, Joseph Kony is the key to a peace deal, and efforts to engage him must be 
                                                 
25
 Following their defeat in Northern Uganda, the LRA rebels shifted “the theatre of war” to ‘stateless’ areas in 
CAR, DRC, Chad and South Sudan, effectively creating a regional crisis. 
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enhanced (Cawthorne, 2007). The Ugandan government has long articulated the position that 
what is needed is a direct deal with Kony (Akec, 2007). When Kony approached the GoU 
about ending the conflict, President Museveni issued a two-month ultimatum to the LRA ‘to 
peacefully end terrorism’ or face a combined force of Ugandan and southern Sudanese troops 
(IRIN, 2006b). A further statement issued by the government indicated that, if Kony were to 
become serious about a peaceful settlement, the government would guarantee him safety. 
 
Several attempts have been made to end the conflict, either militarily or through dialogue. 
Military actions, such as Operation North in 1991, and Operation Iron Fist (OIF) I and II in 
2002 and 2004 respectively have failed to weaken the LRA significantly (Pham & Vinck, 
2010:3). Operation Iron Fist in 2002 was one of GoU’s most severe responses. More than 
10,000 Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) soldiers reportedly participated in large-
scale raids against the LRA, which resulted in many more displacements and abductions 
(Somerville, 2007). Yet, the conflict in Northern Uganda remains unresolved (Quinn, 
2009:59).Because of these and other previous military failures, stakeholders called upon the 
conflicting parties to opt for non-military and non-violent measures for ending the conflict. 
This is when the Juba peace process was initiated. The peace process26 started in July 2006 
and ended in April 2008. It was widely seen by many stakeholders as the best hope for a 
peaceful and negotiated settlement of the 21-year-old conflict in Northern Uganda. Although 
this process ended without signatures on the Final Peace Agreement (FPA), it is still credited 
for the relative peace and calm that has prevailed in Northern Uganda for more than five 
years now. 
 
Following a cessation of hostilities agreement signed in Juba in August 2006 between the 
GoU and the LRA to give way for mutually trusted peace talks, there has been relative calm 
and stability in Northern Uganda. The absence of direct hostilities has provided an 
opportunity for peaceful resolution of the conflict and also given the conflict-affected 
population an opportunity to return to their communities to rebuild their lives. Both the state 
and non-state actors have created an enabling security and political environment to undertake 
initiatives that will contribute to post-war recovery and long-term reconciliation. Religious 
                                                 
26 The talks were based on a 5-point agenda: (1) Cessation of hostilities and the LRA assembly at designated 
points in Sudan; (2) Comprehensive solutions to the conflict and tackling the root causes of the conflict; (3) 
Accountability and Reconciliation; (4) a Formal Ceasefire Agreement; and (5) Demobilisation, Disarmament 
and Reintegration (DDR). 
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and cultural leaders, and indeed other CSOs, have entered into partnerships with government 
and development agencies to embark on peace-building initiatives that are expected to 
transform the lives of the war-affected communities. 
 
As of April 2008, however, it became clear that the LRA rebels had suspended their 
participation in the peace talks, citing the ICC indictments as the major obstacle. In this 
connection, scholars such as Pham & Vinck (2010:9) agree that, although the ICC arrest 
warrants for Joseph Kony and his commanders remain to be executed, the involvement of the 
court has been controversial. However, supporters of the ICC involvement argue that the 
court’s involvement placed pressure on the LRA to seek a negotiated settlement. Schomerus 
(2007:39) asserts that a comprehensive peace deal can only be signed if there is a solution to 
the problem of the ICC arrest warrants – one that satisfies all the parties to the peace talks as 
well as the ICC. 
 
Following the inconclusive peace talks, which ended without the Final Peace Agreement 
(FPA) being signed, the LRA rebels established new bases in the DRC. From there, the LRA 
has dispersed into multiple smaller groups; in the interim, they have brutally murdered at 
least 1,500 civilians and abducted at least 1,600 people, many of them children (Branch, 
2005). LRA violence has often targeted churches, schools and markets, and includes the 
massacre of over 300 Congolese civilians in an attack in December 2009. Following these 
attacks, the Ugandan military launched “Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT)”, a military 
campaign against the LRA rebels in the DRC. This campaign was carried out with logistical 
and technical support from the US government, and in partnership with armed forces of the 
DRC, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). 
 
1.3.13 International Strategies to address the LRA Conflict 
Following the failure to apprehend the LRA officials indicted by the ICC, several 
international stakeholders, particularly the GoU and the US government, have put in place 
measures to prevent the LRA from wrecking more havoc on civilians in the CAR and 
neighbouring countries. In Uganda, Parliament passed the ICC Act on 9 March 2011 to make 
provision in Uganda’s law for the punishment of the international crimes covered by the 
Rome Statute, that is, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Pham & Vinck, 
2010:9). On its part, the US government in May 2009 enacted the LRA Disarmament and 
Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-172 of 24 May 2010). The 
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legislation crystallizes the commitment of the US to help end the brutality and destruction 
that have been a hallmark of the LRA across several countries for two decades, and to pursue 
a future of greater security and hope for the people of central Africa (United States 
Government, 2010). 
 
The law aims to protect civilians from the LRA, to apprehend or remove Joseph Kony (the 
LRA leader) and his top commanders from the battlefield in the continued absence of a 
negotiated solution, and to disarm and demobilize the remaining LRA fighters. It also 
requires the US government to develop a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to protect 
civilians in central Africa from LRA attacks and take steps to stop the rebel group’s violence 
permanently. Furthermore, the law commits the US government to increasing humanitarian 
assistance to countries currently affected by LRA violence, and to supporting economic 
recovery and transitional justice efforts in Uganda. 
 
The law also aims to help secure a lasting peace in Uganda by increasing assistance to war-
affected communities in Northern Uganda and supporting initiatives to help resolve 
longstanding divisions between Uganda’s North and South (United States Government, 
2010). It also seeks to increase funding for transitional justice initiatives and calls on the GoU 
to reinvigorate its commitment to a transparent and accountable reconstruction process in 
war-affected areas. 
 
The law reiterates US policy and commitment to work toward a comprehensive and lasting 
resolution to the conflict in Northern Uganda and other affected areas, including north-
eastern DRC, South Sudan, and CAR. This will be done in partnership with regional 
governments and multilateral efforts. The law commends the GoU for its efforts to stabilize 
the northern part of the country, for actively supporting transitional and development 
assistance, and for pursuing reintegration programs for those who surrender and escape from 
the LRA ranks (United States Government, 2010). Nevertheless, much remains to be done to 
promote sustainable peace, social reconstruction, and development in Northern Uganda 
(Pham & Vinck, 2010:7). 
 
1.3.14 Post-conflict Characteristics of Northern Uganda 
To a limited extent, Northern Uganda may be categorised as a post-conflict area. Barakat 
(2005:10) identifies a number of attributes that characterize post-conflict areas; these include 
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destruction of physical infrastructure, lack of financial institutions, lack of material and 
human resources, institutional fragility27, destruction of relationships, political volatility and 
psycho-social trauma. Such a context is further marked by dependence on relief and the 
absence of security. The GoU has identified several challenges affecting Northern Uganda; 
these include the re-establishment of public and social services (such as government 
administrative services, education, judicial services and healthcare) and the establishment or 
revitalization of essential infrastructure (such as water sources, roads, schools, health centres 
and administration structures) (GoU, 2007). 
 
In addition, the resettlement of IDPs, the restoration of their livelihoods, the removal of the 
threat of explosive remnants of war (ERW), healing the physical and psychological wounds 
of people affected by conflict (especially women and children who were abducted, raped, 
beaten, and traumatized through forced brutalities) by revamping the economy so that war-
affected people can become productive again, and just as importantly, the restoration of law 
and order, are some of the urgent reconstruction tasks. Other tasks ahead include improving 
the capacity28 of state institutions so that they can deliver services, and enhancing the 
accountability29 of the state. 
 
                                                 
27 Fragility refers to periods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to 
mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to 
violence. Research for the Report reinforces the close link between institutional fragility and the risk of conflict 
(World Bank, 2011:XVI). 
28 Capacity refers to the ability of institutions to carry out their core functions efficiently and effectively. When 
states lack this capacity, they cannot mitigate stresses that might induce organized violence (World Bank, 
2011:XVI). 
29 Accountability refers to the ability of institutions to be responsive to citizens, including abiding by their 
aggregated preferences, disclosing necessary information, permitting citizen participation in decision-making, 
and allowing for citizen sanction of public officials on the basis of publicly recognized norms and procedures 
(World Bank, 2011:XVI). 
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Figure 3: Post-Conflict Characteristics of Northern Uganda 
 Poor infrastructure (health, education, roads) 
 Erosion of cultural norms and values 
 High unemployment rates 
 Weak or non-existent state institutions 
 High dependence ratio 
 High prevalence of STIs, incl. HIV 
 Low literacy rates 
 High fertility rate 
 High crime rate 
 Environmental destruction 
 High number of orphans and vulnerable children 
 High prevalence of psycho-social problems 
 Low productivity 
 Declining health standards 
Source: (GoU, 2007) 
 
In order to address the challenges above, the GoU designed the Peace, Recovery and 
Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) to support political dialogue, address 
conflict, and promote growth and prosperity by reversing the declining welfare of the 
population. In addition, the PRDP is intended to address political, security and development 
concerns while continuing to mobilise resources to fill gaps in response to the conflict (GoU, 
2007:IX). 
 
This research was carried out on respondents from the Acholi people and the following 
section provides a brief overview of this grouping. 
 
1.4 Section Synopsis 
This section provided an overview of the Ugandan context, the Northern Ugandan conflict, 
the Juba Peace process and the conflict resolution model that was adopted. The following 
section will discuss the nature of the specific research problem. 
 
1.5 The Nature of the Research Problem 
This section presents the nature of the research problem; the disciplinary framework of the 
study; the research topic; research questions; research objectives; assumptions; significance 
of the study; scope of the study; clarification of key concepts, reflexivity and a brief outline 
of the research report. 
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1.5.1 Disciplinary Framework of the Study: Social Development 
This study is located within the broader social development domain, which includes the 
influence of macro level systems on micro level behaviours and adaptive capacities of 
communities. The theoretical/conceptual framework of this study spans community 
participation, human needs, conflict resolution, peace processes, the participation of 
community members  in peacemaking processes, indigenous methods of conflict resolution as 
well as policy frameworks relevant to the  protection and promotion of the rights of IDPs and 
other people affected by violent conflict. While this study may be of significant interest to 
scholars and practitioners in the field of community development, social policy, and conflict 
resolution, it lies conceptually in the sphere of social development whilst at the same time 
incorporating transdisciplinary models and frameworks from the fields of conflict resolution 
and development. 
 
1.5.2 The Research Topic 
This research was aimed at analysing the nature and level of community participation in the 
conflict resolution process as a strategy for resolving the conflict in Northern Uganda, and to 
assess whether community participation can lead to sustainable peace. Hence the topic of the 
study can be summarized as: 
 
“Sustaining the peace in Northern Uganda: Exploring the potential for 
community participation in conflict resolution processes” 
 
1.5.3 Main Research Questions 
1. Who were the major participants and actors in the peace process? 
2. What are the capacities, potential and opportunities of community members that will 
allow them to participate meaningfully in conflict resolution processes? 
3. What was the nature and level of community participation in the Northern Uganda 
conflict resolution processes? 
4. How appropriate were the mechanisms for engaging conflict-affected communities? 
5. What traditional mechanisms are already in use by the conflict-affected communities? 
 
1.5.4 Objectives of the Study 
1. To identify the perceptions of communities and KIs about the major participants and 
actors in the Northern Uganda peace process. 
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2. To explore the perceptions of communities and KIs regarding their capacities, 
opportunities and potential to participate meaningfully in conflict resolution, given 
their capacities and resources. 
3. To establish the perceptions of communities and KIs about the nature and level of 
community participation in the conflict resolution process in Northern Uganda. 
4. To investigate the perceptions of communities and KIs about the appropriateness of 
mechanisms for engaging conflict-affected communities in conflict resolution. 
5. To find out the perceptions of communities and KIs about the traditional mechanisms 
that are already in use by the conflict-affected communities. 
 
1.5.5 Central Assumptions of this Study 
Some of the central assumptions that underpin this study are: 
1. Peace deals are mostly, if not always, brokered by those in power (elite). 
2. There exist opportunities, resources and potential within and among the conflict-
affected communities to contribute to efforts for resolving the conflict in Northern 
Uganda. 
3. The mechanisms and channels for engaging conflict-affected communities in the 
conflict resolution process were inadequate. 
4. Conflict-affected communities are seldom effectively involved in the conflict 
resolution process. The major actors during the Juba peace process did not effectively 
represent the ordinary conflict-affected communities. 
5. The impediments preventing conflict-affected communities from participating in the 
conflict resolution process could have been due to their own lack of capacity as well 
as structural, institutional, socio-cultural, logistical, economic and political barriers. 
6. The political and security constraints in Northern Uganda hampered conflict-affected 
communities from applying indigenous approaches to conflict resolution. 
7. During peacemaking processes, cognizance is rarely taken of local and traditional 
mechanisms for conflict resolution. 
 
1.5.6 Significance of the Study 
There have not been many studies focusing on community participation. Earlier studies on 
the conflict in Northern Uganda (Dolan, 2005; Branch, 2005; Vinci, 2007; Oxfam 
International, 2007) have sought to understand the history and nature of the conflict, why it 
has eluded resolution for more than two decades now, and what role, if any, the conflict-
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affected communities have played in its resolution. Most of these studies, though, have 
focused on processes of establishing mechanisms for justice for the war-affected population. 
 
The study by Dolan (2005) sought to explain why the war continues, and suggested that while 
the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) bear the greater 
responsibility for the situation, international organizations, donor governments, multilateral 
organizations, academics, churches and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are also 
perpetrators and complicit bystanders, largely because of their inadequate actions to resolve 
the conflict. The Oxfam International study (2007), in contrast, solicited views of IDPs 
regarding the Juba peace negotiations, and established that the views of the communities 
directly affected by the conflict were not adequately reflected during the peace process. The 
study thus sought to give voice to the people of Northern Uganda in order to help identify 
building blocks to a just and lasting peace. The studies by Vinci (2007) and Branch (2005) 
emphasised the reasons for failure to end the conflict, and the probable motivations for its 
continuity.  
 
As a departure from these studies, this present study explored the potential of conflict-
affected communities to participate in conflict resolution processes. It addressed issues of 
structures and mechanisms that were available for engaging these communities in conflict 
resolution with a view to enhancing prospects for durable and sustainable peace. It did not 
consider the participation of CSOs or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the conflict 
resolution process, as has been done by other studies in this field, but looked primarily at 
participation by ordinary citizens. 
 
Although this study was only conducted after the Juba peace process, and therefore could 
have missed the opportunity to observe community involvement in the process, that peace 
process marks a turning point in the history of Uganda, and Northern Uganda in particular. It 
is hoped that the findings of this study will play a role in consolidating the peace prevailing in 
Northern Uganda, and that it will influence more bottom-up community participatory 
processes of conflict resolution and peace building. Lastly, it hopes to provide evidence for 
greater community involvement in peace efforts so that a more sustainable peace can be had. 
Furthermore, it is hoped that greater recognition will be given to the value of indigenous 
conflict resolution processes. The findings could be used to influence policy with regards to 
grassroots decision making processes. 
41 
 
1.5.7 Scope of the Study 
The study investigated the potential for community participation in peacemaking and conflict 
resolution in Northern Uganda as a way of achieving sustainable peace. The study adopted a 
case study approach, focusing on the Acholi sub-region of Northern Uganda. At the time of 
the study, this sub-region comprised four districts (administrative units) – Gulu, Kitgum, 
Pader and Amuru, but during and after the study, three new districts were created; these are: 
Agago (carved out of Pader), Lamwo (carved out of Kitgum), and Nwoya (carved out of 
Amuru). 
 
The sample population from the four districts identified included ordinary citizens, many of 
whom participated in the focus group discussions (FGDs), as well as local leaders, CSO 
representatives, and cultural and religious leaders, who participated as key informants (KI). 
 
1.5.8 Clarification of Key Concepts 
Some key concepts will be clarified and further elaborated where necessary in the conceptual 
mapping of this study. 
 
 Elite (those who hold political power and can influence decisions) 
The elite consist of people who are able, through their positions in powerful organizations, to 
affect national political outcomes. They are a nation's top leadership in all sectors – political, 
governmental, business, trade union, military, media, religious, and intellectual (Field & 
Higley, cited in Burton & Higley, 1987:296). In this study, the concept of the elite is used to 
refer to those within the GoU; the leadership of the LRA and a relatively small dominant 
group within the Acholi society who have a privileged status. Furthermore this ‘elite status’ is 
extended to include local government officials, military personnel, members of parliament, 
cultural leaders and religious leaders, particularly those who directly participated in the peace 
process. 
 
 Conflict 
Conflict can be defined as a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive 
to acquire, at the same moment in time, an available set of indivisible scarce resources as a 
result of relative deprivations (Wallensteen, 2002:16). Conflict occurs when individuals or 
groups give high priority to defending their own interests or positions (Carment & James, 
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2002:205). It also occurs when individuals or groups of people pursue, or are perceived as 
pursuing, incompatible goals, and when there is a lack of compromise on the negotiable 
interests of conflicting parties, which are largely embedded in their needs. In this study, the 
concept of ‘conflict’ is used to refer to the violent armed conflict that led to violence at many 
levels in Northern Uganda. 
 
 Violence 
Violence can be defined as the act of harming others in the pursuit of one’s own interests 
(Kent, 1993:381). Kent identifies four categories of violence: physical violence, economic 
violence, political violence, and cultural violence. He argues that violence is a visible 
manifestation of covert conflict, and that conflict usually remains under the surface (Kent, 
1993:387). Similarly, Galtung (1996) contends that violence is direct, structural or cultural. 
He contends that direct violence involves direct physical attacks such as massacres, murder 
and abduction. Galtung (1996) describes structural violence as causing avoidable death 
through hunger, malnutrition, and lack of life-sustaining drugs in health units. He adds that 
cultural violence stems from assumptions that keep vulnerable groups of people such as 
refugees and IDPs ‘invisible’, resulting in further deprivation of their needs. 
 
 Conflict resolution 
Conflict resolution is defined as a multi-disciplinary, analytical, problem-solving approach to 
conflict that seeks to enable the participants to work collaboratively towards its resolution 
(Tillett, 1991:1).It is a process of attempting to solve a dispute (or conflict) that involves 
processes such as mediation, and that aims to create opportunities for meeting the needs of all 
parties to the conflict. The aim of such a process, then, is to find a win-win outcome as 
opposed to a win-lose situation. In view of the comprehensive nature of the process, it seeks 
to address and resolve deep-rooted sources of conflict. In this study, the concept is used to 
refer to the numerous attempts, by the GoU and CSOs, to end the 21-year old conflict in 
Northern Uganda. It refers to the entire process, but also to specific efforts to change the 
hostile attitudes and the hostile violent behaviours of the key actors, and to the strategies for 
changing the context and structure of the conflict in Northern Uganda. 
 
 Peace 
Munoz (cited in Young, 2010) recognizes peace as a constitutive and indissoluble element of 
social reality whose origins can be traced to the very beginning of humanity, and whose 
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evolution can be associated with the history of humanity. Galtung (1996) provides a typology 
of peace that includes positive peace and negative peace. Kent (1993:378-379) adds that 
‘peace’ is the absence of violence and not the absence of conflict. In other words, although 
peace in the absolute sense might not be achievable, working towards reduction of violence 
remains a meaningful objective. 
 
 Peace process 
A peace process is a political process in which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means. It 
requires a mixture of politics, diplomacy, changing relationships, negotiation, mediation, and 
dialogue in both official and unofficial arenas (Saunders, 1999). In this study, the concept is 
used to refer to all those formal and informal undertakings, between 1986 and 2008, aimed at 
peacefully ending the Northern Uganda conflict. The concept covers efforts by the GoU, 
efforts by CSOs, initiatives of religious leaders, attempts by cultural leaders, and most 
prominently, the Juba peace talks which included the LRA. 
 
 Community 
A community can be defined as a place in which people live (such as a village or city), or as a 
population group with similar characteristics (such as rural villagers or older people), or as a 
concern people share in common (such as religious freedom, status or women) (Doe & Khan, 
2004:361-362). It is a unit of society that allows individuals to take initiative and act 
collectively (Checkoway, 1995).In this study, the concept is used to refer to the diverse and 
heterogeneous members of the community in Acholi, including government officials, 
community workers, religious leaders, cultural leaders and ordinary citizens. 
 
 Community participation 
Community participation refers to the inclusion of a diverse range of stakeholders’ 
contributions in an on-going community development process, from the identification of 
problem areas to the development, implementation and management of strategic planning 
(Schafft & Greenwood, 2003:19). In this study, this concept is mainly used with reference to 
the participation of ordinary community members (mainly IDPs) in the search for peace in 
Northern Uganda. However, the participation of CSOs, religious leaders in different aspects 
of the conflict resolution process since 1986 have also been included. Thus, community 
participation for purposes of this study has been expanded to include both local community 
members as well as middle range leaders coming from civil society. 
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 Internal Displacement and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
The African Union (AU) defines internal displacement as the involuntary or forced 
movement, evacuation or relocation of persons or groups of persons within internationally 
recognized state borders (African Union [AU], 2009:3).The UN defines IDPs as persons or 
groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-
induced disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (GoU, 
2004a:X). The core participants in this study consisted mostly of internally displaced 
community members. 
 
 Civil society 
Civil society refers to the sum of institutions, organizations and individuals located between 
the family, the state and the market in which people associate voluntarily to advance common 
interests (Anheier & List, 2005:54). These institutions are brought together by shared 
interests and collective action, plus their desire to contribute to the smooth functioning of 
society. In this study, this concept is used to refer to non-state institutions that operated in 
Northern Uganda and contributed to the peace process. 
 
 Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
PTSD is an anxiety disorder that can occur after a person experiences a traumatic event, such 
as combat or similar military experience, sexual or physical abuse or assault, a serious 
accident, or a natural disaster, such as a fire, tornado, flood, or earthquake. The defining 
characteristic of a traumatic event is its capacity to provoke fear, helplessness, or horror in 
response to the threat of injury or death. People who are exposed to such events are at 
increased risk for PTSD as well as for major depression, panic disorder, generalized anxiety 
disorder, and substance abuse, as compared with those who have not experienced traumatic 
events. They may also have somatic symptoms and physical illnesses, particularly 
hypertension, asthma, and chronic pain syndromes (Yehuda, 2002:108). It can be assumed 
that most internally displaced persons have experienced some features of PTSD and have 
coped with their situation in various ways. 
 
The following section sets out the researcher’s background and potential impact on this study. 
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1.5.9 Reflexivity 
Reflexivity in research involves reflecting on the way in which research is carried out and 
understanding how the process of doing research shapes its outcomes (Hardyet al, 2001). 
Reflexivity has much to do with the impact of a researcher’s personal characteristics, and 
social, cultural, historical and situational influences on the research findings, interpretations 
and conclusions, since qualitative research depends on the personal characteristics of the 
researcher (Franz et al, 2002). 
 
The researcher (Ugandan) worked in a conflict context, including that of Northern Uganda as 
well as other geographical areas, for more than fifteen years. In part, his experiences with 
conflict-affected communities, particularly their exclusion and under-representation, are what 
inspired him to undertake this research. Nonetheless, he tried to balance this ‘insider’ 
passionate perspective with a high degree of objectivity during the research process. He is 
also   aware of the fact that the study respondents were victims of more than two decades of 
violent conflict, hence his awareness of the need to interview participants appropriately and 
sensitively. Thus, a key consideration was the use of research assistants so that the interview, 
particularly FGDs, could take place in the language of the participants. 
 
The researcher’s academic background in Peace and Conflict Studies was instrumental in 
guiding his actions, in building appropriate rapport with respondents before interviewing 
them, and in skilfully using research techniques that upheld beneficence and confidentiality at 
all costs. The aim was to avoid any harm (Anderson, 1999). 
 
1.5.10 Structure of the Research Report 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. 
 
 CHAPTER ONE: Introduction to the Ugandan context and to the research problem. 
 CHAPTER TWO: Conceptual mapping of the study. 
 CHAPTER THREE: Methodology. 
 CHAPTER FOUR: Presentation and discussion of findings.  
 CHAPTER FIVE: Summary of key findings, conclusions, recommendations and final 
comments. 
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The following chapter presents the conceptual mapping of the study, which is informed 
by relevant models and theoretical frameworks. 
CHAPTER TWO: 
 
2 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical underpinnings of the s
conceptual models and theoretical frameworks that are relevant to th
and frameworks are mostly drawn from the bro
field of conflict resolution. Five frameworks/mod
conflict dynamics (Azar, 1990; Fisher, 2001
(Max-Neef, 1991);the capability approach (Sen, 1999
1994);the pyramid of actors in 
participation (Arnstein, 1969)
the issues of exclusion and inclusion of citizens in the context of
displacement are also explored in this chapter. A review of the literature 
conceptual framework is closely 
 
Figure 4: A Conceptual 
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CONCEPTUAL MAPPING OF THE STUDY
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2.1 Theoretical Models and Frameworks 
A brief review of ethnicity and ethnic conflict will be undertaken to locate the Northern 
Uganda conflict discourse into academic and empirical debates regarding whether the conflict 
was ‘ethnic’ in nature or not, and the challenges of resolving that conflict without applying 
the ‘ethnic lens’ (Azar, 1990; Fisher, 2001; Aapengnuo, 2010). The exclusion/inclusion 
model (Gidley, 2010; Allan, 2003; Guilford, 2000) and Lederach’s pyramid (1997) will be 
discussed in relation to IDPs and their exclusion and possibilities for their inclusion in 
mainstream community life. This will be followed by a discussion of the fundamental needs 
of IDPs, which will be explored using the human needs framework as presented by Max-Neef 
(1991) and other related scholars (Azar, 1990; Maslow, 1954; Miall et al, 1999). Thereafter, 
Sen’s (1999) capability approach will be discussed in an integrated manner with the 
development paradigm, which will consider the ‘lack of freedoms’30experienced by IDPs in 
Northern Uganda. The human security framework (UN, 1994) will be reflected upon to show 
how the security debate has gone beyond state security interests and the physical security 
needs of citizens to cover economic, personal, political, community as well as environmental 
security – generally reflecting a significant shift of the security discourse to groups and 
communities. Finally, this review will introduce the concept of the ladder of citizen 
participation (Arnstein, 1969) to illustrate that, under ideal conditions, community members 
should have participated in the peace process in accordance with a set of hierarchical levels. 
This model has been significantly modified by Feingold (1977) and Charles and DeMaio 
(1993). 
 
2.1.1 Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies 
Peace building is aimed at developing and supporting structures that will assist with the post-
conflict reconstruction and development. Peacekeeping usually involves the cessation of 
violence and the peace is kept or enforced through peacekeeping agents, whilst peacemaking 
refers to the attempts at reaching a settlement (UN, 1995:46). If successful, peace keeping 
and peacemaking strengthen the opportunities for post-conflict peace building, which can 
prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and people. According to Bush (2004), 
peace building refers to two strategic goals, namely preventing a relapse into war or violence; 
                                                 
30
 According to Sen (1999), the term ‘unfreedoms’ refers to the absence of the basic fundamental freedoms, and 
that these ‘unfreedoms’ manifest in the form of  poverty, poor economic opportunities, systematic neglect and 
other aspects that leave people in poverty and with limited choices. 
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and creating a self-sustaining peace. Peace building is thus a framework for peace that 
addresses not only the various forms of physical violence, but also aspects of a society that 
are structurally violent, and could lead to a re-emergence of conflict. 
 
In order to prevent a relapse into war or violence and to develop a self-sustaining peace, the 
concept ‘post-conflict peace-building’ was coined. The concept became popular in the mid-
1990s following the release of the UN Secretary General’s report, Agenda for Peace, in 1992. 
However, more than two decades later, this notion of peace-building whilst vigorously 
advocated by the UN has also had much criticism levelled at it. In part, peace building is 
criticised for being ‘elitist’ and relying far too much on international agencies and expatriates, 
and doing little by way of tapping into the peace building potential of local and national 
institutions and structures (Mac Ginty, 2008). The conceptualisation and practice of peace 
building, particularly in transitional and post-conflict societies, has been driven by the 
dominant liberal peace agenda. In other words, the expectation is that after the war, the 
affected country needs to embrace democracy partly through holding regular, free and fair 
elections, need to promote, protect and observe human rights and, ensure that governance is 
based on the rule of law, upholding justice for all and facilitating market-oriented growth 
(Paris, 2010). Whilst some aspects of this liberal peace agenda may be appealing, not all 
countries want to buy into a purely market driven economy but are often forced to do so by 
liberal funding agendas.    
 
Those in favour argue that despite some of the critique, peace building has done more good 
than harm. Furthermore, those opposed to the exclusive use of conventional peace building 
approaches argue that those hosting peacekeeping missions may inadvertently subjugate a 
country’s peace building activities to be in line with their agendas (Paris, 2010:338).  Due to 
some of the negative outcomes on local communities and institutions, some peace building 
initiatives have been viewed as new forms of imperialism or colonialism (Mac Ginty and 
Chandler, cited in Paris, 2010:348). According to Bush (2004), the problem with ‘peace 
building’ is that almost any intervention (whether in the field of development, humanitarian 
aid, human rights, access to justice, deepening democracy or institutional capacity building) 
can be described as ‘peace building’. Therefore, it may not always be clear as to how one 
could meaningfully integrate indigenous methods of conflict resolution as well as indigenous 
peace-building approaches together with ‘modern'’ forms of justice/conflict settlement and/or 
peace building which may ideologically and culturally be diametrically opposed. 
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Nonetheless, several scholars (Francis, 2012; Cooper et al, 2011; Paris, 2010; Mac Ginty, 
2008; Chandler, 2006) agree that there can never be one single approach to peace building. In 
fact, they contend that there is need to blend traditional and conventional methods of peace 
building in order for peace to be owned and sustained by the communities and countries 
recovering from conflict. There is need for greater ownership of the peace building process 
by the communities affected by conflict. According to Paris (2010:343), there is also need for 
less intrusion by external actors so that the vast local peacemaking /peace building potential 
and resources of the communities that are directly affected may be maximised. The merger of 
traditional and modern peace building approaches would bring together multiple actors to 
play complementary roles through a multi-level partnership advocated by Lederach (1997). 
 
Lederach’s pyramid of actors and approaches to peace building (1997) helps to illustrate the 
roles that different actors could have in a peace process, and shows the position of grassroots 
citizenry in such processes. The pyramid of actors and approaches to peace building 
(Lederach, 1997) posits that, in the peacemaking process, there are usually three levels of 
actors: at the grassroots level, at the middle level and at the top level. Those at the grassroots 
level are community members/ordinary citizens while those at the middle level are usually 
middle-range actors such as religious/cultural/academic as well as NGO leaders who could 
link the community to the top-level actors. At the apex of the pyramid are top-level actors, 
typically military and political leaders, who usually represent the main protagonists, normally 
rebels and governments (Lederach, 1997:45). 
51 
 
Figure 5: The Pyramid of Actors and Approaches to Peace Building 
 
Source: based on Lederach (1997) 
 
Drawing on Lederach’s (1997) pyramid, it is clear that the focus of this study is at level 3. 
This research is concerned with whether or not community members in fact participated in 
the Juba peace process. Using the case study of Northern Uganda, the study recognised that 
community participation would only be possible if there were defined channels of 
communication and mechanisms that facilitated participation at the various levels. This is 
dependent on the nature and level of politics at play in a given community. Because most of 
the community members in Northern Uganda were internally displaced for more than two 
decades, they were vulnerable and disempowered by the conflict. Also, many of them were 
traumatized, disempowered and were unable to meet most of life’s basic needs. Nonetheless, 
it is possible that their first hand experiences could have provided invaluable insights for the 
peace process. At the same time, some community members may have considered such 
participation to be life threatening and dangerous to their livelihoods. 
 
Level 1: The elite political & military leaders 
usually negotiate the settlement, and declare 
the end of armed hostilities. 
Level 2: Religious leaders, NGOs, cultural 
leaders & academia represent the interests of 
Level 3 and can influence actors at Level 1. 
Level 3: Local community persons/leaders 
and local/indigenous community based 
organizations could play a key role at the 
grassroots level if they have the necessary 
skills. 
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In Northern Uganda, over 95% of the local population was internally displaced for most of 
the two decades of conflict. Although 98% of them have returned to their communities of 
origin, it is possible that many are struggling with the re-building of their homes, villages or 
dealing with trauma and the effects of long term exclusion/marginalization.  Their situation in 
IDP camps further constrained their ‘freedoms’ as well as impacting negatively on a whole 
range of capabilities (Sen, 1990). Furthermore, their basic needs and other human security 
needs are still inadequately provided for. 
 
However, the rich reserve of indigenous conflict resolution practices embedded in these 
communities, together with some efforts by CSOs at capacity building, could have made it 
possible for greater community level participation in the peace process as well as at other 
levels. Using the peace building model proposed by Lederach (1997) together with the ladder 
of participation’ (Arnstein, 1969), the author believes that these community members could 
have made a difference in the peace process leading to more sustainable outcomes. Positive 
outcomes have been experienced in other countries, particularly among women and youth 
groups affected by conflict, most notably in Burundi, Rwanda, South Africa, Northern 
Ireland, Palestine and Mozambique (Van Tongeren, 2005). 
 
2.1.2 Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict 
An ethnic conflict is an armed conflict between ethnic groups, and is caused mainly by 
secessionist tendencies, usually leading to the breakup of multi-ethnic communities or states 
being ruled or divided along ethnic lines (Fisher, 2001). Examples of ethnic conflicts include 
the Yugoslav wars, the first Chechen war, the Nagorno-Karabakh war, the Rwanda civil war, 
and the war in Darfur. Prominent scholars such as Azar (1990) and Fisher (2001) suggest that 
ethnic conflicts often lead to what has been termed “protracted social conflict”. Azar (1990) 
argues that communal groups may experience deep-seated cleavages based upon racial, 
religious, cultural or ethnic lines, with their main characteristic being continued hostility and 
sporadic outbreaks of violence. Azar (1990) adds that ethnic conflict is caused by the 
frustration of human needs for security, recognition, and distributive justice. 
 
Further, ethnic and identity-driven conflicts are the result of an underlying fear of extinction 
that is often a result of real or perceived vulnerability by particular ethnic groups who may 
have previously experienced persecution or discrimination, or perceived threats from the 
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domination of state machinery by a single ethnic group which denies other groups access to 
opportunities and services that satisfy their basic human needs (Azar, 1990; Fisher, 2001). 
 
Particularly in Africa, an ethnic group is the predominant means of social identity formation. 
Most ethnic groups in Africa coexist peacefully with high degrees of mixing through 
interethnic marriage, economic partnerships, and shared values (Aapengnuo, 2010). 
Nevertheless, there is a general perception that Africa is trapped in a never-ending cycle of 
ethnic conflict, and that it is this ethnicity that is responsible for the pervasive violent 
conflicts on the continent. Using examples of the Rwandan genocide, Darfur, northern 
Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and the violent aftermath of the controversial Kenyan elections, 
among other cases, analysts seem to substantiate the perception that actually African conflicts 
are largely ethnic-based. 
 
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including Sierra-Leone, Ivory Coast, Liberia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo have suffered major and extensive conflicts, many of which 
have been mostly between ethnic groups. However, because these conflicts have been 
between ethnic groups does not mean that they have been ‘ethnic’ in nature. According to 
Burton (1990), most ethnic conflicts in Africa are a result of ineffective state institutions that 
are unable to satisfy the human needs of their citizens, and not the aggressive nature of 
human beings as claimed.As such, the conflict in Northern Uganda may be described as one 
of those ethnic conflicts. Like in many multi-ethnic countries in African, there has been a 
tendency to violently compete for power, property, rights, jobs, education, development, 
investments and social services, hence there is a linkage between economic factors and ethnic 
conflict. 
 
Marginalisation and income disparities based on ethnicity can be viewed as a major cause of 
conflict (Brown, 1996). For example, in Uganda poverty statistics may seem to show some 
degree of marginalisation. Because the region was affected by conflict for more than two 
decades, poverty levels are inevitably the highest in the country; they stood at 46% in 2010. 
This is compared to 24%, 22% and 11% for Eastern, Western and Central Uganda 
respectively (GoU, 2012a). From the statistics, it would appear that the north-south divide 
which works against Northern Uganda is responsible for this imbalance. As a result, the 
conflict has become increasingly defined in terms of ethnicity, and ethnicity has gained 
widespread social and political significance. 
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However, ethnicity in itself is typically not the driving force behind African conflicts but a 
lever used by political leaders to mobilize supporters in pursuit of power, wealth, and 
resources (Aapengnuo, 2010:1). In Rwanda, political manipulation of resource conflicts led 
to the well-orchestrated 1994 genocide. Politicians, demagogues, and the media used 
ethnicity as a play for popular support and as a means of eliminating political opponents 
(both Tutsis and moderate Hutus), but this should not be understood to mean that the 
genocide was about ethnicity (Aapengnuo, 2010:2). Often it is the politicization of ethnicity 
and not ethnicity per se that stokes the attitudes of perceived injustice, lack of recognition, 
and exclusion that are the source of conflict. The misdiagnosis of African conflicts as ethnic 
ignores the political nature of the issues of contention. People do not kill each other because 
of ethnic differences; they kill each other when these differences are promoted as the barrier 
to advancement and opportunity (Aapengnuo, 2010:2). 
 
Therefore, recognizing that ethnicity is a tool and not the driver of intergroup conflict should 
refocus our conflict mitigation efforts to the political triggers of conflict (Aapengnuo, 
2010:1). In the case of Kenya, ethnicity became an issue in the country’s elections in 
December 2007 because of a political power struggle that found it useful to fan passions to 
mobilize support. 
 
2.1.3 Peace Building from Below 
The concept of ‘peace building from below’ is closely associated with Lederach (1997). It is 
a relatively new approach to peace building and conflict transformation that is based on the 
notion that the conventional conflict resolution approaches that did not include all sectors of 
society were doomed to failure. The major argument of this approach is that, for peacemaking 
processes to be effective and sustainable, they must be based on the empowerment of 
communities torn apart by war (Ramsbotham et al, 2005:215). However, this approach 
cannot be seen in isolation from the broader processes since global forces also have an impact 
on local communities (Ramsbotham et al, 2005:216). 
 
With regard to the need for community participation in peace building, it is important to 
emphasise that the level and degree of community involvement is still negligible. One of the 
reasons for this is that the grassroots capabilities have not been expanded for various reasons.  
The quality and frequency of engagement between ordinary community members and the 
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elite in matters that directly affect their livelihoods still leaves much to be desired. Thus, in 
order to have an engaged participating citizenry, structures and training needs to be in place 
otherwise community voices will not be heard in the ‘corridors of power’ nor will they be 
heard around the negotiating table. 
 
It has been argued that the participation by civil society organisations (CSOs) in peace 
building should be seen as one way of involving communities. In Northern Uganda, Acholi 
religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI) carried out consensus building activities, training 
and dialogue, advocating for specific policies such as the Amnesty Law, and mediating or 
supporting negotiations, and it was also generally seen as representing the voices of the 
community members (Otim, 2009). Another CSO, Kacoke Madit, undertook local, national 
and international advocacy and raised awareness about the Northern Uganda conflict through 
meetings of the Ugandan community, GoU officials, government of Sudan, LRA rebels, the 
Acholi in the Diaspora, representatives of the international community (Oywa, 2002). 
However, the extent to which these and other CSOs legitimately represented the voice of the 
community is not known. It is possible that some CSOs may be driven by their own agendas 
and may have aspirations that run contrary to those of ordinary community members. 
 
Accordingly, the shift in thinking should move the emphasis in conflict resolution work from 
an outsider-neutral approach towards a partnership with local actors, which is one of the key 
characteristics of peace building from below (Ramsbotham et al, 2005:217). This argument 
seems congruent with O’Brien’s (2005:120) assertion that, although peacemaking usually 
refers to the top-level negotiations that end in a political agreement, there is increasing 
appreciation for community level peace initiatives that can feed into top-level discussions. 
Culturally sensitive, participatory peacemaking which is people-centred and people-driven 
should enable people to determine their own solutions to conflicts (O’Brien, 2005:126). This 
would, in Lederach’s (1997) words, help to build a peace constituency within the conflict 
setting itself. 
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Figure 6: A Proposed Model for Community Participation in Conflict Resolution 
 
Source: Based on Arnstein (1969) and Lederach (1997) 
 
Figure 6:56 is a proposed model for community participation in conflict resolution 
processes.  It is a merger of Arnstein’s ladder of citizens’ participation (1969) and Lederach’s 
pyramid of actors (1997). The model seeks to combine the strengths of the two models to 
promote a better understand of the processes and dynamics at play across these various 
‘Tracks’ but also how community members can be enabled to participate through a 
progressive process of engagement. By collaborating with key stakeholders at level 2, while 
directly engaging with the elite, and usually representatives of key parties to the conflict at 
level 1, the ordinary community members have the potential to substantially influence the 
decisions of the officials who enter into formal peace agreements. By engaging directly or 
indirectly with the community, the elite negotiators would have the opportunity to address 
issues of critical concern to the citizens and to ensure their timely inclusion onto the agenda. 
This model has the potential for harnessing the peacemaking resources available at all levels 
Level 1: The elite political & military leaders 
usually negotiate the settlement, and declare 
the end of armed hostilities. 
Level 2: Religious leaders, NGOs, cultural 
leaders & academia represent the interests of 
Level 3 and can influence actors at Level 1. 
Level 3: Local community leaders and local/ 
indigenous NGOs play a key role at the 
grassroots level; they need skills training to 
engage with & influence those at Levels 1 & 2. 
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of the community (see Figure 7:80 for a detailed discussion of the ladder of citizen 
participation). 
 
Using the model leads to a more effective merger of levels 1, 2 and 3, or what is commonly 
referred to as Track 1, 2 and 3 of the peacemaking processes, thereby increasing the chances 
of securing durable peace. During the Juba peace process, the input from ordinary citizens 
was not adequately utilised, and not everyone in Northern Uganda felt that they had been 
included in the peace process. In fact, it appears that some had been deliberately excluded for 
political or socio-economic reasons. 
 
2.1.4 The Social Exclusion and Inclusion Model 
Guildford (2000:1) defines social inclusion as the state of being accepted and participating 
fully within our families, our communities, and our society. Gidley et al (2010:7) argue that 
social inclusion should be understood as including access, participation, engagement and 
empowerment. Social inclusion interventions are associated with economic benefits, social 
justice, empowerment, transformation and development (Gidley et al, 2010:13). However, it 
should also be noted that social inclusion is a particularly complex notion, characterised by a 
lack of shared understanding about what it means to be socially included and about the 
necessary conditions to achieve social inclusion (Allan, 2003:622). 
 
Social inclusion is a contested term both in the academic and policy literature with a diversity 
of definitions available; the term appears poised to replace terms such as access and equity. 
Social inclusion can be traced back at least to Max Weber in the 19th century, while its 
counterpart term, social exclusion, emerged in France with an emphasis on the importance of 
social cohesion to society (Gidley et al, 2010:6). The social inclusion and exclusion discourse 
is mainly related to issues of inequality in society and the disadvantaged groups therein, 
including the homeless, the jobless, people with disability, the economically marginalised, 
and those discriminated against based on gender considerations. In fact, the concept of social 
exclusion denotes a perception of certain individuals who are pushed to the extreme edge of 
society and who are prevented from participating fully in society partly due to poverty, lack 
of skills and opportunities, or as a result of discrimination. 
 
According to Commins (2004:68), social exclusion is a dynamic process of being shut out, 
whether partially or fully, from any of all several systems, which influence the economic and 
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social integration of people into their society; he further argues that it can be a cause as well 
as a consequence of income poverty and material deprivation. Social exclusion is also 
underpinned by injustice and the absence of equity in that there is no fair process and no due 
outcomes in the distribution of political power, resources, opportunities, and sanctions 
(World Bank, 2011:XVI). Social exclusion involves the process of persistent disadvantage in 
terms of which the social and occupational rights of persons are being undermined. It 
encompasses not only a lack of access to goods and services, thus exacerbating poverty and 
preventing the satisfaction of basic needs, but also encompasses, among others, lack of 
security, lack of justice, and lack of participation and representation (Kurian & Bedi, 2004). 
 
According to Sen (2000:12), social exclusion can be a deprivation in itself. For example, not 
being able to relate to others and to take part in the life of the community can directly 
impoverish a person’s life. In the social exclusion and inclusion debate, there is a visible 
relationship between economic deprivation and poverty, which have social and political 
implications. In the case of Uganda the IDPs, there seems to be some form of discrimination, 
intended or unintended, against disadvantaged groups, effectively driving them into further 
deprivation and marginality. Marginality in this study is used to refer to economic, cultural, 
legal, political, and social inequality and exclusion, a state of ‘being underprivileged and 
excluded’ in terms of access to physical security, social, economic, and legal needs as well as 
education vis-à-vis the majority (Grabska, 2005:10). 
 
But who are the excluded, and why are they excluded? According to Labonte (2004:117), 
people are excluded from accessing socio-economic benefits largely because they are poor. 
But people are poor because they lack these benefits. They lack these benefits because capital 
and state structures allow wealth to accumulate unequally, and because powerful ‘others’ are 
able to benefit directly and immediately from this. People are also excluded from these 
benefits because they are women. And yet, for the past two centuries, women have been cast 
economically as a source of cheap and surplus wage labour, and of free reproductive labour. 
Powerful ‘others’ thus benefit directly and immediately from women’s relative exclusion 
from economic and social benefits. 
 
 Causes and manifestations of exclusion among IDPs 
Regarding IDPs, Michael Carnea (cited in IDMC & NRC, 2012:4) identifies nine risks or 
processes that cause impoverishment among IDPs; they include: landlessness, joblessness, 
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homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of 
access to common property and social services, social disarticulation, and the loss of 
education opportunities. Social exclusion of IDPs can also lead to impoverishment31 of 
individuals, families and communities. IDPs often lose land, property, livelihoods and access 
to health and education services; hosts of IDPs too may exhaust their resources in coping 
with the new arrivals, especially in Africa where most IDPs stay with relatives or in host 
communities (Michael Carnea, cited in IDMC & NRC, 2012:4). 
 
In Northern Uganda, exclusion has manifested in the form of IDPs not sharing the same 
opportunities as the majority of Ugandans, not having adequate income, suffering from 
financial poverty and material deprivation, not effectively participating in the labour market 
(partly because of a lack of skills), not receiving sufficient or good quality social services and 
other benefits of a welfare state (such as safe water, education and health care), not enjoying 
good social relations within and outside their communities, and not being able to enjoy fully 
their fundamental human rights, as enshrined in the Constitution of Uganda and the numerous 
international human rights instruments. In fact, at the start of the IDP resettlement, there were 
concerns that IDPs were returning to a life of disadvantage and would be without adequate 
services (Land and Equity Movement in Uganda [LEMU], 2007:2). In Northern Uganda, this 
exclusion appears to be at individual, community and institutional level. In this study, 
exclusion relates to the failure of formal institutions to integrate and provide for the needs of 
IDPs. The people of Northern Uganda have disproportionately endured most of the suffering 
caused by the conflict. Displacement, abduction, mutilation, and despair are a reality for the 
more than 70% of Ugandans that live in the north. Yet their voices have been largely eclipsed 
in the fray (Quinn, 2009:62). 
 
During the Juba peace process, ordinary citizens were excluded from the major stages of the 
peacemaking process with the emphasis being placed on national and international elite 
actors. Ordinary citizens were not placed at the centre of the analysis of the conflict; instead, 
they were treated as passive bystanders or victims (Mkandawire, cited in Branch, 2005:2). In 
this regard, Nordstrom (1997:92) argues that global politics has handed down a legacy of 
                                                 
31 Impoverishment is understood as the loss of natural capital, human-made physical capital, human capital and 
social capital (Michael Carnea, cited in Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre& Norwegian Refugee 
Council, 2012:4).  
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relegating conflict resolution to the realm of politico-military leaders and to the offices of 
specialists, as well as to the elite who are far removed from the epicentres and the impact of 
bloodletting, disregarding the fact that peace is ultimately forged on the ground – by 
individuals and in communities. 
 
During and immediately after the conflict, IDPs were excluded from enjoying the benefits 
that they were entitled to as citizens of Uganda. They lacked access to health care and 
education, and were unable to claim their entitlements, which made them unable to lead 
decent and dignified lives. Regional imbalances occurred, and the population was unable to 
engage in activities that would enable them progress towards achieving the MDGs (UNDP, 
2007a). Moreover, they lost control over their property and livelihood assets, many of which 
had been lost during the insurgency; this effectively denied them the ability to fulfil their own 
needs. It should be noted, however, that many of the IDPs were poor even before being 
displaced. 
 
In Uganda, and Northern Uganda in particular, the entire community of IDPs, more 
specifically women, widows, single mothers, orphans, the aged, people with disabilities, the 
poor and the sick, children and youth are among the most excluded people. Additionally, a 
significant number of the female returnees32 return to their communities with children, yet 
they are unable to go back to school or join any vocation teaching centre because they have to 
take care of such children (Maina, 2009b:121). It appears that the groups above are excluded 
because of various socio-economic and political processes and structures at local and higher 
levels. In this regard, then, it might be prudent in the short term to focus on the conditions of 
people who are excluded, but for the long term, focus should be placed on dealing with the 
socio-economic and political power structures that create the conditions for exclusion. Even 
as people begin to venture back to their villages in Northern Uganda, conflicts have already 
begun to erupt over land whose boundaries have been blurred by long displacement, 
disfigured by war, and rendered uncertain by ambiguous laws (Quinn, 2009:57). 
 
                                                 
32 Returnee is the term used by the international community to identify a person who was a refugee, but who has 
recently returned to his/her country of origin. This term is increasingly applied to IDPs (who, according to the 
strict definition, never left their country of origin). Defining a returnee is thus applicable on a person’s prior 
refugee or IDP status. 
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Similarly, the exclusion of IDPs from political participation can reinforce feelings of 
marginalization and make it even more difficult for a government to claim legitimacy. 
Ensuring that IDPs are able to participate in the political process can be a tangible expression 
of a commitment to adopt policies of inclusiveness that strive to be responsive to the needs of 
marginalised and victimized parts of the population (Kalin, 2007:2). 
 
Excluded IDPs seem to share some universal characteristics. For example, in the context of 
the former Yugoslavia, Cvejic & Babovic (2010:10-12) state that Serbian IDPs lack access to 
documentation; they, particularly women, are excluded from the labour market and are 
confined to undesirable unskilled jobs in the informal sector; they are excluded from 
education; they are excluded from healthcare; they are excluded from housing, and they are 
further exposed to poverty and material deprivation. It is evident that IDPs face serious 
economic, psychological and social obstacles. Another important feature of their social and 
economic position is that many of them face multidimensional exclusion. 
 
 Unemployment among IDPs 
Although global unemployment stands at 200 million people, including 75 million youth 
under the age of 25, the socio-economic status of IDPs is a matter of high importance for 
survival and prosperity (World Bank, 2013:xiii). They need income to realise their goals, 
including providing for the needs of their families. In order to realise this, they need some 
form of gainful employment, which is not available for most of the IDPs. In fact, the World 
Bank (2013:xiii) argues that jobs are instrumental to achieving economic and social 
development, and that employment is important for social cohesion. Conflict can 
fundamentally disrupt jobs by destroying or damaging infrastructure and access to markets, 
as well as through altering incentives. In Sri Lanka, for example, conflict in the northern part 
of the country disrupted economic activity and created favourable conditions for the 
insurgency to recruit among the newly unemployed (Checko, 2007). This kind of situation is 
clearly not desirable given the volatility of the context in Uganda. 
 
The high rates of illiteracy among IDPs, combined with their lack of skills, will undermine 
the IDPs’ competitiveness in the global labour market, and in most cases, there has been no 
affirmative action to compensate for their circumstances. In fact, jobs are among the most 
pressing issues in countries in conflict or emerging from it (Adams, 2011). Jobs are critical 
for restoring the livelihoods of individuals and families affected by war and violence, 
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reintegrating ex-combatants, and rebuilding everybody’s sense of belonging in society. They 
are also key to jump-starting economic activity, reconnecting people, and reconstructing 
networks and the social fabric. Alongside security and justice, jobs are central to breaking 
cycles of violence, restoring confidence in institutions, and giving people a stake in society 
(Ozden & Schiff, 2006). 
 
 Unemployment and exclusion: the long-term consequences 
As a result of widespread unemployment, the unskilled and unemployed adults, as well as the 
unskilled and unemployed youth and children, are likely to create a long-term development 
crisis for Northern Uganda. Ultimately, this may even precipitate a recurrence of the conflict, 
since an uneducated and unskilled young population is more prone to engage in violence and 
conflict (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). In particular, young ex-combatants face exclusion 
partly because society views them as war victims who are irreparably damaged, and as a lost 
generation that has been rejected by their families and communities for the heinous acts they 
have committed; this image is equally promoted by the media and advocacy agencies (BBC, 
2007). Further, it has been proposed that young ex-combatants face exclusion because of the 
fact that many still carry symptoms of PTSD and depression years after their reintegration. 
Promoters of this belief forget that the majority of young soldiers are actually able to adjust 
when they return from combat, and that many of them become integrated civilians and 
function at par with others in their community, both socially and economically (Betancourt et 
al, 2008; Humphreys &Weinstein, 2006; Williamson, 2006). 
 
 Suggestions for social inclusion of IDPs 
In the case of Northern Uganda, social inclusion interventions would entail some of the 
following: economic empowerment of IDPs; improved access to quality education; improved 
access to quality health care services; community empowerment through vocational skills 
development; increased involvement of IDPs in governance and decision making; 
improvement in recreation and sports initiatives, particularly for youth and children; initiation 
of social action programmes that improve the social dynamics of communities affected by 
conflict; community participation through giving them a voice; accountability and public 
dialogues; and enactment of an appropriate legal and policy framework that deals with issues 
of justice and social inclusion. In Serbia, Cvejic & Babovic (2010:4) found that, ten years 
after the end of displacement, IDPs remain excluded, and thus, there is clearly a need for 
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carefully tailored measures and policies and an active network of institutions in order to 
support IDPs and make them active members of society. 
 
Further, learning from this situation, it is proposed that the first response to address the 
exclusion of IDPs would be to address their weak economic position, which negatively 
influences their social inclusion (Cvejic & Babovic, 2010:20). Also, the role of the local 
administration in improving social inclusion of IDPs is very important since local 
circumstances differ significantly in different localities. The design of support networks 
should be influenced by the knowledge of the local administration and the capacities of the 
IDPs themselves (Cvejic & Babovic, 2010:21). 
 
It should be noted, however, that it remains a daunting task to promote the inclusion of 
marginalised people and groups into systems that have systematically excluded them, either 
deliberately or by omission for a long time. The results of this deliberate process have 
affected the fundamental human needs of people in various ways, and these need to be borne 
in mind. 
 
2.1.5 The Human Needs Framework 
The human needs framework is associated with a number of scholars, most notably Azar 
(1990), Maslow (1954), Max-Neef (1991), and Miall et al (1999). Scholars of human needs 
argue that all human actions and social interactions are driven by human needs. Some of 
these scholars, particularly Burton & Dukes (1990b), assert that no consensus exists at 
present regarding the definition of human needs. 
 
Nonetheless, Rosati et al (cited in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:163) suggest that the term can be 
used to mean the minimum set of universal needs common to all individuals everywhere. It 
should be noted, however, that human needs are better understood as culturally relative, 
varying across diverse cultural contexts. Human needs are dynamic and variable (Rosati et al, 
cited in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:163-164). The introduction of the human dimension into the 
study of conflict resolution makes a fundamental difference both to explanation and to 
process (Burton & Dukes, 1990a:85). 
 
Human needs are a key motivational force behind human behaviour and social interaction. 
According to this perspective, there exist specific and relatively enduring human needs, 
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which individuals will inevitably strive to satisfy, even at the cost of personal disorientation 
and social disruption. The theory states that people may resort to violence when deep-rooted 
human needs have been frustrated (Miall et al, 1999:45-48). For example, when faced with a 
severe shortage of water or food, people who are normally peaceful may resort to violence. 
Just as there are biological needs that must be satisfied in order to survive, there are also non-
material, psycho-social needs, such as dignity, acceptance, justice, identity and security. 
According to Miall et al (1999), when these needs are frustrated through, for example, a 
political system that is oppressive and discriminative, fertile ground for violence is created. 
There is empirical support for this assumption, which demonstrates clearly that individuals 
have these fundamental human needs (Azar, cited in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:156). 
 
Human needs theorists such as Maslow (1954) and Rosati et al (1990) locate the foundation 
of politics, including global politics, in the interactions of individuals and groups that are 
striving to satisfy their needs in the social contexts that surround them. According to Rosati et 
al (cited in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:156), the human needs perspective postulates that human 
needs are a fundamental underlying source of political and social interaction in world society. 
To this end, there is an emerging argument that links conflict with human needs. Azar (cited 
in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:146) hypothesizes that the source of protracted social conflict 
(PSC)33 is the denial of those needs required in the development of all people and societies – 
security, identity, social recognition of identity and effective participation. In fact, Rosati et 
al (cited in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:157) postulate that human needs deprivation has an 
impact on the long-term legitimacy and stability of political and social systems. They argue 
that, given the existence of human needs, social systems must be responsive to individual 
needs, if they are to maintain their legitimacy and survive intact in the long term. Rosati et al 
(cited in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:162) further assert that societies that fail to meet the needs 
of their members eventually become unstable over time. Further, Burton & Dukes (1990a:85) 
argue that human needs must be satisfied if law and order is to be sustained and if societies 
are to be stable and not violent. Thus Rosati et al (cited in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:160) 
                                                 
33
 Protracted social conflict is a technical term used to describe conflicts that are protracted or intractable, i.e. 
complex, severe, commonly enduring, and often violent. When a group's identity is threatened or frustrated, 
intractable conflict is almost inevitable. Protracted conflicts denote hostile interactions between communal 
groups that are based in deep-seated racial, ethnic, religious and cultural hatreds, and that persist over long 
periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence (Azar, 1990). 
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contend that it is imperative to examine human needs, both at an individual level and also at 
larger social aggregates, including political groups and organizations as well as states. 
 
According to Rosati et al (cited in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:174-175), the primary source of 
human motivation stems from satisfying some basic human needs. The human needs 
perspective proposes that behaviour is a function of the level to which human needs are 
satisfied and the relative priority placed on those needs. Maslow (1954) argues that human 
needs are hierarchical and that they are pursued in an ascending order, starting with the most 
basic ones (the physiological needs), safety, love or belonging, esteem and ending with self-
actualization. However, it should be noted that needs hierarchies, such as those proposed by 
Maslow(1954), are not a crucial element of all human needs approaches (Rosati, Carroll & 
Coate, cited in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:166). Other scholars (Clarke, 1993; Hofstede, 1993; 
Max-Neef, 1991) further criticize Maslow’s hierarchy of needs for being merely a linear 
ranking typology, and, moreover, one that is simplistic, ethnocentric, and individualistic. 
 
Max-Neef’s (1991) human needs theory identifies ten key needs34 that are simultaneously 
present, and that are based on a holistic and dynamic system that is non-hierarchical. Max-
Neef (1991) contends that needs are consistent and universal across cultures and throughout 
history. However, he also notes that it is the needs satisfiers, such as being, having, doing and 
interacting that vary according to the cultural and sub-cultural context and according to 
historical period. 
 
Nonetheless, there is already sufficient empirical evidence to allow one to conclude that 
individuals have human needs, which motivate and affect their behaviour (Rosati et al, cited 
in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:172). Further, it is the values, interests and desires, more so than 
needs, that are closely tied to socialization and to the political, social, economic and cultural 
environment (Rosati et al, cited in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:168). Hence, it is quite 
understandable that people would want to be part of conflict resolution processes, since they 
would want to make sure that their interests, values, access to resources, and so forth are 
being considered; in the case of IDPs in Uganda, this is crucial too. 
 
                                                 
34 These ten key needs are: understanding, identity, freedom, affection, transcendence, participation, leisure, 
creation, protection and subsistence. 
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As a result, there is an inherent connection between the fulfilment of human needs, the 
stability of social structures and political dynamics. To this end, Rosati et al (cited in Burton 
& Dukes, 1990b:177) argue that the pursuit of human needs does not automatically imply 
that they will be fulfilled, but that individuals will continue to strive to fulfil them. It is, thus, 
the conflict between individuals in a group and social context who are attempting to fulfil 
human needs in social structures that results in the dynamic interplay of politics. 
 
A number of limitations regarding the human needs theory have been identified. For 
example, Rosati et al (cited in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:158-159) contend that the theory is 
overly simplistic and idealistic. Further, the difficulty of proving empirically the existence of 
human needs, and the link between these and actual individual behaviour and social relations, 
is of concern. 
 
In addition, Rosati et al (cited in Burton & Dukes, 1990b:165) further raise a number of 
critical questions concerning the precise nature of human needs and whether there is a 
hierarchy or priority of human needs; how human needs differ from (and how they are related 
to) interests, values, and desires; and how other factors, such as ideologies, intervene between 
needs, interests, values and behaviour. Despite the difficulties with a human needs approach, 
it is normally accepted that people have needs that they seek to fulfil. In this regard, it would 
appear that the fundamental human needs of the population in Northern Uganda have not 
been adequately provided for, over a long period of time, which seems to have been the 
motivation behind the two decade conflict. Accordingly, the population in Northern Uganda 
and indeed the LRA complain about exclusion, marginalization, poor service delivery by 
government, persecution, denial of economic opportunity, and poverty as the main reasons 
behind the conflict (Branch, 2005; Nannyonjo, 2005; Shaw & Mbabazi, 2007). 
 
In this regard, Sen (1999) has written extensively about capabilities, and how these 
capabilities are essential in the realization of growth and development of individuals and 
ultimately communities. This is a framework I will explore further in the next sub-section. 
 
2.1.6 The Capability Approach 
The capability approach is a normative framework of thought for the evaluation and 
assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies, and 
proposals about social change in society (Robeyns, 2005:93). The approach gained popularity 
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in the early 1980s through the work of philosopher and economist Amartya Sen, and later in 
the early 1990s through the work of philosopher Martha Nussbaum. However, a great deal of 
work on this approach had already been pioneered by early thinkers like Aristotle, Adam 
Smith and Karl Marx (Robeyns, 2005:94). 
 
The capability approach postulates that, when making normative evaluations about 
capabilities and human development, the focus should be on what people are able to be and to 
do. For example, Sen (1999) argues that, when evaluating people’s development and 
capability, the focus should be on the real freedoms that people have for leading a valuable 
life, that is, on their capabilities to undertake activities, such as reading, working, or being 
politically active, or of enjoying positive states of being, such as being healthy or literate 
(Robeyns, 2003:61-62). 
 
The capability approach can be used to evaluate several aspects of people’s well-being, such 
as inequality, poverty, the well-being of an individual or the average well-being of the 
members of a group. It can also be used as an alternative evaluative tool for social cost–
benefit analysis, or as a framework within which to design and evaluate policies, ranging 
from welfare state design in affluent societies, to development policies by governments and 
non-governmental organizations in developing countries. The capability approach provides a 
tool and a framework within which these phenomena can be conceptualized and evaluated. In 
particular, the core characteristic of the capability approach is its focus on what people are 
effectively able to do and to be; that is, on their capabilities (Robeyns, 2005:94). 
 
According to the capability approach, development should be conceptualized in terms of 
people’s capabilities to function, in other words, their effective opportunities to undertake the 
actions and activities in which they want to engage, and to be the person they want to be. For 
example, every person should have the opportunity to be part of a community and to practice 
a religion; but if someone prefers to be a hermit or an atheist, they should also have this 
option (Robeyns, 2005:95). These so-called beings and doings, which Sen (1999) calls 
functionings, together constitute what makes a life valuable. Functionings include working, 
resting, being literate, being healthy, being part of a community, being respected, and so forth 
(Robeyns, 2005:95). Sen (1999) argues that evaluations and policies should focus on what 
people are able to do and be, on the quality of their life, and on removing obstacles in their 
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lives so that they have more freedom to live the kind of life that, upon reflection, they have 
reason to value (Robeyns, 2005:94). 
 
The capability approach evaluates policies according to their impact on people’s capabilities. 
It asks whether people are being healthy, and whether the means or resources necessary for 
this capability are present, such as clean water, access to doctors, protection from infections 
and diseases, and basic knowledge on health issues. It asks whether people are well-
nourished, and whether the conditions for this capability, such as having sufficient food 
supplies and food entitlements, are being met. Further, the approach asks whether people 
have access to quality education, to real political participation, and to community activities 
that support them to cope with struggles in daily life and that foster real friendships 
(Robeyns, 2005:95-96). 
 
The capability approach identifies capabilities as people’s potential functionings. 
Functionings, as said above, are beings and doings (Sen, 1999). Examples of capabilities are 
being well fed, taking part in the community, being sheltered, relating to other people, 
working on the labour market, caring for others, and being healthy (Robeyns, 2003:62-63). 
Robeyns (2003:62) argues that there is a gender dimension to the understanding and 
application of the capability approach. She gives examples of reproductive health, voting 
rights, political power, domestic violence, education and women’s social status as issues that 
have gender dimensions, and therefore particularly women’s capabilities or functionings need 
to be viewed that way in certain societies, particularly the patriarchal ones. Robeyns’ (2003) 
argument is supported by Agarwal (1994:1455) who argues that the gender gap in the 
ownership and control of property is the single most critical contributor to the gender gap in 
economic well-being, social status, and empowerment. 
 
The capability approach primarily looks at development as the process of increasing people’s 
real freedoms by focusing on the ends that make development important (Sen, 1999:3).  Sen 
(1999) underscores the importance of individual freedom as both the means and the end of 
development. To this end, Sen (1999) postulates that basic and fundamental freedoms, 
coupled with elimination of what he terms ‘unfreedoms’ – poverty, poor economic 
opportunities, systematic neglect and other aspects that leave people in poverty and with 
limited choices – are the real meaning of development. 
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In this regard, Sen (1999) identifies the five major freedoms as: political freedoms, economic 
facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. Careful 
analysis of the capability approach reveals that these five freedoms are inter-connected and 
mutually reinforcing, which means that vulnerability in one may result in deprivation in one 
or all the other freedoms. Notably, freedoms such as political freedoms, economic facilities 
and social opportunities cannot be divorced from one another, as they are mutually 
complementary, and are the key to the realization of the individual’s freedoms. In addition, 
the capability approach is about the ability of an individual to function (Sen, 2005:5), in other 
words, the ability of the individual to be, to do, and to function effectively through, for 
example, sufficient nutrition and good health (Sen, 1999). 
 
 The capability approach and the population in Northern Uganda 
Relating the capability approach to the population in Northern Uganda, most of whom were 
IDPs for more than two decades, it is evident that majority of them lacked most, if not all, of 
these five freedoms. For instance, they lacked income due to displacement and confinement 
to IDP settlements, where they could not engage in any economic activities, paid or unpaid, 
which in turn affected their ability to access the ‘functionings’ such as food, health care, 
security, social groups and education. 
 
Further, due to violent conflict and internal displacement for over two decades, the 
population in Northern Uganda did not enjoy any political freedoms and social opportunities 
due to challenges associated with living in crowded IDP settlements; neither did they enjoy 
protective security, since they continuously experienced armed attacks and violence even 
under protection of government soldiers (Quinn, 2009). The failure for the population in 
Northern Uganda to enjoy these freedoms has numerous ramifications for their long-term 
development, most notably the following: missed economic opportunities that have led to the 
highest poverty levels in the country; limited participation in political processes such as 
elections; inability of the population to access quality education and quality healthcare; total 
dependence on humanitarian aid, and the emergence of a population that is a passive recipient 
of assistance as opposed to an active and dynamic population. These issues, combined, 
severely undermine individuals’ abilities to realize their necessary capabilities, both in the 
short term and in the long term. 
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The huge disparity between the population in Northern Uganda and the rest of the country, 
created by more than two decades of civil war, has led to what Ajulu (cited in Nhema & 
Zeleza, 2008a:214) describes as ‘two Ugandas’, and has implications for what Sen (1999) 
calls the expansion of the range of opportunities for individuals. It is acknowledged that, 
although the war is over, factors remain that could threaten progress, such as economic 
disparity, land tenure irregularities, high levels of unemployed youth and disenfranchised 
populations, as well as high expectations regarding peace dividends (Rebeca Grynspan, 
quoted in IRIN, 2012). 
 
Related to the capability approach, Sen (1999) perceives development as freedom. According 
to Sen (1999:3), development is a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. 
Freedoms depend on other determinants, such as social and economic arrangements (for 
example, facilities for education and health care) as well as political and civil rights, such as 
the liberty to participate in public discussion and scrutiny. This conception of development is 
in conformity with the human security paradigm, which emphasizes that people’s freedom to 
exercise their many choices is a major tenet of development and security (UN, 1994:23). The 
quotation below summarizes the importance of freedoms and so-called ‘unfreedoms’ in 
development: 
 
Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as 
tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect 
of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states. 
Sometimes the lack of substantive freedoms relates directly to economic poverty, 
which robs people of the freedom to satisfy hunger, or to achieve sufficient nutrition, 
or to obtain remedies for treatable illnesses, or the opportunity to be adequately 
clothed or sheltered, or to enjoy clean water or sanitary facilities. In other cases, the 
unfreedom links closely to the lack of public facilities and social care, such as the 
absence of epidemiological programs, or of organized arrangements for health care or 
educational facilities, or of effective institutions for the maintenance of local peace 
and order. Still in other cases, the violation of freedom results directly from a denial 
of political and civil liberties by authoritarian regimes and from imposed restrictions 
on the freedom to participate in the social, political and economic life of the 
community (Sen, 1999:3-4). 
 
During and after the conflict, the population in Northern Uganda experienced a number of 
unfreedoms, ranging from high levels of absolute poverty currently at 46% (GoU, 2012a:20), 
lack of economic opportunities due to lack of skills and loss of livelihoods and livelihood 
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assets, limited access to education, limited access to health care, limited access to sufficient 
and good quality food, total dependence on food and other forms of humanitarian aid, poor 
social infrastructure, lack of decent shelter, lack of sufficient and safe water, lack of job 
opportunities especially for the young and skilled people – all of which Sen (1991:7) likens to 
keeping people in bondage and captivity – and including the absence of opportunities for 
meaningful participation in governance at local and other levels. These unfreedoms have 
indeed impeded the development in Northern Uganda. They have created a population with a 
sense of indifference towards community affairs, and they have created a disoriented 
population for whom development has become an elusive and ever changing objective. For 
example, the IDPs’ lack of access to livelihoods caused both impoverishment and 
dependence on humanitarian assistance, thereby forcing them to resort to negative coping 
strategies and thus becoming vulnerable to economic exploitation (IDMC & NRC, 2012:10). 
 
In addition, food insecurity among IDPs in Northern Uganda increased due to the absence of 
adequate development initiatives. Agricultural inputs and labour were a major constraint on 
food production, despite the availability of land. Income generating activities were mainly 
limited to low paying activities; income dropped to very low levels during the time when 
returning IDPs had to clear their land and construct their homes; and lastly, low incomes 
affected IDPs’ ability to rapidly rebuild their former livelihoods or invest in livestock, 
thereby prolonging their dependence on food assistance (Martin et al, 2009). 
 
A further complicating factor is the interconnected and intertwined nature of these 
unfreedoms; for example, economic unfreedom can breed social unfreedom, just as social or 
political unfreedom can foster economic unfreedom (Sen, 1991:8), thus perpetuating a cycle 
of underdevelopment, akin to Chambers’ (1983:108-138) deprivation trap resulting from 
several clusters of disadvantage. Not only is there interconnectedness among unfreedoms, 
there is also interconnectedness among freedoms. For example, political freedoms (in the 
form of free speech and elections) help to promote economic security. Social opportunities 
(in the form of education and health facilities) facilitate economic participation. Economic 
facilities (in the form of opportunities for participation in trade and production) can help to 
generate personal abundance as well as public resources for social facilities. Freedoms of 
different kinds can thus strengthen one another (Sen, 1999:11). It should be noted that the 
success of a society is evaluated by the freedoms that the members of that society enjoy. 
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Therefore, these unfreedoms, as experienced in Northern Uganda, will continue to deny 
people the means and ends to development, if they are not addressed comprehensively. 
 
The capability approach is strongly linked to the human security framework in the sense that 
the two models seek to measure the same variables, albeit from different stand points. While 
the capability approach seeks to evaluate the quality and level of achievement of variables 
such as education, health, etc., the human security framework seeks to ensure that these 
variables are sufficiently provided for as a means of ensuring the human security of 
individuals and communities. However, opportunities can only be taken hold of when people 
feel safe and secure. 
 
2.1.7 The Human Security Framework 
Human security is defined as the protection of the vital core of human lives in ways that 
enhance human freedoms and human fulfilments (Commission on Human Security [CHS], 
2003:4). This definition is based on two main aspects: firstly, safety from such chronic threats 
as hunger, disease, and repression, and secondly, protection from sudden hurtful disruptions 
in the patterns of daily life (UN, 1994). Human security thus, means protecting fundamental 
freedoms of people, protecting people from severe and widespread threats and situations, and 
protecting people from both violent and non-violent threats. It also means freedom from 
pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or even their lives (Suhrke, 1999:269; UN, 
1994). It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural 
systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity 
(CHS, 2003:4). In addition, human security is defined by International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001:15) as the security of people – primarily 
their physical safety, but also their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity 
and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
 
Human security is an emerging paradigm which is associated with the pre-eminent 
progressive values of the 1990s, particularly protecting human rights, implementing 
international humanitarian law, protecting the vulnerable, saving lives, reducing the suffering 
of individuals during armed conflict, and facilitating socio-economic development based on 
equity (Suhrke, 1999:266). It is a useful framework for understanding global vulnerabilities 
whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the 
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proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state or the security of 
territory or governments (Buzan, 1997; Suhrke, 1999:269).As such, the most fundamental 
difference between traditional security and human security is that, while traditional security 
equates security with the survival of the state and the promotion and protection of its national 
interests, the human security framework involves a fundamental shift of focus from the state 
to the individual citizen. Human security is an integrative concept with two major 
components: freedom from fear and freedom from want (UN, 1994:24). Freedom from fear 
means safety from such chronic threats as violent conflict, hunger, disease and repression, 
while freedom from want implies protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the 
patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities (UN, 1994:23). 
 
 A gender dimension 
From a gender perspective, human security focuses on the serious neglect of gender concerns 
under the traditional security model. The focus of the traditional concept of security on 
external military threats to the state has meant that the majority of threats that women face 
have been overlooked (Robeyns, 2005). By focusing on the individual, the human security 
model thus aims to address the security concerns of both women and men equally. As is the 
case in other conflicts worldwide, women were the most affected by armed violence and 
conflict in Northern Uganda; they formed the majority of IDPs, they constituted the majority 
of victims not only of gender based violence, but also of cruel and degrading practices, such 
as rape (Suhrke, 1999). Even after internal displacement, women's human security continues 
to be threatened by unequal access to resources, especially land, unequal possibilities for 
property ownership, the experience of domestic violence, limited education opportunities for 
the girl child, exclusion from leadership structures and changed gender and social roles. In 
this regard, the human security framework is a vital reference for empowering women, 
through education, participation and access, as gender equality is a necessary precondition for 
sustainable peace and development. 
 
 Dimensions of human security 
The UN (1994:24-25) identifies seven major components of human security, namely: 
economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, 
community security, and political security. According to the UN (1994), economic security is 
defined as assuring an income for the population, while food security means that all people at 
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all times have both physical and economic access to basic food. Similarly, health security 
means that people are protected against poor nutrition and an unsafe environment. 
 
Environmental security involves the assurance that human beings live in, and also rely on a 
healthy physical environment. Similarly, personal security is concerned with people’s 
security from physical violence, and this is perhaps the most important human security factor. 
Related to personal security is another human security component – community security, 
which deals with people’s ability to feel secure as a result of belonging to families, 
communities, organizations or other groups that provide identity and a set of values. Lastly, 
political security is concerned with the need for people to live in a society that honours their 
basic human rights. 
 
 Relevance to Northern Uganda 
The concept of human security is presented both as an end-state of affairs – i.e. safety from 
such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression – and as a process in the sense of 
protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. Thus, an attempt 
to apply the human security framework to Northern Uganda during and after the conflict 
brings to the fore the reality that the population was, and actually remains, insecure. Far and 
beyond the Ugandan border in DRC and Central African Republic, the LRA leader remains at 
large and his army continues to forcibly recruit child soldiers as fighters, engaging in sexual 
and gender-based violence (SGBV) against women and girls, as well as boys and men, 
thereby preventing them from leading healthy lives (UNHCR, 2013). 
 
 Consequences of human insecurity in Northern Uganda 
Consequently, visible regional imbalances have occurred between the northern region and 
other regions, resulting in and exacerbated by the inability of the local population, 
particularly the poor, to engage in initiatives that would enable them get out of poverty and to 
realize the MDGs (UNDP, 2007a). The population lacks basic productive assets; they lack 
capabilities and opportunities for development; there is limited human capital due to poor 
education and skills; orphans and vulnerable children are inadequately catered for; and there 
is income inequality between the Northern region and other regions (Chronic Poverty 
Research Centre [CPRS], 2011; Shaw & Mbabazi, 2007). This situation is worsened by the 
failure of many government programmes to accelerate post-conflict recovery and 
development. 
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In addition, it is proposed that the conflict has split the country into two: South Uganda has 
been experiencing economic development and growth, whereas Northern Uganda has been a 
theatre of war for the past two decades (Shaw & Mbabazi, 2007:569). The region has not 
benefited from the good macro-economic performance of the rest of the country, but the 
conflict has led to gross human rights violations, destruction of infrastructure, economic 
paralysis, disruption of social service delivery systems and social disintegration (UNDP, 
2003). This situation calls for what Sen (1999), in his capability framework, describes as 
expanding opportunities for people as a means of realizing development. One example of 
economic insecurity that has affected the IDPs is denying them access to their ancestral land 
where they undertook subsistence farming activities, which is effectively denying them any 
form of income. 
 
In a number of Africa countries, IDPs live in protracted displacement; their process of finding 
a durable solution has stalled, often leaving their rights unprotected and their communities 
marginalised (IDMC & NRC, 2012:3). It is acknowledged that Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration (DDR)35 of former combatants are major challenges for countries emerging 
from conflict. Although ex-combatants make up a relatively small share of the total 
population, unemployment and idleness, particularly of young men, are stress factors that can 
strain and potentially undermine fragile post-conflict environments (Keddie, 1998). In fact, in 
some cases, such as the DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, young ex-combatants have no 
memory of peaceful times or normal civilian life (World Bank, 2013:195).Particularly in 
Northern Uganda, the reintegration of young ex-combatants appears not to have been 
managed well either, yet it resides in the nexus of development and security agendas and has 
emerged as a critical development tool as well as a preventive intervention instrument for 
sustainable peace (Pouligny, cited in Maina, 2009b:115). 
 
 A criticism of human security 
Although praised by supporters as a ground-breaking framework to redefine security and as a 
new paradigm in security studies and policy making, the human security framework has been 
                                                 
35
 DDR refers to the process of demilitarizing official and unofficial armed groups by controlling and reducing 
the possession and use of arms, disbanding non-state armed groups and reducing the size of state security 
services, and assisting former combatants to reintegrate into civilian life (Ball & Van de Goor, 2006). 
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criticized by a number of scholars (Axworthy, 2001;Kaldor, 2007;King & Christopher, 2001; 
Paris, 2001) for being too broad and overly vague, which undermines it effectiveness; for 
being imprecise and therefore unable to make any contribution to academia or policy; and for 
being difficult to prioritize and operationalise due to the overlapping nature of its seven 
dimensions. In particular, Paris (2001:88) argues that the human security framework is 
“slippery by design” as it fails to separate causes and effect. 
 
In the implementation of the human security framework, there should be a careful balance 
between freedom from fear and freedom from want. There is a danger of organisations 
placing emphasis on one and not the other. For example, in Northern Uganda there appears to 
have been emphasis on freedom from fear (conflict prevention and resolution, peace-
building, violence prevention) while neglecting or doing little about the freedom from want 
(emergency assistance, hunger and disease). 
 
 The human security of IDPs 
The phenomenon of IDPs is relatively new, having only received international attention in the 
early 1990s. During the past decade, increasing numbers of intrastate conflicts have swelled 
the number of IDPs, whereas the number of refugees has gradually shrunk (Salama et al, 
cited in Spiegel et al, 2010:341). Displacement not only violates an individual’s dignity but 
can also amount to a violation of their human rights, including inter alia their rights to life, 
shelter, food, an adequate standard of living, property, equality, and non-discrimination. It 
also often exposes the most vulnerable among them, women and children in particular, to 
illness, destitution, exploitation, gender-based violence, and forcible recruitment into armed 
groups. 
 
Conflict has been, and indeed remains, a major driver of forced displacement in many parts 
of the world. The international system gives the state primary responsibility for the well-
being and rights of its displaced people within its borders. However, more often than not, the 
state itself is caught up in internal conflict, and may lack authority, stability, capacity, 
legitimacy and governance systems to guarantee the welfare and rights of the displaced 
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people. In addition, humanitarian space36 has shrunk substantially because of political 
polarisation and a perception by combatants that humanitarian assistance is merely an 
instrument of interference by foreign powers (Spiegel et al, 2010:341). 
 
The largest wave of displacement in Uganda occurred in 1995-96, when the government 
forced civilians in Northern Uganda into so-called ‘protected villages’, which received little 
assistance from the government (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre [IDMC] & 
Refugee Law Project [RLP], 2006). As a result, IDPs fled to urban areas where they were not 
sufficiently provided for. According to Refstie et al (2010:32), IDPs in urban areas are most 
often perceived as either economic migrants, or IDPs who have reached a ‘durable 
solution,’37 and consequently, they are not given much attention and assistance. 
 
The human insecurity of IDPs does not end when they return from displacement because, 
even when they return home, they encounter considerable obstacles to reintegration and other 
durable solutions, i.e. local integration in cases where they have been displaced to or 
resettlement to another part of the country. The human security challenges for IDPs in return 
areas include insufficient safety of returnees; failure to return property to the displaced and 
reconstruction of their houses; and failure to create an economic, social and political 
environment that sustains return (Kalin, 2007:2). 
 
Although over 95% of former IDPs have returned to their homes within Northern Uganda, 
the need to protect them in their homes, both in urban and rural areas, remains – because they 
remain vulnerable as a result of their human security situation. For the few people still in IDP 
camps, estimated to be 30,000, the need to continue with protection activities remains, with 
particular focus on life-saving activities, physical security, the provision of basic services 
such as shelter, health, water and sanitation, and support to long-term livelihoods (IDMC, 
2013). The hundred of young boys and girls remain exposed to threat of abduction and 
recruitment into rebellion partly because of unemployment, the lack of opportunities for 
education and economic opportunities. 
                                                 
36
Humanitarian space refers to physical locations that are safe from attack in a conflict; respect for core 
humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality; and the ability of aid agencies to access 
and help civilians affected by conflict (Spiegel et al., 2010:341). 
37
IDPs are considered to have reached a durable solution when they have either returned to their places of 
origin, have locally integrated in the areas in which they initially took refuge, or have settled and integrated in 
another part of the country and no longer have displacement-specific needs (Refstie et al, 2010:32). 
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Regarding the continued human insecurity of IDPs, Kalin (2007:2) adds thus: 
 
Failure to consider IDP concerns may jeopardize the sustainability of peace. For 
example, when displaced people must return to areas where armed groups that have 
displaced them are still present or where access to their land is dangerous because of 
landmines, return might not take place. If IDPs are not able to recover their land or 
property or otherwise find solutions allowing them to live decent lives, and when they 
feel that they have suffered injustice, reconciliation becomes more difficult. If durable 
solutions are not found for IDPs, their potential for contributing to economic 
reconstruction and rehabilitation is limited and poverty reduction becomes more 
difficult. In contrast, resolution of such issues can be a positive force for social 
rehabilitation and thus lasting peace. Experience has shown that IDPs who return can 
play an important role in re-building their homes and communities and thus in 
contributing to the economic development of the country. 
 
Accordingly, human security in the case of Northern Uganda would mean freedom from 
violence and freedom from fear, and addressing the individual and community vulnerabilities 
that accompany them. It would also mean access to food, access to quality health care, access 
to quality education, freedom from fear of insecurity for individuals and the community, the 
ability to live in a safe environment, access to economic opportunities, and the realization of 
the right to participate in political processes, including freedom to participate in peace 
processes, plus other freedoms and fulfilment. More importantly, human security would mean 
freedom for the two million people previously uprooted from their homes by the conflict to 
return to their homes in safety, and to be assured of an end to the conflict. Human security 
would also mean affirmative-action economic opportunities to address and reverse the 
income inequalities between Northern Uganda and other regions, thereby promoting 
equitable development. It is on this basis that all initiatives in Northern Uganda are (or should 
be) designed and implemented using the human security framework. 
 
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the human security situation in Northern 
Uganda did not permit the population to participate meaningfully in the peacemaking and 
conflict resolution process; they had numerous encumbrances and were pre-occupied with 
improving their human security situation, as the power of the state was weak, distant and 
illegitimate during most of the period of the conflict. 
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 Land as a human security factor in Northern Uganda 
Land conflict lies at the root of many internal displacement flows in Africa, and the 
resolution of hotly contested land claims represents a key barrier to solutions for thousands of 
IDPs (Bradley & Aspelt, 2012). Land issues are important drivers of violence and conflict 
when access is unequal, tenure insecure or competition intense (IDMC & NRC, 2012:11). 
Similarly, land in Northern Uganda has become one of the most critical factors in the 
resettlement and post-conflict recovery process, with peace and stability in the majority of 
return areas being hampered by land disputes (IRIN, 2012). 
 
Also, inter-communal disputes over land and the allocation of land to private investors for 
cultivation, could threaten peace in parts of Northern Uganda. For example, between January 
and April 2012 alone, at least five people were killed in violent land disputes in Amuru 
district, while two people were killed in the newly created Nwoya District late 2011 (IRIN, 
2012). The land problem is equally acknowledged by the GoU. Betty Bigombe, Uganda’s 
Minister for Water and former negotiator with the LRA (quoted in IRIN, 2012) stressed that 
land conflict would be a hindrance to development if it was not addressed. She warned that 
failure to address the land disputes could lead to another conflict like the one with the LRA. It 
is recommended, therefore, that one of the ways to mitigate rampant land disputes in 
Northern Uganda is the enactment of new legislation or the amendment of existing land 
legislation to resolve issues related to land inheritance, inconsistencies arising from colonial 
mistakes, women and land, minorities, land administration, compulsory acquisition, and 
lately the vice of land-grabbing (IRIN, 2012). 
 
However, there remain challenges with mechanisms for resolving land disputes. Under the 
AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa (2009), for example, the 
property dispute resolution mechanisms that states are encouraged to establish under Article 
11(4) are not explicitly enjoined to restore property to displaced claimants, tacitly 
recognizing that in some cases other groups (for example, longstanding secondary occupants) 
may also have a legitimate claim to the land. 
 
2.1.8 The Ladder of Citizen Participation 
One of the most dominant theories of participation is closely associated with Arnstein (1969) 
who identified and illustrated the eight levels of participation in a ladder pattern; this model 
has come to be popularly known as ‘the ladder of citizen participation’, with each level 
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corresponding to the extent of the citizens’ power in determining the end product (Soen, 
1981:108). In a descending order, Arnstein identifies these levels as citizen control, delegated 
power, partnership, placation, consultation, informing, therapy, and manipulation. 
 
Figure 7: The Ladder of Citizen Participation 
 
 
Source: Based on Arnstein (1969), Feingold (1977) and Charles and DeMaio (1993) 
 
Figure 7:80 is an illustration of the ladder of citizen participation. It is based on Arnstein, 
(1969), Charles and DeMaio (1993) and Feingold (1977). Arnstein asserts that citizen 
control, delegated power and partnership illustrate the degree of citizen power. She argues 
that citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power, and that participation without 
redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless. The top three 
levels of participation on Arnstein’s ladder presuppose equal sharing of power between the 
elite and ordinary community members. In the middle of the ladder of citizen participation, 
Arnstein (1969) argues that placation, consultation and informing reflect the degree of 
5. Placation 
8. Citizen control 
4. Consultation 
3. Informing 
2. Therapy 
7. Delegated power 
6. Partnership 
1. Manipulation 
Typical levels of non-participation 
A high degree of tokenism by the elite 
Power sharing between elite & citizens 
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tokenism that exists (Soen, 1981:108). Arnstein (1969) further asserts that therapy and 
manipulation are typical levels of non-participation. White (1996:6), in contrast, contends 
that while participation has the potential to challenge patterns of dominance, it may also be 
the means through which existing power relations are entrenched and reproduced. 
 
Despite being one of the most influential theories of citizen participation, there have been 
attempts to modify the model. For example, Feingold (1977:157) attempted to increase the 
likelihood of citizen participation by reducing the rungs of the ladder from eight to five: 
informing, consultation, partnership, delegated power, and citizen control. Charles and 
DeMaio (1993:893) further modified the ladder and collapsed it into three categories: 
consultation, partnership and citizen control. These variations illustrate that there are 
significant gradiations of citizen participation, and that, the higher the rungs of the ladder, the 
greater the redistribution of decision-making and control to the public. For Charles and 
DeMaio (1993:893), consultation represents the lowest form of actual citizen participation. In 
fact, Feingold (1977:158) argues that, while consultation provides an opportunity for 
individuals to express their views, there is no guarantee that individual views will be taken 
into account. Conversely, partnership represents a higher rung of the ladder; under this, 
power is re-distributed through negotiations between ordinary citizens and decision makers. 
 
Lastly, Feingold (1977:158) suggests two high categories of citizen participation: delegated 
power and citizen control. He postulates that, while citizens may have dominant decision-
making authority under delegated power, they have full control when they are put in full 
charge of decision making under the citizen control rung. Both Arnstein (1969) and Feingold 
(1977) appear to agree that delegated power and citizen control represent the highest form of 
citizen control, since there is more likely to be meaningful transfer of power from traditional 
decision makers. Too often, however, genuine and balanced participation only takes place at 
the operational stages of programme development. As a result, there will be charges of 
‘tokenism’ and threats to withdraw from the participation process entirely (Zakus & Lysack, 
1998:8). Although the ladder of citizen participation is relevant to Northern Uganda, there is 
limited literature as to the extent of community participation in Northern Uganda, particularly 
in the conflict resolution process, and more specifically the Juba peace talks. However, the 
responses of the study participants were very insightful, and will be presented in greater 
detail in the findings chapter ahead. The emerging conclusion is that there was minimal and 
unstructured community participation. 
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Another perspective of community participation was advanced by Wetmore and Theron 
(1998:36-37), which views community participation both as a means and an end (see Figure 
8:82). The authors suggest that, for community goals to be realized, a number of changes 
must take place: the capacity of citizens to influence their own future must be expanded; 
development must progress on the basis of equity so that equality is achieved; and political 
empowerment must be encouraged so that people participate in their own development. 
 
Figure 8: Community Participation as a Means and as an End 
 
 
A Model of Participation as a Means and as an End, Based on Wetmore & Theron (1998) 
 
However in the light of the foregoing discussion, and taking into account the various 
theoretical  models explored in this study, this diagram could be re-conceptualized to bring 
out a stronger connection between the many determinants of effective participation, most 
notably: human needs, human security, citizens’ capabilities, and citizens’ inclusion in all 
community processes. In order to strengthen community participation, the theoretical models 
used in this study can be integrated into a single model to show the interconnected nature of 
the theoretical frames used in this study, and to enable the development of a more coherent 
discourse regarding community participation in conflict resolution processes (see Figure 
10:93). 
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2.1.9 Representation and the Legitimacy of Community Representatives 
Legitimacy means the product of satisfying the felt needs and solving perceived and observed 
local problems, i.e. legitimacy refers to citizens’ support of a policy, order or regime 
(Hanberger, 2003:270). In this regard, it is argued that sustainable peace needs a public peace 
process since the elite - diplomats, governments and armed groups may simply not be acting 
in the interests of the citizens (Lederach, 1997:94-95; Barnes, 2002:6; Pouligny, 2009:174-
187; Ron, 2010:347-355). However, since the entire population cannot attend peace 
negotiations, civil society groups become the people’s representatives and their involvement 
improves the prospect of ownership of both the negotiations and the outcome. In fact, 
ownership of peace agreements creates significant pressure for implementation (McKeon, 
2004:5). Nonetheless, ideally, any peace process needs to be embraced by those who have to 
live with the consequences, namely the population whose exclusion from such a process may 
otherwise alienate them (Barnes, 2002; Donais, 2009: Bell & O’Rourke, 2007). 
 
Further, current research suggests that peace processes are more likely to achieve durable 
peace if they are inclusive because they are then likely to enjoy the support of the entire 
population. It is such inclusion that has a positive effect on the legitimacy of the peacemaking 
process. However, during the negotiation of elite agreements, those who should arguably be 
benefiting from the peace in the first place, namely the citizens, usually do not participate 
(Zanker, 2013:2). This is because such negotiations are inherently elite and often externally 
mediated (Barnes, 2002; McGghie & Wamai, 2011). Although negotiations limited to a small 
number of conflicting parties can, in some instances, be successful, allowing warring factions 
to come to an agreement, a peace won by excluding other groups can come at a price 
(Zanker, 2013:3). In particular, the population may feel left out of a process that is not really 
theirs, yet a legitimate peace process must obtain the broadest possible support from political 
parties and the population (Donais, 2009:3; Wanis-St.John & Kew, 2008:13; Lanz, 2011). It 
is on this basis that there has been advocacy for involvement of CSOs, arguing that they 
make peace processes more legitimate, thus improving the prospect of durable peace 
(McKeon, 2004:21; Belloni, 2008; Jarstad & Sisk, 2008:11: Wanis-St. John & Kew, 2008; 
Lanz, 2011:238; Nilsson, 2012:21). 
 
A clear definition of civil society is useful in understanding what it is, and if it is legitimate 
enough to represent communities in peace processes. According to Belloni (2008:182), civil 
society is the set of voluntary organisations and groups not created by the state. But does not 
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being created by the state give civil society sufficient legitimacy to represent the wider 
community? And is representation understood by both the community members and civil 
society officials? The classic definition of ‘representation’ comes from Pitkin (1967:8) who 
defines it as ‘making present again’ – making opinions and voices present in their actual 
absence. Pitkin (1967:8) distinguishes between formalistic, descriptive, symbolic and 
substantive representation. While formalistic representation refers to the institutional 
arrangements which assign to representatives the authority to represent, and their 
accountability to those they represent, symbolic representation is what the representative 
stands for. In other words, what the representative means or symbolizes for those being 
represented. Further, descriptive representation considers representation to be like a mirror or 
a piece of art, resembling those being represented. Substantive representation refers to 
activities of representatives and whether their actions are taken on behalf, or in the interest of, 
those being represented. 
 
Based on Pitkin’s (1967) framework, it is not immediately clear as to the type of 
representation that was undertaken by cultural and religious leaders, who represented the 
community in Northern Uganda during the Juba peace process, and how this was done in 
practice, especially considering that it remains debatable whether civil society actors are 
legitimate representatives of the community (Bell & O’Rourke, 2007:305; Belloni, 
2008:209). 
 
In arguing for community representation in peace processes, Sharpf (1997:18-36) proposes a 
multi-dimensional framework for democratic legitimacy. It consists of a political system’s 
input legitimacy, which emphasises authentic representation or fair proceedings with all 
relevant stakeholders being involved. The framework also consists of outcome legitimacy, 
which emphasises effective policies as an outcome. While input legitimacy presupposes that 
every citizen should be able to participate in public discourses, linking political decision with 
the community’s preferences, output legitimacy is normally the guarantor of legitimacy as it 
is concerned with a high degree of effectiveness in achieving goals and outcomes that citizens 
are more collectively concerned about (Scharpf, 1997:19). More specifically, input 
legitimacy relies on representation since not everyone will be able to participate in political 
processes (Boedeltje & Cornips, 2004:6-10; Ron, 2010:356-359).In addition to Scharpf’s 
(1997) model, Zanker (2013:5) proposes a model of ‘legitimate representation’ which has 
85 
three elements, namely: significative representation, substantive representation and 
accountable representation. 
 
Figure 9: Model of Representation (Based on Zanker, 2013; Scharpf, 1997; Pitkin, 
1967). 
 
Source: Zanker (2013:5). 
 
Drawing on examples from Liberia and Kenya civil society participation in peace making, 
those in favour of civil society representation provide seemingly compelling arguments. For 
example, civil society groups participated in negotiations that led to the comprehensive peace 
agreement for Liberia, signed in Ghana in 2003. During the negotiations, CSOs were 
involved in the negotiations as official delegates, unofficial observers and as activists. Also, 
civil society groups were appointed to Liberia’s national transitional legislative assembly 
created by the comprehensive peace agreement (Zanker, 2013:6). 
 
While it is widely believed that the inclusion of civil society groups as community 
representatives to peace processes is good, it is fraught with some challenges (Wanis-St.John 
& Kew, 2008:21-22). Involving many parties to a negotiation will not facilitate cooperation 
between parties as disorganization increases with the number of actors, potentially leading to 
a ‘progressive deterioration of effective communication’ (Zanker, 2013:3). In addition, civil 
society representatives and community members invited to participate in the Liberia peace 
process reported that their participation was constrained by the fear of being killed, in 
addition to poverty and struggling to survive. As such, involvement in the peace process was 
seen as a secondary issue. Furthermore, CSOs which participated in Liberia’s negotiations 
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that led to the comprehensive peace agreement made independent arrangements for their 
participation, and were hampered by financial difficulties and security restrictions (Hayner, 
2007:28; Nilsson, 2009:42). 
 
In addition, various local government officials, youth leaders and religious leaders felt that 
the ordinary people had not been represented during the Liberian peace talks, and that CSO 
officials who attended the negotiations went there to get jobs. In particular, one respondent in 
Zanker’s study (2013:8) claimed that negotiators in Liberia’s peace talks never asked the 
local people what they wanted, and there was no local representation. The Kenya peace 
process of 2008 was also criticised for being elitist and being dominated by top and urban 
elite from the political, diplomatic and civil society class (Zaker, 2013:9-10).Even civil 
society groups that participated in negotiations that led to the Liberian CPA were criticised 
for being western-educated elite who did not know what was happening outside the capital, 
Monrovia (Zanker, 2013:8). On his part, however, the chairman of the inter-religious council 
of Liberia argued that through their extensive networks, they were aware of what was 
happening all over the country (Zanker, 2013:8). 
 
Regarding the relevance of Scharpf’s (1997) and Zanker’s (2013) models, the main elements 
of both of these models seem to have been absent in Northern Uganda’s peace making 
process. It appears that community members did not directly identify with their 
representatives and vice versa. There does not appear to have been any symbolic attachment 
between the community and their representatives, which would make the representatives 
appear more legitimate. 
 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that no other obstacle is more daunting than the choice of 
who should participate in peace processes (Ron, 2010:366). Also, there is a view that during 
times of conflict, it will no doubt be difficult to gather comprehensive data on what the 
population expects from a negotiation process, but at the very least, civil society should 
explain their role and input to those they represent (Zanker, 2013:6). It has been argued, 
therefore, that the long-term benefits of designing inclusive processes far outweigh the short-
term gains of an exclusive process (McClinton & Nahimana, 2008:75; Moran & Pitcher, 
2004:516; Wanis-St.John & Kew, 2008:32). 
 
 
87 
2.1.10 Community participation: an overview 
Without bottom-up community participation approaches to conflict resolution and/or peace 
building, any settlement or development initiative is doomed to failure. The politics of 
inclusion/exclusion play a central role in conflict dynamics with South Africa’s Apartheid 
policy being a clear example of this. The persons who are most affected by wars and violent 
conflict are ordinary citizens, community members whose homes are destroyed and whose 
lives are at risk. They are the ones who can most eloquently speak about the impact of wars 
and how best to address their needs. But the notion of ‘community’ is still highly contested as 
well as the meaning of ‘participation’. Participatory community representation at various 
decision making fora is considered to be part and parcel of any democratic society, and 
having people participate in their own development planning brings their views into the arena 
of genuine participatory decision making (Bowen, 2008:65; Cooke & Kothari, 2001). 
However, the concept of ‘participation’ and its actual implementation is susceptible to abuse 
and misuse, and requires a context-specific interpretation (Cooke & Kothari, 2001:18). 
 
There has so far been insufficient interest in examining community participation in conflict 
resolution processes in different contexts, specifically among conflict-affected communities, 
in order to understand how these processes have contributed to the success and sustainability 
of peace. Proponents of community participation argue that community involvement in 
conflict resolution processes and the utilization of indigenous and socially acceptable 
approaches are more likely to result in sustainable peace (Mac Ginty, 2008:140). According 
to Van Tongeren (2005), by bringing communities together while working towards a 
common goal, individuals and community groups, such as women’s groups, youth groups 
and faith-based organizations, can all play a crucial role in the promotion of peace, 
particularly at the community level. 
 
However, there have been numerous explanations offered for the limited involvement of the 
community in conflict resolution. In Africa especially, one of the reasons given is a lack of 
capacity, especially skills and ability, among community members, yet it is also argued that 
communities can be empowered to improve their capacity and to use their skills to secure 
their own futures. Another problem that is often cited is the absence of appropriate structures 
for community participation. In this regard, Strange (1972:657) argues that there is a need for 
clear citizen participation structures, and that these structures must have clear and direct 
access to the decision-making process .With regard to the gender bias the participation of 
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women in decision-making fora as compared to men has been negligible. Generally, the 
numbers of women who participate in formal negotiations is very limited at local and global 
levels, but this situation appears to be worse in Sub Saharan Africa. The cultural and 
patriarchal systems that have been passed on from generation to generation present numerous 
structural and systemic challenges and limitations that do not allow women to exploit and 
maximize their potential (UNIFEM, 2010; UNIFEM, 2005). 
 
Burns et al (2004:2-3) emphasise the importance of community participation. They argue that 
active participation of community local residents is essential to improved democratic and 
service accountability. Further, Burns et al suggest that community participation enhances 
social cohesion because communities recognise the value of working in partnership with each 
other and with statutory agencies. Thus community participation brings local knowledge and 
local perspectives into critical debates (Cooke & Kothari, 2001:19). The question remains as 
to how one could further empower community members through building their capacities. In 
addition, community participation enhances effectiveness of decisions since their ‘buy-in’ 
would lead to greater success when it comes to the implementation of plans that affect them.  
 
In addition to the above, Conciliation Resources (2013) posits that because community 
definitions of needs, problems and solutions are different from those suggested by elite 
officials, community participation then enables policy to be relevant to local communities, in 
addition to delivering regeneration and skills development and networks, which gives 
community members the opportunity to address social exclusion. Burns et al (2004:3) further 
elucidate that community participation promotes sustainability because community members 
have ownership of their communities and can develop the confidence and skills to sustain 
developments once the ‘extra’ resources have gone. Nonetheless, the traditional model of 
community participation needs to be re-examined. According to Cooke & Kothari (2001:22), 
community members participate in programmes that have been pre-arranged by the elite or 
elite agencies, and not the other way round. In this sense, the nature and extent of community 
participation is already pre-determined and shaped by the interests of the elite. Therefore, the 
assumption that the inclusion of community members is a way of democratising decision 
making is a simplistic understanding of the dynamics of community development. In fact, 
Cooke & Kothari (2001:31) argue that more community participation does not necessarily 
mean that decisions and programmes will favour the affected communities. 
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Despite the good intentions of proponents of community participation, the behaviour of those 
in power (the elite) limits such direct and active participation of citizens.  It appears that 
dominant groups have often deprived the marginalised and more vulnerable and socially 
excluded segments of society from participation in community affairs (Botes & Van 
Rensburg, 2000:50). 
 
This study thus focused on the potential for community participation in the conflict resolution 
process in the Northern Ugandan context. Because of the difficulties associated with 
community participation, the term can be prone to misinterpretation. Particularly in the case 
of Acholi, a significant proportion of the community are persons who were internally 
displaced for more than two decades. 
 
The study, therefore, addresses the issue of whether the participation of ordinary citizens in 
the conflict resolution process could contribute to the sustainability of peace. At the same 
time it interrogates whether the internally displaced people (IDPs) considered themselves as a 
community as such. This study, therefore, focuses on perceptions as to whether the 
participation of this IDP community could contribute to the sustainability of the peace in 
Northern Uganda. 
 
2.1.11 Community Capacity and Opportunities for Participation 
Community participation, however effective, is not a panacea for all community problems, 
although it is essential for identifying and dismantling the political, economic and social 
arrangements that foster increasing disparities between the poor and the rich (Morgan, 
2001:229). However, very often participation is via consultation instead of partnership or 
delegation (Kilpatrick, 2009:39). In this connection, Guijt and Shah (1998:1) criticize the 
participatory development model because many participatory development initiatives do not 
deal well with the complexity of community differences, including age, education, economic 
status, religious affiliation, caste, ethnic group, and, in particular, gender. 
 
Effectiveness of community participation can be linked to citizens’ ability to participate. In 
this regard, Frankish et al (2002:1471) contend that discussions about the roles and 
responsibilities of citizens often focus on their capacity to make decisions. To this end, 
Brownlea (1987) argues that the desire to have community representation may compromise 
the quality of processes partly because the people involved may have limited skills or 
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knowledge compared to those responsible for making the decisions. Also, participation may 
involve people who are less accountable for outcomes than professional decision-makers. 
Other scholars (Arnstein, 1969; Piette, 1990) appear to concur with Brownlea (1987) when 
they argue that participation may be costly and inefficient. 
 
Furthermore, Charles and DeMaio (1993:893) contend that the level of participation in 
decision making is the extent to which individuals have power in the decision-making 
process. For Charles and DeMaio (1993:893), there is a significant difference between 
listening to the views of ordinary citizens on the one hand, and shifting full decision-making 
authority and responsibility to them on the other. The level of decision-making involvement 
is key to defining what is meant by participation and the processes established to structure it. 
 
Also, Sawyer (1995:19) adds that community participation may threaten professionals 
because it requires the sharing of their sources of power – knowledge and skills. In addition, 
Dudley (1993:7) suggests that true participation is a threat to powerful and vested interests. 
Sharing power and other resources with ordinary citizens may result in conflict with the elite. 
Also, as members of the public, ordinary citizens do not have access to resources that 
translate into political power and decision-making authority (Checkoway, 1981; Morone & 
Marmor, 1981). To this end, Charles and DeMaio (1993:888) assert that many of the early 
citizen participation experiments have not resulted in a full transfer of power to the public. 
Nonetheless, there is no question that there is increasing legitimacy for the demand for 
increased citizen participation in decision making. 
 
Nevertheless, there seems to be an increased focus on the need for public participation, and 
this has been a major focus of recommended reforms in the governance sector in particular. 
Richardson and Waddington (1996:314) contend that, for true democratic participation and 
decision making to take place, there is a need to empower communities, while at the same 
time curtailing the dominant role of the professional groups. In fact, Morone (1990:253) 
asserts that the call for citizen participation has not only been one of empowering an 
oppressed group, but of subordinating the dominant groups. However, as Sawyer (1995:19) 
argues, it should be noted that tensions might emerge as experts would feel threatened by 
uncertainty and by an anticipated reduction in their influence and expert power. Additionally, 
Alvarez et al, 1998:4) note that, because participation usually involves a set of material 
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demands, such as a redistribution of resources, its meanings will inevitably be contested both 
at the level of rhetoric and in social practice. 
 
Citizen participation is often said to be shallow – because it normally occurs after issues have 
been framed or the decisions have been made (Yang & Pandey, 2011:880). Admittedly, 
opening up to citizens’ participation takes more time than it takes for managers to make 
unilateral decisions, yet such unilateral decisions may alienate external stakeholders and 
become tied up in controversies, delays or litigations (Creighton, cited in Yang & Pandey, 
2011:885). 
 
Regarding the need to redistribute power, Polletier (cited in Kilpatrick, 2009:40) argues that 
those with power in the community are likely to influence the agenda at the expense of 
disadvantaged groups. This builds on the revelation by Boyce (cited in Kilpatrick, 2009:40) 
that, even in developed countries, disadvantaged groups are unlikely to be able to participate 
equally or meaningfully. In addition, even quite unintentionally, community participation 
usually ends in consolidating the power of professionals, rather than achieving the ideal of 
broad-based local involvement (O’Neill, cited in Zakus & Lysack, 1998:8). Nonetheless, 
Werner (cited in Zakus & Lysack, 1998:3) asserts that, despite the challenges, there is some 
level of agreement that a community’s level of participation reflects the level of power in its 
possession. 
 
But as Chambers (1998:xviii) argues, struggles over power are not necessarily destructive. To 
this end, Morgan (2001:222) contends that power struggles are, to many analysts, crucial to 
the long-term viability of participatory endeavours. Chambers (1998:xviii) hastens to add 
that, for the ensuing conflict to be productive, planners and policy makers need to anticipate 
it and devise mechanisms to accommodate it because participation programmes that cannot 
cope with disputes over power are likely to fall short of expectations. 
 
Particularly during peacemaking and peace building processes, community participation can 
be constrained by the sensitivities surrounding conflict and violence. Often times, conflict 
resolution is overly ‘securitized’, hence creating the impression that it is a matter that should 
be left to the security experts or other elite actors. To this end, therefore, the role of the 
community in peace making is limited to the local level efforts such as promoting community 
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cohesion and coexistence, while the role of resolving the sticking points is exclusively carried 
out by the elite (Lederach, 1997; Conciliation Resources, 2013). 
 
It should be noted, however, that participation might mean an additional burden to the 
vulnerable population (Sawyer, 1995:18). In addition to the burdens that can be imposed by 
community participation and the difficulties in achieving broad and genuine local 
involvement, meaningful participation also brings socio-political risks and implications 
(Madan, cited in Zakus & Lysack, 1998:8). For example, there may be political and 
bureaucratic unwillingness to encourage widespread community participation since it may be 
perceived as a threat to established power patterns and actively resisted (Collins, cited in 
Zakus & Lysack, 1998:8). In particular, involving the community in resource allocation 
decisions undoubtedly creates tensions (Richardson & Waddington, 1996:313). Nonetheless, 
Richardson and Waddington (1996:314) argue that the role for the community in resource 
allocation decisions must continue to be developed. 
 
In the subsequent sections of the thesis, the literature presented will be useful in 
contextualising this study and the analysis and discussion that follows.  
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Figure 10: A Conceptual Model for Community Participation 
 
 
The model, Figure 10:93, shows that the community members are (or should be) at the centre 
of participation processes. Arrows that link community participation processes to the 
determinants of effective community participation, namely human security of citizens, 
satisfaction of the needs of the communities, improved capabilities of community members, 
and social inclusion are connected with the centre to highlight the connectedness of the pre-
requisites for community participation. Conversely put, the model identifies what needs to be 
in place in order for citizens to participate effectively in the peacemaking processes. The 
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model further illustrates that the failure to guarantee human security, the failure to meet 
citizens’ needs, the failure to guarantee citizens’ social inclusion, and the failure to enhance 
the capabilities of citizens, negates their ability and motivation to participate by reducing the 
factors that lead to their exclusion. In the context of former IDPs in Northern Uganda, the 
model makes a case for ensuring human security, meeting citizens’ needs, ensuring citizens’ 
meaningful social inclusion and strengthening citizens’ capability as an effective and 
necessary strategy for dealing with the aftermath of two decades of war. 
 
2.2 Legal and Policy Frameworks for Protection of IDPs 
World leaders, and African leaders in particular, have made commendable efforts in 
developing a sound normative framework for protection and promotion of the rights of IDPs; 
it includes: the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981); the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement (1998); the African Union Convention for the Protection of the 
Rights of IDPs (2009); the Great Lakes Protocol for the Protection of IDPs (2006); and the 
Uganda National IDP Policy (2004). 
 
2.2.1 The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) (1981) 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights covers both civil and political rights as 
well as economic, social and cultural rights. The Charter, furthermore, not only includes these 
rights for individuals but also for peoples. In addition, it also imposes duties, which is unique 
in international human rights instruments (Ouguergouz, 2003). The charter was adopted by 
the African Union (then the OAU) in 1981 and entered into force in 1986. It has been ratified 
by fifty-three African Union (AU) member states, and it provides a full-fledged human rights 
framework applicable in situations of internal displacement. It also contains features that are 
important for the protection of IDPs, such as the right to development (Ouguergouz, 2003). 
 
The Charter’s individual rights and freedoms (civil, cultural, economic, political and social) 
include rights to: non-discrimination (article 2); liberty and security of person (article 6); fair 
trial (article 7); receive, express and disseminate information and opinions (article 9); 
property (article 14); and education (article 17). Furthermore, states parties have an obligation 
to protect and assist the family (article 18). The peoples’ rights enshrined in the African 
Charter ensure inter alia that all peoples: are equal (article 19) and have the right to a general 
satisfactory environment favourable to their development (article 24). 
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In Northern Uganda, however, most of the rights enshrined in the charter have been violated. 
For example, the right to non-discrimination (article 2) was violated, because the people 
affected by conflict, particularly IDPs, were discriminated against in terms of service delivery 
and protection. Many people in Northern Uganda lost their lives, so the right to life (article 4) 
was not assured; the right to free association (article 10) was violated, since IDP camps were 
restrictive and IDPs were not allowed to travel outside the camps (albeit for their own good); 
the right to assemble freely with others (article 11) was also denied, since some IDPs and 
other people outside the camps were restricted from meeting, and in fact often suspected of 
being rebels or rebel collaborators; freedom of movement and residence (article 12) was 
violated, since the population was driven out of their homes and asked to live in IDP camps; 
the right to work (article 15) was denied, since most of the IDPs were unemployed due to 
absence of job opportunities and the absence of a conducive environment for work; the right 
to education (article 17) was also violated, since there were no opportunities for school going 
children to study in most IDP camps. 
 
Further, the right to economic, social and cultural development (article 22) of IDPs was not 
observed, since the context of conflict and displacement did not favour economic, social and 
cultural development activities; the right to a general satisfactory environment (article 24) 
was not upheld either, since living conditions in most of the IDP settlements were deplorable 
and squalid. Further, although the charter provides that states parties shall take the necessary 
measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical 
attention when they are sick (article 16), this obligation was not fulfilled, as 100,000 deaths 
are reported to have occurred by 2006 due to preventable diseases (ICG, 2006b). 
 
2.2.2 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998) 
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement address the specific needs of IDPs 
worldwide. They identify the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of persons from 
forced displacement and to their protection and assistance during displacement as well as 
during return or resettlement and reintegration (Deng, 1999:484). The fact that the principles 
apply during and after displacement means that the human security principles concerning 
IDPs go beyond the period of displacement, to the period of resettlement and reintegration, as 
it usually takes a long time after displacement for former IDPs to regain their capabilities and 
regain self-sufficiency. Nonetheless, although applauded as a useful reference framework, the 
principles are, to a great extent, merely a moral code of conduct. The principles are neither a 
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convention nor law, hence they are not enforceable. Their use is dependent on the good will 
of national authorities, and their commitment to enact an appropriate legal and/or policy 
framework to bring into effect these principles (Kalin, 2007). 
 
It should be noted that the intentions of the Guiding Principles (1998), the AU Convention 
(2009), the Great Lakes Protocol (2006) and Uganda’s IDP policy (2004) are complementary 
and mutually reinforcing in as far as promoting the human security of IDPs is concerned. The 
guiding principles, the UN, the AU and the GoU make explicit statements regarding the 
standard of living and quality of life that IDPs should be accorded, meaning that their human 
security is considered higher, if not at the same level with other forms of security. They all 
aim at preventing internal displacement in the first place, but also advocate for non-
discrimination, respect and observance of the rights and freedom of IDPs, like those of other 
persons, as enshrined in numerous international human rights instruments, international law 
and appropriate domestic law (AU, 2009:2; Deng, 1999:484; GoU, 2004a:4). 
 
2.2.3 The AU Convention for the Protection of the Rights of IDPs (2009) 
In Africa, governments have realized that recognition of IDPs’ human rights and accepting 
the primary responsibility to protect those rights are essential elements in addressing internal 
displacement and its devastating effects (IDMC & NRC, 2012:5). This recognition led 
African countries to the formulation of the African Union Convention for the Protection of 
the Rights of IDPs in 2009. 
 
In its preamble, the Convention acknowledges the gravity of the situation in which IDPs find 
themselves, their suffering and their specific vulnerabilities, and how these become sources 
of continuing instability and tension for African states. It is in this regard that the AU pledges 
commitment to providing durable solutions to the situations of IDPs by establishing an 
appropriate legal framework for their protection and assistance (AU, 2009:1). The AU 
convention acknowledges the lack of a binding African and international legal and 
institutional framework for the prevention of internal displacement and for the protection and 
assistance of IDPs, but acknowledges that the present Convention will provide such a 
framework (AU, 2009:2). The convention builds on the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, which are recognized globally as a useful framework for the protection and 
assistance of IDPs (AU, 2009:2). 
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The AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa is a broad legal 
framework that seeks to strengthen regional and national measures to prevent or mitigate, 
prohibit and eliminate root causes of internal displacement; prevent internal displacement, 
protect and assist IDPs in Africa (AU, 2009:4), as well as provide for durable solutions38(The 
Brookings Institution, 2010:5). In fact, the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance 
of IDPs in Africa is the first regional treaty to address the IDP issue comprehensively, from 
preventing displacement to providing protection and assistance, and supporting durable 
solutions. The AU Convention (also known as the Kampala Convention) represents a critical 
new tool for tackling some of the largest and most complex IDP situations in the world: some 
ten million people are internally displaced across the continent, making up one third of the 
world’s IDP population (Bradley & Aspelt, 2012). 
 
The AU Convention significantly advances the normative framework on internal 
displacement in several key areas, including: the protection from arbitrary displacement; the 
responsibilities of the African Union, multinational companies and private security actors; 
and the right to a remedy for the wrongs associated with displacement. Article 12(3) of the 
convention, for example, provides that reparations shall be payable for damages incurred 
when a state merely refrains from protecting and assisting IDPs in the event of a natural 
disaster. In fact, remedies may be sought by any person affected by displacement, even in 
cases where the displacement occurs because of natural disasters or for any other reason 
outside the state’s control. This wording suggests that, in addition to IDPs themselves, other 
groups affected by displacement, such as host and return communities, may also be entitled to 
redress (Bradley & Aspelt, 2012). 
 
The Convention is an affirmation of the leading role and responsibility of national 
governments in protecting and assisting IDPs and preventing situations of internal 
displacement in the region as well as within their individual countries by addressing the 
phenomenon’s root causes (AU, 2009:4). Prior to the enactment of the AU Convention in 
2009, IDPs were not protected under international law, but they, in fact, often fell through 
‘the protection gap’ at the domestic level. Although many IDPs remain marginalised and 
                                                 
38 The three recommended durable solutions are: (1) sustainable reintegration at the place of origin; (2) 
sustainable local integration in areas where IDPs take refuge (local integration); and (3) sustainable integration 
in another part of the country (settlement elsewhere in the country). 
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vulnerable to human rights violations for extended periods, it is hoped that enactment of the 
convention will contribute to Africa’s overall human security and development, in addition to 
providing a framework for the prevention of displacement in the first place, and thereafter the 
protection and assistance given to IDPs. To highlight the high likelihood of success in 
implementing the convention, thirty-five of the fifty-three Africa countries had already signed 
the Convention, while eleven had ratified it by April 2012. Nonetheless, the convention has 
not yet come into force, since it can only do so after fifteen AU member states have ratified 
or acceded to it (Bradley & Asplet, 2012). 
 
The AU further declared its determination to adopt measures aimed at preventing and putting 
an end to the phenomenon of internal displacement by eradicating the root causes, especially 
persistent and recurrent conflicts, as well as addressing displacement caused by natural 
disasters, which have a devastating impact on human life, peace and stability, security and 
development (AU, 2009:1). The AU further affirms its primary responsibility and 
commitment to respect protect and fulfil the rights to which IDPs are entitled, without 
discrimination of any kind (AU, 2009:2). 
 
As a way of addressing economic as well as other dimensions of human security of IDPs, the 
AU Convention (2009:5) commits to the promotion of self-reliance and sustainable 
livelihoods of IDPs. Also, as a mechanism for enacting legal frameworks for protection and 
assistance of IDPs, the AU Convention (AU, 2009:5-6) commits states parties to incorporate 
provisions of the Convention and other relevant international instruments and obligations into 
domestic law by enacting or amending relevant legislation on the protection of, and 
assistance to IDPs. As an element of legislation, states parties shall designate an authority or 
body to coordinate IDP-related issues (AU, 2009: 6). Through the Convention, states parties 
reaffirm that it is the primary responsibility of the states to accord protection and assistance 
of IDPs (AU, 2009:7), and as such that they shall provide IDPs with adequate basic 
humanitarian assistance in terms of food, water, shelter, medical care and other health 
service, sanitation, education and other necessary services (AU, 2009:12). 
 
2.2.4 The Great Lakes Protocol on Protection and Assistance of IDPs (2006) 
The Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection of and Assistance to IDPs (2006) was established 
to provide a legal framework for ensuring the adoption and implementation, by member 
states, of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in the Great Lakes Region. The 
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protocol was also put in place to ensure legal protection, by member states, of the physical 
safety and material needs of IDPs in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement. Further, the protocol is intended to provide a legal basis for the domestication 
of the Guiding Principles into national legislation by member states. Lastly, the protocol is 
intended to commit member states to prevent and eliminate the root causes of displacement 
(International Conference for the Great Lakes Region [ICGLR], 2006:2). 
 
The Great Lakes Protocol confers upon member states a number of responsibilities, notably: 
the responsibility to undertake to prevent arbitrary displacement and to eliminate the root 
causes of displacement; to mitigate, to the extent possible, the consequences of displacement 
caused by natural disasters and natural causes; to protect the physical and material safety of 
IDPs during flight, in places of displacement, and upon their return, or resettlement elsewhere 
within the territory of the State; to assess the needs of IDPs and to assist them with 
registration and maintenance of a national data base for the registration of IDPs; to designate 
organs of government responsible for disaster emergency preparedness, and for coordinating 
protection and assistance to IDPs; to facilitate rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access and 
assistance to IDPs; to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian personnel in areas of 
displacement; to safeguard and maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of the 
protection and location of IDPs in accordance with international guidelines on the separation 
of armed elements; to adhere to the principles of international humanitarian law and human 
rights applicable to the protection of IDPs; and to ensure the safe location of IDPs in 
satisfactory conditions of dignity, hygiene, water, food and shelter, away from areas of armed 
conflict and danger, and having regard to the special needs of women, children, the 
vulnerable, and persons with disabilities (ICGLR, 2006:2-4). 
 
The formulation of the Great Lakes Protocol presents an international agreement adopted at a 
sub-regional level, and makes incorporation of the Guiding Principles into domestic law an 
obligation. This is a very promising way to build consensus on the need to protect IDPs 
legally and on the content of such protection bottom-up; it could also serve as an example for 
other regions (Kalin, 2007:4). 
 
2.2.5 The Uganda National Policy for IDPs (2004) 
Uganda’s National Policy for IDPs was adopted in 2004 to promote the protection of and 
assistance to IDPs. The policy draws on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and 
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commits the GoU to protect its citizens against arbitrary displacement, to guarantee their 
rights during displacement, and to promote durable solutions by facilitating their voluntary 
return, resettlement, integration and re-integration (GoU, 2004b:19-23). The policy also 
guarantees that IDPs will not be deprived, arbitrarily or compulsorily, of property or any 
interest in the right over property (GoU, 2004b:24). Further, the policy guarantees food 
security, shelter, clothing, education, health, as well as water and sanitation for IDPs (GoU, 
2004b:24-28). Since the end of hostilities in 2006, over 98% of IDPs in Northern Uganda 
have returned to their ancestral communities, with a small minority, particularly the old and 
vulnerable, remaining in IDP camps. 
 
Nonetheless, there remain serious security, humanitarian and human rights problems not only 
in IDP camps, but also in areas of return and resettlement. These issues include: poor health 
and sanitation conditions; lack of access to schools and availability of teachers; inadequate 
and low quality of health facilities; rampant land and property conflicts; high levels of sexual 
and gender-based violence; and violation of the rights of citizens (IDMC & NRC, 2012). 
 
Nonetheless, the Uganda IDP policy has not fulfilled its intention to promote the human 
security of the IDPs. Although the GoU has developed and implemented parts of the National 
Policy for Internally Displaced Persons (2004), it has not resulted in any profound changes; 
it is not clear whether this is a result of a lack of political capacity or the ability to implement 
policy or to create conditions in which the policy could be effective (The Brookings 
Institution, 2006:12). Government, and indeed other duty bearers, need to ensure that people 
affected by conflict are accorded the necessary assistance and that the work of the policy goes 
beyond areas of internal displacement so as to continue guiding the broader recovery and 
development initiatives taking place in communities of former IDPs (The Brookings 
Institution, 2006:12). As an element of human security, therefore, government should show 
political commitment and demonstrate such commitment to re-prioritising the needs of 
former IDPs. 
 
Finally, it should become clear that the various elements in the conceptual mapping of the 
study, that is social inclusion and exclusion; the human needs framework; the human security 
framework, and the capability approach are all interlinked as they highlight various facets 
that impact on the level of community participation and the processes involved in conflict 
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resolution an in peace building. This multi–theoretical framework will provide the researcher 
with a nuanced lens through which to analyse the findings. 
 
2.3 Summary 
The chapter presented the key literature and theoretical frameworks that guided the study. In 
particular, the chapter provided a link between the literature and the theoretical frameworks 
used in the study, in addition to establishing linkages to the context in Northern Uganda. In 
addition, the chapter presented an analysis of some of the major legal and policy frameworks 
for protection of IDPs. Some of these are national, regional as well as international legal and 
policy instruments. 
 
The following chapter presents the methodology used to undertake this research. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research questions and design; study area and population; map of 
the Acholi sub-region; sample size and selection; research instruments; piloting the research 
instruments; facilitators and interpreters; data collection approach; data cleaning; data 
verification; qualitative data analysis; research ethics and finally the limitations of this 
research. 
 
3.1 Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer the following research questions: 
1. Who were the major participants and actors in the peace process? 
2. What are the capacities, potential and opportunities of community members that will 
allow them to participate meaningfully in conflict resolution processes? 
3. What was the nature and level of community participation in the Northern Uganda 
conflict resolution processes? 
4. How appropriate were the mechanisms for engaging conflict-affected communities? 
5. What traditional mechanisms are already in use by the conflict-affected communities? 
 
The following design and methodological considerations are directly linked to answering the 
research questions in the most appropriate manner. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
A research design is a plan that guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analyzing 
and interpreting observations (Yin, 2003:21). It is the logical link between the data to be 
collected and the conclusions to be drawn about the initial questions of the study. This study 
adopted a purely qualitative exploratory research design. A qualitative exploratory research 
design has to do with finding out what is happening (exploring phenomena), acquiring new 
insights, or asking new questions (Robson, 1993:42). 
 
The qualitative exploratory research design was considered appropriate for the study because 
it satisfactorily enabled the study to describe the Northern Uganda conflict resolution process. 
As Hollis (1994:17) has argued, a qualitative research design is useful in obtaining 
descriptive answers on how the study participants perceive the meaning of the various aspects 
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of the study. In this case, the understanding of the meaning of various events in Northern 
Uganda during two decades of civil conflict was vital. In addition, the exploratory design was 
useful in obtaining information from a relatively un-researched area, and in uncovering 
perceptions about political behaviour and attitudes that it is not possible to quantify 
(Harrison, 2001:74). Further, the qualitative research design was suitable for exploring the 
subject matter in as much detail as possible, and thus for achieving ‘depth’ rather than 
‘breadth’ (Blaxter et al, 2006:60). As such, this design was considered appropriate for the 
study since it focussed on gaining an understanding of the insights that respondents had about 
the Northern Uganda conflict resolution process. 
 
3.3 Study Area and Population 
The area chosen for this study was the Acholi sub-region of Northern Uganda, an area that 
was extensively devastated by armed conflict for twenty-one years. 
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Figure 11: Map of Acholi Sub-Region (Study Areas Are Circled) 
 
Source: http://reliefweb.int/map/uganda/northern-uganda-sub-regions (accessed 27 May 
2010) 
 
At the commencement of the study, the area was composed of four districts (administrative 
units), namely: Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Amuru. However, during and shortly after the study 
period, three new districts were created out of these four districts. Nwoya district was carved 
out of Amuru; Agago district was carved out of Pader, while Lamwo district was carved out 
GULU 
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AMURU 
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KITGUM 
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of Kitgum district. For purposes of this study, the original four districts will constitute the 
area of study. 
 
The main town in Acholi, Gulu, is located 240 kilometres from Kampala, the capital of 
Uganda. At the end of 2006, the population of Acholi sub-regions was 1,047,800. This 
population is predominantly rural and is resident in nine (9) counties and fifty-nine (59) sub-
counties (Fountain Publishers, 2007). The population in Acholi is represented in the national 
assembly (parliament) by eleven (11) directly elected members of parliament, seven (7) 
women members of parliament and one (1) youth representative. 
 
In terms of the economy, the main economic activities in Acholi are agriculture (mainly crop 
production) and fishing. It should be noted that over 90% of Acholi population lived in IDP 
camps for more than 21 years. As such, the level of economic activity in the region is very 
low. This explains the high poverty levels in the sub-region, which was 60.7% for Northern 
Uganda in 2008 (UBOS, 2009:24-25), and 46% in 2010 (GoU, 2012a:20). 
 
The Acholi sub-region was purposely chosen because it is the sub-region in Northern Uganda 
that was most affected by the violent conflict that paralyzed the communities for 21 years, 
leading to displacement of nearly 90% of the local population. The primary respondents for 
this study were ordinary citizens who participated in Focus Group Discussions (here after 
referred to as FGDs), plus local leaders, opinion leaders, CSO representatives, cultural 
leaders and religious leaders who participated in Key Informant (KI) interviews. 
 
Figure 12: Diagrammatic Structure of the Study Area 
 
 
GULU DISTRICT 
3 counties 
15 sub-counties 
PADER DISTICT 
2 counties 
18 sub-counties 
AMURU DISTRICT 
2 counties 
8 sub-counties 
KITGUM DISTRICT 
2 counties 
18 sub-counties 
ACHOLI SUB-REGION 
(4 Districts: Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Amuru) 
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Table 1: Sample of Sub-Counties in the Study Districts 
District Sub-County Total 
Amuru Koch Goma; Lamogi; Pabbo 3 
Gulu Bardege; Bungatira; Laroo; Layibi; Ongako; Unyama 6 
Kitgum Amida; Kitgum Town Council 2 
Pader Atanga; Pader Town Council;  2 
Total Sub-counties  13 
 
The thirteen sub-counties were selected using both purposive and simple random sampling 
techniques; a simple random sample was used to choose the specific study areas from the 
four districts (see Table 1:106). The non-probability (purposive) sampling techniques used 
were snowball and quota sampling. After selection of the sub-counties, FGD participants 
were selected using the quota sampling technique while KI interview respondents were 
selected using the snowball technique. 
 
3.4 Sample Size and Selection 
Sampling is the process of choosing a smaller, more manageable number of people to take 
part in research (Dawson, 2002:47). The study used mostly purposive non-probability 
sampling with random probability sampling used where necessary. These techniques were 
used to identify KIs and FGD participants. In particular, the snowball technique was critical, 
since respondents with the relevant information were generally unknown or were hard-to-
reach (Strydom & Delport, cited in De Vos, 2002:336). 
 
The purposive sampling technique was guided by various factors: emphasis was placed on 
districts where most LRA atrocities were committed; districts that hosted the highest number 
of IDPs during the conflict; access to the local population as determined by the level of 
settlement of the returning IDPs; the district that is home to the LRA leader; districts that still 
hosted IDPs during the study period; the location of critical KIs; and the accessibility to the 
district and sub-counties in terms of distance. 
 
The snowball and quota sampling techniques were used to select the participants that had 
played a more direct role in the peacemaking process. This involved identifying an individual 
(or organization) that had participated in the peace process. The first respondent helped in 
identifying the next, and so on. The snowball technique was applied until the required quota 
of respondents was reached. Notwithstanding the small sample of this study, as in other 
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qualitative studies, the sample size provided deeper insights and understanding of the conflict 
in Northern Uganda. 
 
3.4.1 Selection of Key Informants 
Twenty-six (26) KIs were purposely selected. They included political leaders, religious 
leaders, cultural leaders, opinion leaders, women leaders, youth leaders, as well as CSO 
representatives. The detailed sample is summarised in Table 3:108. An effort was made to 
ensure the representation of women and youth. 
 
The rationale for the above mix of KIs from key categories of the community leaders was that 
they were the most suitable respondents for this study because they were information rich. In 
addition, they represented a wide range of perspectives due to their diverse roles and 
leadership responsibilities in Acholi, and they were well informed about the issues affecting 
their local communities, including their aspirations. Further, these respondents could have 
potentially had a chance to participate in the Northern Uganda conflict resolution process. 
However, to balance the information obtained from them, FGD meetings with ordinary 
community members were also held. 
 
Table 2: Sample of Key Informants 
District CSOs Religious 
Leaders 
Political 
Leaders 
Cultural 
Leaders 
Opinion 
Leaders 
Civil 
Servants 
Total 
Gulu 8 1  2 1 2 14 
Amuru 2 - 3 - - - 5 
Kitgum 1 1   2 - 4 
Pader 3 - - - - - 3 
Total 14 2 3 2 3 2 26 
 
Please note that Gulu district had the majority number of KIs because it was the epicentre of 
the conflict, and because it also hosts the offices of the majority of the INGOs, NGOs and 
CSOs operating in Northern  Uganda (including central government representatives, media 
houses, the private sector, religious and cultural institutions). Gulu is also the regional 
commercial centre and capital. It was by default, therefore, that most respondents were found 
in Gulu district. 
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3.4.2 Selection of Focus Group Participants 
Thirteen (13) FGDs were held. The number of FGDs was purposely determined to ensure that 
each of the four districts in Acholi-Sub-region had at least two FGDs. The FGD participants 
were selected through snowball and simple random sampling methods. In total, 169 
respondents participated in the FGDs, divided fairly among the youth, women, men and 
elders. The 13 FGDs were deemed adequate since this approach was aimed at complementing 
and triangulating data collected through in-depth face-to-face interviews with KIs. FGD 
participants were ordinary local community members, most of whom did not hold any 
leadership positions in their community. FGD participants were chosen using the snowball 
technique. The detailed sample is summarised in Table 3:108. 
 
Table 3: Sample of Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Participants 
District Sub-county Community / Village Females Males Total 
Amuru 
 
Lamogi Pagak 04 06 10 
Koch Goma Kal “A” II 04 05 09 
Pabbo Pabbo  02 09 11 
Gulu Bardege Airfield Ward 03 08 11 
Ongako Kal Central 05 11 16 
Unyama Unyama IDP Camp 03 09 12 
Bungatira Coope 06 03 09 
Laroo Bwona-Gweno Ariaga 05 04 09 
Layibi Layibi “A” & “B” 03 07 10 
Kitgum Town Council Ocettoke 09 07 16 
Amida Akworo Te-cwa 04 09 13 
Pader Town Council Kiteng 06 08 14 
Atanga Kal Central 19 10 29 
Total   73 96 169 
 
Please note that Gulu district had the majority number of focus groups because it was the 
epicentre of the conflict and also hosted majority of the IDP camps in Northern Uganda. 
Also, the district experienced peace any other district in the North, so the population which 
had returned to their areas of origin was much higher than that in other districts. It was by 
default, therefore, that most FGD interviews were held in Gulu district. 
 
3.5 Research Instruments 
Two main research instruments were used to collect data for the study, namely the KI 
interview schedule and Focus Group Discussion guide. The choice of instruments was 
informed by the fact that this study was predominantly qualitative and exploratory in nature. 
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3.5.1 Key Informant Interview Schedule 
An interview guide was designed for the KIs.39 The schedule had five (5) sections (see 
APPENDIX 1: Interview Guide:242). The interview schedule consisted of open-ended 
questions to the greatest extent possible in order to elicit spontaneous responses and 
maximize the respondents’ knowledge. This approach enabled respondents to communicate 
their underlying attitudes, beliefs and values (Fielding & Thomas, 2005:126). 
 
3.5.2 Focus Group Discussion Guide 
In a FGD, a number of people come together to discuss a certain issue for the purpose of 
research (Dawson, 2002:76). The group interaction consisted of verbal and non-verbal 
communication and an interplay of perceptions and opinions that stimulated discussion 
without necessarily modifying or changing the ideas and opinions of participating individuals 
(Schurink et al, in De Vos, 1998:314). FGDs enabled the participants to express different 
opinions and experiences, hence allowing the researcher to compare and contrast these 
responses with the KI interview respondents. The FGD guide (see APPENDIX 2: Focus 
Group Discussion (FGD) Guide:244) was developed in line with the research questions and 
was used to elicit information from ordinary members of the community in the thirteen 
selected sub-counties (see Table 1:106). Interpreters used the FGD guide to moderate FGDs. 
 
3.6 Piloting the Research Instruments 
The KI interview schedule was administered to ten respondents from sub-counties that were 
not part of the area of study. The FGD guide was piloted on two FGDs. The purpose of 
piloting the research instruments was to identify vagueness and ambiguities in the design of 
the research instruments and to gain insight into how the actual study respondents might 
understand and react to the questions. Based on the outcome of the piloting, the researcher 
reviewed and revised the research instruments. These revisions included the removal of some 
questions and the inclusion of new ones in the research tools. Further, the pilot test led to the 
refinement, re-arrangement and re-ordering of questions to ensure a more logical and clearer 
flow of the data collection and analysis process. 
                                                 
39 Key informants are individuals who are targeted for data collection because their information will provide an 
accurate and valuable perspective on the setting as well as lead to other sources of information (Creswell, 1998, 
cited by http://www.setda.org/web/guest/glossary on 28 November 2009). 
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Piloting of research instruments is strongly recommended by scholars such as Druckman 
(2005:158). During the pre-test, aspects such as average time taken with respondents, 
appropriateness of questions or topics, and sensitivity of topics or questions were considered. 
As a result, the pre-test enabled the researcher to identify questions or topics that respondents 
did not understand well, struggled with or did not answer accurately. In addition, the pre-test 
helped in assessing the appropriateness of the data collection methods, an aspect that scholars 
such as Druckman (2005:160) have also advocated. Following the pre-tests, responses were 
analysed and the research tools modified appropriately. 
 
3.6.1 Establishing Contact with Key Informants 
Informal discussions were held with KIs in order to brief them about the purpose of the 
research and to set up appointments for in-depth face-to-face interviews with them at a later 
stage. This process enabled the researcher to identify and establish contact with respondents 
deemed most suitable for the study. Advance contacts with the KIs enabled the building of 
trust between the researcher and the participants, which contribute to a smooth interview 
process (Shenton, 2004:65). The KIs were adequately prepared for the interviews since they 
had been given ample notice prior to the interview. The researcher carried out all twenty-six 
interviews. 
 
3.6.2 Mobilizing FGD Participants 
FGD participants were identified using the snowball sampling method. This process was 
facilitated by four community guides, one from each of the four districts. This process was 
undertaken well in advance of the FGD interviews and appointments set up with the 
respective focus groups. FGDs were held on dates and at venues agreed by the participants 
themselves. The FGDs were held, as much as possible, at venues that were deemed neutral 
and known to respondents, such as school premises, community centres, government offices, 
and health centres. 
 
3.7 Facilitators and Interpreters 
The researcher identified, selected and trained three qualified facilitators and interpreters who 
were assigned to work as interpreters and facilitators during FGDs. Alongside the researcher, 
the facilitators recorded and transcribed qualitative data obtained during FGDs. 
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3.7.1 Profile of Facilitators and Interpreters 
The facilitators identified held a minimum qualification of a Bachelor’s Degree, although 
preference was given to current students of Peace and Conflict Studies. The facilitators were 
familiar with basic qualitative research techniques, particularly interviewing. They also had 
some work and/or research experience in Northern Uganda, and Acholi in particular. They 
had very good knowledge of Luo, the Acholi local language, at the level of translation and 
interpretation. Preference was given to those whose first language was Luo and who could 
speak, read and write it. Also, facilitators had to demonstrate an ability and willingness to 
work for extended hours and days in places still perceived to be insecure. 
 
Table 4: Profile of Facilitators and Interpreters 
Research 
Assistant 
Gender Age Qualification Language(s) 
Spoken 
No of FGDs 
moderated 
RA 1-TO M 37 B (SWSA); PGD (PPM) Luo 5 
RA 2-JO M 32 B.A (Arts) Luo 4 
RA 3-PO M 35 B.A (SS) Luo 4 
Researcher M 38 PhD Candidate English Present at all FGDs 
 
Legend 
B (SWSA): Bachelor of Social Work and Social Administration 
PGD (PPM): Post-Graduate Diploma in Project Planning and Management 
B.A (Arts): Bachelor of Arts 
B.A (SS): Bachelor of Arts with Social Sciences 
 
Please note that all facilitators were male for a number of reasons: because their work was 
predominantly to moderate FGDs, there was a need for cultural sensitivity due to bias against 
the female gender by the local population. Also, most FDGs were held in rural areas where 
there is a low appreciation of female researchers. In addition, due to the perceived insecurity 
prevalent in Acholi at the time of the field research, few female researchers were willing to 
spend substantial amount of their time in remote areas, with limited amenities. Although the 
researcher made an effort to identify female facilitators from the research areas, those who 
were willing to work under these conditions had very limited experience and skills of 
interviewing and moderating FGDs. Nonetheless, the researcher believes that the presence of 
female facilitators would have made a difference. 
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3.7.2 Training of Facilitators and Interpreters 
The facilitators were trained in basic qualitative research skills (qualitative data collection 
and analysis) by the researcher himself in order to ensure a clear understanding of the subject 
matter, the key objectives of the research, the research questions, and the techniques for 
interviewing and recording responses from the FGDs. The training ensured that facilitators 
became conversant with the entire research undertaking and that they gained confidence to 
carry out their tasks without major errors. In particular, the training for facilitators focused on 
moderating FGDs, recording responses, using voice recorders and transcribing recorded data. 
 
3.8 Data Collection Approach 
Data for this study were collected using two key qualitative methods: in-depth interviewing 
and FGDs. While the researcher conducted all the face-to-face in-depth KI interviews, the 
facilitators moderated the FGD interviews mainly because these were held in Luo, a local 
language in which that the researcher was not conversant. 
 
3.8.1 Data Collection using the Key Informant Interview Schedule 
Most KI interviews were held at offices or homes of the respondents, although some were 
held at private places, such as hotels, because these proved more centrally located and offered 
a more quiet and private environment for an extensive interview. The locations were always 
mutually agreed between the researcher and respondents. 
 
The researcher himself conducted the interviews with all the twenty-six (26) KIs. To ensure a 
good flow of the interviews, one facilitator took notes during each interview. This method 
proved to be very useful, since a few respondents had initially declined to have their 
responses tape-recorded, fearing that some of their opinions would not be ‘politically’ 
correct. However, following satisfactory explanation of the ethical code of conduct guiding 
the researcher, all respondents agreed to have their responses tape-recorded. This provided a 
back-up for the hand-written material. In addition, the researcher endeavoured to write down 
critical issues during interviews. The researcher also transcribed and analyzed qualitative data 
from the KI interviews. As a result of the need for clarification, concrete information or 
second opinion as a result of gaps realized during and after preliminary data analysis, some 
face-to-face meetings and follow-up telephone interviews with KIs were done where 
necessary. 
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One of the major problems experienced during the KI interview process was the failure of the 
respondents to keep their appointment times. The researcher made phone calls to give 
respondents ‘gentle reminders’ about the scheduled meetings, but also to offer to move the 
interview to another more convenient place, if the respondent deemed it necessary. 
 
3.8.2 Data Collection through Focus Group Discussions 
Thirteen (13) FGDs, at least two (2) in each district, were held. The smallest FGD was made 
up of nine participants and the largest was composed of 29 participants.40 FGDs lasted 
approximately one-and-a-half to two hours (90-120 minutes). FGDs involved ordinary 
community member, with the exception of one local leader in each FGD. During the FGDs, 
the objectives of the study were elaborated in simple and clear terms, hence creating a free 
atmosphere. Because of the language barrier of the researcher, FGDs were facilitated by 
qualified interpreters (see 3.7.1 Profile of Facilitators and Interpreters:111 and Table 
4:111). The moderators made efforts to solicit individual contributions from all FGD 
participants, but at the end, the group views were noted down. The moderators also probed 
for details whenever it was deemed necessary. 
 
For each FGD, an effort was made to have an equal representation of women, elders, youth 
and men from that community. FGD participants were chosen using the snowball method. 
During FGD interviews, one local leader attended as an observer. Not only was this because 
local leaders were instrumental in community mobilisation and participation in the study, but 
it was necessitated by the prevailing political and security situation in the area. During the 
period of the study, the study area had just started to recover from more than two decades of 
violent conflict and displacement, so the context was still characterized by overt security 
operations, mass return and resettlement for former IDPs, and political mobilisation in 
preparation for the general elections that were to take place between February and March 
2011. Nonetheless, the presence of local leaders during the FGDs did not appear to influence 
the level of engagement between the research team and respondents. The presence of local 
leaders did not prevent some participants from making critical statements. On the contrary, 
their presence gave legitimacy to the research process and gave the respondents the 
                                                 
40
 Although the number of participants in many focus group meetings exceeded what is recommended, the 
researcher had difficulty controlling the over-enthusiastic community members who expressed the desire to 
contribute to a discussion regarding an issue affecting the entire Northern Uganda. 
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confidence to participate in the study without worrying about any possible negative 
ramifications. 
 
Under the guidance of the researcher, the facilitators transcribed the data from the FGDs, 
after which the researcher himself did the analysis. With the consent of the FGD participants, 
all interviews were tape-recorded and one of the two facilitators attached to each group took 
notes to complement recorded information and also to provide backup data, just in case there 
was to be loss of recorded data. The researcher was present at all the FGDs. 
 
3.8.3 Secondary Data Collection 
The researcher undertook an extensive review of secondary sources of information, 
particularly the review of relevant documents that were critical for answering the research 
question and sub-questions. Specifically, the researcher reviewed several documents related 
to the Northern Uganda conflict resolution process, including the five protocols signed during 
the Juba peace process; the final peace agreement resulting from the Juba peace process; and 
the PRDP document. In addition, other reference documents pertinent to the study were 
reviewed, particularly academic journals, documents analysing the failures and successes of 
peace processes around the world, and other relevant publications addressing the issue of 
community participation in conflict resolution processes. 
 
3.8.4 Language Used During Data Collection 
All data collection tools were written in English. The FGD interviews were conducted in Luo, 
the dominant local language in Acholi, in order to maximize participation of respondents. 
Data from FGDs were recorded and transcribed in English by the facilitators. The KI 
interviews were conducted in English, and information was recorded and transcribed in 
English by the researcher himself. 
 
3.9 Data Cleaning and Editing 
During data collection, data editing was done to ensure that data gaps were identified and 
filled before the research team left the field. On-going editing allowed the researcher and 
facilitators to identify areas for clarification during subsequent interviews. At the end of the 
field-based research, data verification was undertaken. These processes are recognised and 
recommended by Shenton (2004) and Van Maanen (1983). 
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3.10 Data Verification 
Data verification is a key aspect of the research process. It contributes significantly to the 
level of trust that readers will have in the research. Data verification was done according to 
Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) data verification framework, which includes four key criteria that 
are widely accepted as a measure for trustworthiness of data in qualitative research: 
credibility; transferability; dependability; and conformability. These criteria are also 
supported by Shenton (2004:63). Using these criteria, trustworthiness of qualitative data was 
ensured through the following ways: 
 
 Credibility: 
The extent to which the data measures or tests what it is actually intended (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985) was ensured by strict adherence to recommended procedures of conducting focus 
group discussions and maintaining appropriate size and composition. The researcher adopted 
established qualitative research methods and data gathering techniques such as KI interviews 
and FGDs, which are appropriate for such a qualitative study (Shenton, 2004:64; Guba, 1981; 
Merrian, 1998). In addition, the researcher recorded accurately, and in sufficient detail, data 
obtained from study participants (both focus group participants and key informants). Data 
collection tools (the FGD guide and KI schedule) were pretested to ensure appropriateness of 
questions (see 3.6 Piloting the Research Instruments:109). To ensure that participants 
were honest, the researcher ensured that FGDs involved only those who were willing to take 
part and prepared to offer data freely. FGD participants were encouraged to be frank from the 
outset of each FGD. Rapport was always established in the opening of the FGDs. 
 
Before undertaking the study, the researcher undertook preliminary contact and engagement 
with the study participants, particularly the KIs since these were purposely selected because 
of their status in society and because they were information rich. This prolonged engagement 
enabled the building of trust and confidence between the researcher and the study participants 
ahead of the study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Earlandson, 1993). Also, the researcher gained a 
better understanding of some of the KIs that would later become key participants in the study. 
The researcher, nonetheless, maintained a professional relationship with the would-be study 
participants and maintained awareness of the potential for undue influence as a result of the 
sustained engagement (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Earlandson, 1993). 
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The researcher selected the FGD participants using the snowball sampling method in part to 
avoid ‘researcher bias’ and other influences (Guba, 1981; Earlandson, 1993; Preece, 1994). 
Further, random selection of FGD participants was the best strategy for selecting FGD 
participants for this kind of study as there was need to obtain as many varied and diverse 
opinions as possible from ordinary members from conflict-affected communities in Northern 
Uganda and to ensure that the study participants were truly representative of the study 
population (Preece, 1994). 
 
The researcher and the FGD facilitators made the effort to check the accuracy of the data 
obtained from KIs and FGD participants, where possible (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In 
addition, the researcher reviewed other studies undertaken in Northern Uganda and other 
contexts with a similar profile (Silverman, 2000). 
 
 Transferability: 
Transferability refers to the extent to which the qualitative study findings can be understood 
within the context of the particular characteristics of the geographical area in which the 
fieldwork was carried out (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To address this criterion, the area of study 
and procedures of data collection have been documented in this chapter in order to make it 
easy for future studies to compare qualitative findings of this study with those of studies in 
similar contexts. In particular, the study findings may be applied to similar contexts in 
Uganda, particularly in those areas affected by prolonged violent conflict (Merriam, 1998). In 
the same vein, findings of this study (in chapter four) are discussed in relation to other studies 
on community participation and conflict resolution in Africa, and other parts of the world. 
 
 Dependability: 
This refers to the extent to which use of the same methods in the same context with the same 
participants would yield similar results (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In-depth description of the 
research methodology is one of the strategies recommended and thus used by the researcher 
to ensure that this study can be repeated and to allow for the integrity of research results. 
 
 Conformability: 
Confirmability refers to objectivity and the extent to which findings are free from the 
intrusion of the researcher’s biases (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Here steps must be taken to help 
ensure as far as possible that the work’s findings are the result of the experiences and ideas of 
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the informants, rather than the characteristics and preferences of the researcher. The strategies 
recommended and thus used in this study for ensuring confirmability included: triangulation 
to reduce effect of investigator bias, admission of researcher’s beliefs and assumptions 
(reflexivity), recognition of shortcomings in study’s methods and their potential effects, and 
in-depth methodological description. The researcher undertook KI interviewing and focus 
group discussions as a strategy for triangulating data obtained, and as a means of minimizing 
the limitations of using a single method, in addition to exploiting the benefits of both 
techniques (Guba, 1981;Brewer & Hunter, 1989).In addition, the researcher undertook a 
literature review, largely guided by the conceptual map of the study (see 2 Introduction:47 & 
2.1 Theoretical Models and Frameworks:48). Also, some selected documents frequently 
referred to by KIs were reviewed to validate some of their critical responses. 
 
Notwithstanding the difficulty of maintaining confirmability of the study findings, the 
researcher maintained utmost objectivity during the study. The study results are exclusively a 
result of the ideas and experiences of study respondents, and not a preference of the 
researcher (Patton, 1990). 
 
3.11 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Qualitative data analysis (QDA) is a process used to identify themes and to construct 
hypotheses (propositional statements), as they are suggested by data, and an attempt to 
demonstrate support for those themes and hypotheses (Tesch, 1990). Data analysis involved 
systematically and rigorously identifying themes, concepts, categories and wider patterns that 
emerged in relation to the study objectives, research question and sub-questions. 
 
Before data collection, tentative themes were identified, i.e. those given in the research 
question and tentative code categories were assigned based on the research question. During 
data collection, some of these themes were confirmed and new ones were formulated. After 
data collection, information on the code categories was assembled together, hence 
transforming the data into some form of explanation. 
 
Specifically, the following key steps and procedures in QDA were followed as recommended 
by Tesch (cited in De Vos, 1998:43-344): 
 
 FGD interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed by the facilitators/interpreters 
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 The researcher thoroughly read through all the transcripts and got a clear sense of the 
data 
 One transcript was selected and taken at a time and analysed critically to inform the 
themes and categories emerging from the data obtained 
 The researcher generated topics, listed them and clustered them into related topics 
 Using the list of topics, the researcher developed colour code categories 
 The researcher started searching for meanings from each transcript, labelling these 
meanings as themes emerged, and at the same time progressively identified categories 
and sub-categories 
 The researcher crystallized the categories above to ensure that they were mutually 
exclusive 
 The step above was followed by development of a framework of themes, categories and 
sub-categories (based on research questions), which adequately captured all the data 
collected 
 The researcher made sure that the major themes and sub-themes generated were 
logically linked to objectives; these themes and sub-themes were used as the guideline 
for integrating results (actual quotes) and integrating them with already available 
literature 
 To ensure in-depth analysis, themes and categories from KI interview data were 
identified independently from FGD data, and these were later merged to form an 
integrated (composite) analysis framework (see Table 7:130). 
 
3.11.1 Triangulation of Information 
Triangulation41 of information was done in order to improve the reliability and richness of the 
information gathered, and to reduce researcher bias. The use of multiple methods and sources 
of evidence was helpful in ensuring accurate information. Yin (2003) asserts that 
triangulation presents a number of advantages, most notably because the use of multiple 
sources enables the convergence of different lines of inquiry (Patton, 1990; Shenton, 2004; 
Guba, 1981). In this respect, the information collected through in-depth face-to-face KI 
                                                 
41 Triangulation in research terms usually means that researchers use different sets of data, different types of 
analyses, and/or different theoretical perspectives to study one particular phenomenon. These different points of 
view are then studied so as to situate the phenomenon and locate it for the researcher and reader alike (Deniz, 
1978, accessed from http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/plumb.html on 28 November 2009). 
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interviews, plus data collected through FGDs were linked together to arrive at solid 
conclusions of the validity of the information obtained. 
 
3.11.2 Quality Control and Assurance 
In order to come up with accurate findings and informed conclusions and recommendations, 
comprehensive training was given to the facilitators. Among others, emphasis was put on 
how to communicate with and relate to people affected by armed conflict, plus other general 
principles and standards of the research process. Facilitators were proficient in both English 
and Luo, the local language spoken in Acholi. This was necessary for them to communicate 
effectively with the study respondents, including those who were illiterate or semi-literate. 
 
In addition, other steps were taken to reduce threats to accuracy and completeness of data. 
These included tape-recording and transcribing both the KI interviews and FGDs. Also, the 
information obtained from the small sample of KIs was validated and triangulated with 
information from FGD participants. This approach has been strongly recommended by 
scholars such as Gilbert (2005:208) and Burns (2000:419). 
 
3.12 Research Ethics 
Ethics and ethical conduct remains at the centre of social science research and other research 
discourses. According to Strydom & Delport (cited in De Vos, 2002:63), ethics is a set of 
moral principles that are suggested by an individual or group, are subsequently widely 
accepted, and offer rules and behavioural expectations about the most correct conduct 
towards experimental subjects and respondents, employers, sponsors, other researchers, 
research assistants and students. Ethical guidelines also serve as standards and as the basis on 
which each researcher ought to evaluate his own conduct. 
 
Various authors have identified a number of ethical issues, but those in common among most 
of the authors are: confidentiality; non-deception of the respondents; plagiarism; doing no 
harm; data analysis and writing; actions and competence of the researcher; and informed 
consent, i.e. voluntary participation of respondents. All of these issues were considered in this 
study. Moreover, during this study, research was conducted in accordance with the principles 
guiding research, as proposed by Bulmer (2005:49-50). These principles include the 
following. 
 
120 
 Informed Consent 
Respondents were informed that they had been selected to participate in the study because of 
their positions in society, and as members of their community, and because of their 
knowledge of issues related to the Northern Uganda conflict resolution process. They were 
further informed that, in selecting them, the researcher did not have prior knowledge about 
them as individuals or as members of their community. It was highlighted that the research 
design involved snowball and quota sampling, and that this implied that the participants had 
been chosen randomly. KIs were informed that they were selected purposely because they 
were the most suitable respondents for this study because of their roles in society, and 
because they were deemed to be well informed about the research topic. Respondents’ 
consent was sought prior to their participation in the study. Respondents were informed that 
they were free to refrain from answering any question put before them, or to withdraw from 
the entire interview all-together (Shenton, 2004:66-67). Respondents’ decisions were thus 
based on adequate information concerning the nature and purpose of this study. Interviews 
commenced when respondents indicated their willingness to participate in the study. 
 
 Confidentiality 
All data were safeguarded and kept confidential. Identities of respondents were protected. 
Codes were used to connect interviews and respondents. Express consent was sought from a 
respondent whose contribution was to be used verbatim or where it was likely that their 
contribution would be published. The research team ensured maximum respect for 
respondents’ right to privacy. Respondents were met at neutral places or locations of their 
choice. During FGD and KI interviews, the researcher sought and obtained the consent of 
respondents before using devices such as voice recorders. 
 
 Plagiarism 
The researcher took the utmost care to acknowledge various authors or sources of 
information used during the study. This was done through proper citation in line with 
established academic procedure. The researcher avoided any form of plagiarism. 
 
 The ‘Do No Harm’ Principle (Anderson, 1999) 
To the best knowledge of the researcher, the research process did not, in any way, 
intentionally or unintentionally, produce negative results that could have harmed respondents 
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and/or their communities. The researcher ensured that no question posed any risk or threat to 
any respondent. 
 
 Deception of Participants 
The researcher did not deliberately misrepresent the facts in order to make other people, 
especially study participants, believe what was not true. This is a critical principle also 
advocated by Loewenberg & Dolgoff (cited in De Vos, 1998:27). The researcher did not 
withhold information or offer incorrect information in order to solicit the participation of 
subjects when they would otherwise have refused to participate in the study. 
 
 Data Analysis and Report Writing 
The researcher, and indeed the facilitators, maintained utmost objectivity during data 
transcription, data analysis and report writing. The data analyzed was that which was 
collected from the study respondents, and was not falsified or changed in any way. Data 
analysis was done in such a way that it did not change the meaning intended by the 
respondents. In addition, limitations related to the study sample and design have been 
mentioned (see 3.13 Limitations of the Study:121). 
 
 Actions and Competence of the Researchers 
All the people involved in undertaking the research had the minimum qualifications required 
to conduct the study. The principal researcher was a PhD candidate under the guidance of a 
senior academic supervisor. All the facilitators were University graduates in different social 
science subjects, had prior work or research experience in Northern Uganda, and also had a 
very good command of both English and Luo, the local language used in Acholi. They were 
mature, modestly dressed and naturally related with the respondents in their community. 
 
 Publishing Practice 
For any publication resulting from this research, due credit will be given to individuals and 
organizations that have significantly contributed to the study. 
 
3.13 Limitations of the Study 
There is no study that can be concluded successfully without any limitations. As expected, 
therefore, this study had some limitations, ranging from the research design to data collection 
and analysis, and including the research methodology, and the researcher himself. These 
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limitations, and the ways in which they were mitigated to protect the research findings, are 
discussed below. 
 
3.13.1 Limitations Related to the Research Design 
The main limitation of this study is associated with qualitative exploratory research design in 
general. This had implications for time and financial costs, since qualitative data collection is 
laborious and expensive in terms of the time taken to interview a reasonable number of 
respondents, the time and costs involved in travelling to the study sites in remote areas, and 
the cost of materials used in the research process. In particular, the objective of obtaining a 
qualitative understanding of the reasons for human actions, beliefs and attitudes can be 
challenging to achieve. Obtaining such qualitative data required tact and skill in the process 
of exploring in-depth information related to the research topic. In this regard, the research 
quality is heavily dependent on the individual skills of the researcher. 
 
Specifically in the post-conflict context in Northern Uganda, some of the information sought 
tended to invoke strong emotions and war memories of some respondents. Careful thought 
and planning was needed in order to ensure that the results obtained were as accurate as 
possible. Nevertheless, the researcher allocated adequate time for the study, trained 
facilitators adequately, planned for travel and waiting time, and also dealt professionally with 
any emotional situations of respondents resulting from relatively sensitive questions, 
although this was uncommon. 
 
3.13.2 Limitations Related to the Research Methodology 
Although the study sample was heterogeneous and included elite and ordinary community 
members, this sampling frame did not allow the researcher to generalize the findings to the 
general population, partly because the sample of KIs and FGD participants was small. Also, 
the sample was designed to be representative of the districts under study, not the whole of 
Northern Uganda – since only the Acholi districts were included in the study. 
 
3.13.3 Limitations Related to Data Collection 
Balancing the size of the focus group and maintaining rapport with the study area community 
members was a challenge for the FGD moderator(s). In some study areas, community 
members were so eager to participate in the FGDs that large numbers of people turned up 
wanting to participate in the FGD (see 3.8.2 Data Collection through Focus Group 
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Discussions:113). The research team often laboured to explain that only a limited number of 
participants were required. One way that this was resolved was to work alongside area local 
leaders to select the FGD participants. The local leaders were briefed in advance of the 
requirements for community members to be part of the FGD.  This included issues of 
representation of interest groups, such as women, youth, formerly abducted people, former 
rebels, and persons with disability, among others. 
 
The main limitation related to data collection was the fact that data were collected from a few 
individuals, which means that it may not be correct if the findings are generalized to the 
larger population. The researcher also noticed that some of the information obtained from 
elite respondents might not be reliable. Some of this information was also impossible to 
substantiate. 
 
The use of recording devices (e.g. tape/voice recorders) created some discomfort among 
some of the respondents during the FGDs until the researcher re-stated the code of ethics 
guiding the research. In addition, it is possible that participants’ responses were influenced, in 
part, by inaccurate recall, social desirability42and concerns over their safety in areas 
recovering from violent conflict. 
 
The other limitation was the delay in the arrival of respondents at agreed venues, and the 
location of respondents who were based in remote and inaccessible areas. However, as a 
mitigation measure, the researcher allocated adequate time to the research process and 
ensured a good time management plan. Also, the researcher and the facilitators used the 
waiting time to continuously review data that was already collected, so the delayed arrival of 
respondents did not significantly affect the research schedule. 
 
3.13.4 Limitations Related to Data Analysis 
The volume of data, an inherent limitation in qualitative data, made transcription, 
interpretation and analysis time-consuming. The diversity of the sample brought with it a 
diversity of opinion and, therefore, complexity in data analysis. The study was conducted in 
                                                 
42
 Social desirability bias is a term used in scientific research to describe the tendency of respondents to reply in 
a manner that will be viewed favourably by others. This will generally take the form of over-reporting good 
behaviour or under-reporting bad behaviour (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002). 
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an area where the researcher was not familiar with the local language, and hence relied on 
facilitators to moderate the FGDs in Luo and to transcribe the data in English; this may have 
made data transcription difficult and subjective. As a result, it is possible that there was 
interpretation bias. It is possible that the opinions and judgments of the interpreters could 
have influenced the results, as they transcribed the data in English. However, the level of 
training for FGD facilitators, the use of anonymous interviews, the emphasis on 
confidentiality, the supervision of FGD facilitators and quality control were all designed to 
reduce biases and errors. 
 
As a mitigation measure, the researcher implored the facilitators to record and transcribe the 
data as strictly, as accurately and as verbatim as possible so as to limit subjectivity and also 
minimize bias. The researcher further adhered to the data analysis and verification framework 
(see 3.10 Data Verification:115 & 3.11 Qualitative Data Analysis:117) as a means of 
leading to reliable data and conclusions. Themes and categories generated from FGD data 
were compared with those from KI interview data. The researcher found that there was a 
logical connectedness between the two. 
 
3.13.5 Limitations Related to the Researcher 
The major limitation related to the researcher was that he was not conversant with Luo, the 
local language used in Acholi. As such, language was a barrier to the researcher’s ability to 
relate personally to the FGD respondents. In addition, he was unable to facilitate and 
moderate the FGDs. Accordingly, he relied on the ability of the facilitators to record and 
transcribe, accurately and adequately, the qualitative data from FGDs. Nonetheless, the level 
of education, work and research experience and other personal qualities of the facilitators, 
coupled with the training they had received prior to participating in the study ensured that 
they played their role satisfactorily. 
 
3.14 Summary 
The research methodology presented here provides a logical basis for data collection, 
presentation, analysis and discussion of the findings from the study. The study adopted a 
purely qualitative approach, and used a qualitative exploratory design. During the study, data 
was collected through FGD interviews and face-to-face KI interviews, which allowed 
triangulation, corroboration and integration of the data obtained from respondents. 
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The following chapter presents and discusses the study findings, and also provides a brief 
context of Acholi sub-region where the study was undertaken. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
4 Introduction 
This chapter will present the context of the Acholi sub-region; the frameworks for discussing 
the study findings; the responses of the study participants in relation to previous research 
done; and finally an overview of the findings in relation to the conceptual mapping of the 
study. The profiles of respondents in the study have already been presented in Chapter two 
(see Table 2:107 & Table 3:108). 
 
4.1 Acholi Sub-Region: The Study Context 
This study was conducted in Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Amuru districts of the Acholi sub-
region of Northern Uganda between May 2010 and April 2011. During this period, there was 
a relative sense of security and stability among the population, compared with the violence 
experienced in that sub-region for more than two decades preceding this study. 
 
By the time of the study, more than 85% of former IDPs had returned to their places of 
origin, and were already trying to rebuild their lives after more than two decades of 
displacement. Community members were engaging in agriculture and other livelihood 
activities, plus other socio-cultural activities aimed at reviving their culture. The major state 
institutions, particularly the security agencies, the public servants and the extension workers 
(health workers, agricultural officials, vets, and teachers) were present in the communities. 
 
During the time of this study, it was still evident that the respondents and the population in 
general were still transitioning from war to peace. Many were optimistic about the future and 
seemed focused on rebuilding their lives, renewing their livelihood activities and advocating 
broadly for transitional justice, with an emphasis on accountability. At the same time, 
respondents were concerned about challenges they were facing, particularly: the rampant land 
conflicts; domestic violence associated with the gender dynamics of the conflict; the changed 
gender roles during and after the war; the failure to realize a tangible peace dividend; and 
inadequate assistance and transitional justice for the victims43 of war, particularly the absence 
of reparations and compensation. 
                                                 
43 The UN defines victims as “persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or 
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through 
acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations of 
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Also, respondents were concerned about the inconclusive reintegration of ex-combatants and 
ex-servicemen, plus the threat of unexploded ordinances (UXOs) and explosive remnants of 
war (ERWs). This situation is typical of a post-conflict society, and it will take significant 
effort by all stakeholders – state and non-state actors (NSAs) – to address these issues. Local, 
cultural, religious and political leaders, as well as security officials and ordinary people, were 
very cooperative and helpful during the research process, in part because they felt that this 
study might contribute to post-conflict healing. 
 
4.2 The Frameworks for Discussing the Study Findings 
The frameworks for discussing the study findings have been developed systematically. Table 
5:128 is a Framework developed after doing a first level analysis of the Focus Group 
Discussion data; Table 6:129 is a Framework developed after doing a first level analysis of 
the data gained from the Key Informants, and Table 7:130 is a composite Framework that 
sets out the themes and categories generated from both sets of data (Focus Groups and 
individual Key Informant Data). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
international humanitarian law. Where appropriate, and in accordance with domestic law, the term ‘victim’ also 
includes the immediate family or dependants  of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in 
intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization” (United Nations [UN], 2010:3). 
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4.3 Data Analysis Framework for Focus Group Data 
Table 5: Themes and Categories Generated from FGD Data 
Themes Categories 
1. Major participants and 
actors 
 Categories of participants 
 Selection of participants 
 Actors and their roles 
 Limitations of the participants 
 
2. Community capacity, 
potential and 
opportunities  
 Community capacity and potential for participating in 
conflict resolution processes 
 Community opportunities not exploited 
 
3. Nature and level of 
community 
participation 
 Avenues for community involvement in conflict resolution 
 The role of Civil Society Organisations 
 Impediments to community involvement 
 Level of community participation 
 
4. Appropriateness of 
conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
 
 Appropriateness of conflict resolution mechanisms 
 Limitations of the conflict resolution mechanisms 
 
5. Traditional mechanisms 
for conflict resolution  
 Understanding traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution 
 Relevance of traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution 
 Traditional mechanisms used in Acholi 
 Adequacy of traditional mechanisms 
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4.4 Data Analysis Framework for Key Informant Data 
Table 6: Themes and Categories Generated from KI Interview Data 
Theme Categories 
1. Major participants and 
actors 
 Composition of participants 
 Criteria for selecting participants 
 Roles of different participants 
 Mandate and legitimacy of different actors 
 
2. Community capacity, 
potential and 
opportunities 
 Community capacity and opportunities for participation in 
conflict resolution 
 Community involvement in the conflict resolution process 
 The International Criminal Court (ICC) factor in Northern 
Uganda 
 
3. Nature and level of 
community 
participation 
 Community participation in conflict resolution 
 The role of women 
 Participation of victims 
 The role of local and central governments 
 The role of cultural leaders and institutions 
 The formal nature of the peace talks 
 
4. Appropriateness of 
conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
 
 Mechanisms used in conflict resolution 
 Limitations of conflict resolution mechanisms 
 
5. Traditional 
mechanisms for 
conflict resolution 
 Types of traditional mechanisms used in Acholi 
 Relevance of the traditional mechanisms 
 Limitations of traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution 
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4.5 Data Analysis Framework for Key Informant and Focus Group Discussion Data 
Table 7: A Composite Framework for Discussing the Study Findings (FGD & KI Data) 
Themes Categories 
1. Major participants and 
actors in the Northern 
Uganda conflict 
resolution process 
 
 Composition of key participants 
 Criteria for selection of participants 
 Role of the community representatives 
 Limitations of the community representatives 
 
2. Community capacity, 
potential and 
opportunities for 
participation in conflict 
resolution processes 
 
 Community capacity, potential and opportunities for 
participation in conflict resolution processes 
 Community opportunities not exploited 
 
3. The nature and level of 
community participation 
in conflict resolution 
 
 The nature of community participation 
 The level of community participation 
 Impediments to community participation 
 
4. Appropriateness of 
conflict resolution 
structures for engaging 
conflict-affected 
communities  
 
 Appropriateness of structures for engaging conflict 
affected communities in conflict resolution 
 Suggestions for future structuring 
 The role of the elite 
 
5. Traditional conflict 
resolution practices 
 
 
 Traditional mechanisms of Conflict Resolution in 
Acholi 
 Relevance and appropriateness of the Acholi traditional 
mechanisms of conflict resolution 
 Limitations of Acholi traditional mechanisms of 
conflict resolution 
  
 
4.6 Outline for Discussing the Study Findings 
The framework for presenting the study findings has been reformulated to ensure that the 
discourse is more logically presented. Accordingly, categories of objective 2 and objective 3 
have been integrated; hence, the findings from these two objectives will be discussed 
conjointly. The conjoined objectives 2 and 3 will be discussed under the following sections, 
and in the following order (see Table 7:130). 
 
 Community capacity, potential and opportunities for participation in conflict resolution 
processes 
 Nature and level of community participation in Conflict Resolution in Northern Uganda 
 Community opportunities not exploited 
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 Impediments to community participation 
 
Overall, the study findings will now be discussed according to the following structure: 
 
i. Objective 1: major participants and actors in the conflict resolution process 
ii. Objectives 2 & 3: community capacity, potential and opportunities for participation 
in conflict resolution processes, as well as the nature and level of community 
participation in conflict resolution processes 
iii. Objective 4: appropriateness of conflict resolution structures 
iv. Objective 5: traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution 
 
4.7 Major Participants and Actors in the Northern Uganda Peace Process 
The process of resolving the Northern Uganda conflict involved several categories of actors 
at different stages. While the efforts of some of these actors were documented and 
acknowledged, the involvement of others was not as evident. The most documented 
participants and actors were those who were involved in the Juba peace talks (2006-2008). 
During this process, the major participants were: the official GoU peace team, the official 
LRA peace team, and the GoSS (mediation team). Others were observers either officially 
accredited by the peace teams or those individually invited by the mediator. There were also 
regional and international observers from regional and international institutions, such as the 
United Nations, the African Union, the East African Community, and the European Union. 
There were also official observer groups from foreign governments and regional states44, as 
well as local-level observers, such as religious leaders, cultural leaders, elected leaders, 
appointed leaders, as well as representatives of International Non-Governmental 
Organisations (INGOs), local NGOs and CSOs. 
 
4.7.1 Composition of Key Participants 
The level of participation in decision making is the extent to which individuals have control 
over the decision-making process. Listening to the views of ordinary citizens is not enough 
since they need to also participate in the decision-making process (Charles & DeMaio, 
1993:893). 
                                                 
44
 Official observers were: the US government, the European Union, the UN, and five African governments 
(Mozambique, Kenya, South Africa, DRC and Tanzania). 
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In peacemaking, there are a number of dilemmas regarding who sits at the negotiating table: 
representatives of the armed groups and/or political parties? (Oliver, 2002:92).Some peace 
processes may pander to the agendas of those carrying guns, and the political elite 
(Conciliation Resources, 2013:6). At the same time, the ‘elite’ cannot be overlooked in the 
peace deal, thus it was the reason why the politicians and military officers made up the 
majority of the participants in the Juba peace process, to the disadvantage of ordinary 
citizens. 
 
Study participants explained that participants included appointed and elected political leaders 
and CSO representatives, mainly from Northern Uganda: 
 
The RDCs [Resident District Commissioners] and the LC5s [members of the Local 
Council 5] participated. Then also George, the coordinator [of the] Pader NGO 
Forum, travelled there several times to participate in the Juba peace talks. Also 
Hussein of ARLPI [Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative] was directly 
participating in the Juba peace talks (KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
The political leaders, these were actors. We had the traditional leaders. We had 
women, especially the elderly women. We also had the youth, though they were 
brought on [board] at a later stage. Then the civil society and religious leaders (KI, 
CSO representative, Pader District). 
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Figure 13: Core, Peripheral & Minimal Statuses of Actors in the Peace Process 
 
Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
Respondents explained that the LRA peace team was made up of mainly Acholi people from 
the diaspora, who had no first-hand knowledge and experience with the situation in Acholi: 
 
We needed to send our own representative to inform those LRA representatives about 
the difficult conditions we live in here, because when you look at their composition, 
they don’t know anything. They are not part of the LRA fighters, nor did they 
experience the conflict, since they did not live in the conflict affected community nor 
even in Uganda; they stay mainly in Europe and America (Elder, FGD participant, 
Amida Sub-county, Kitgum District). 
 
Nordstrom (1997:94) asserts that, even though local people may be mobilized to take part in 
internal conflicts, they are usually not engaged in their resolution. National and international 
(elite) actors, mainly powerful nations, sophisticated power elites, formal non-government 
bodies and academics tend to become engaged in resolution of these conflicts. This omission 
can be ultimately detrimental to the peace process. Thus, since the Northern Ugandan peace 
process was largely dominated by the LRA, GoU and other elite actors, the outcome may be 
viewed more as an elite settlement45. 
                                                 
45 Elite settlements consist of broad compromises among previously warring elite factions, resulting in political 
stability and thus providing a necessary precondition for the sustained practice of representative democracy 
(Burton & Higley, 1987:295). 
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Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
4.7.2 Criteria for Selecting Participants in the Juba Peace Talks 
Participants explained how institutions with existing structures found it easy to select their 
representatives, while local government representatives were not selected based on any 
known criteria: 
 
Religious leaders formed themselves into an already strong group called Acholi 
Religious Leaders Peace Initiative [ARLPI]. This body was comprised of the Catholic 
Church, the Anglican Church and the Muslim community (KI, opinion leader, 
Kitgum District). 
 
The traditional or cultural leaders also have structures. Rwot David Acana [the 
Acholi paramount chief] would call for his council meeting and they identify who 
should participate (KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
The civil society was only focusing on those involved in peace building aspects like 
CSOPNU, which had structures. So they would come to a district and ask us to 
identify the members involved in peace building and conflict resolution (KI, CSO 
representative, Pader District). 
 
When we come to local government leaders, there were no known criteria. They 
would just select the district chairperson and a few sub-county leaders (KI, CSO 
representatives, Pader District). 
 
The process of selecting participants in a peace process is as important as the peace talks 
themselves, and a failure to select the right participants may have negative implications for 
the process and the outcome. 
 
 Selection of community representatives 
Many respondents complained that they did not know the criteria for the selection of 
community representatives. Furthermore, those who were selected were clan heads and 
religious leaders: 
Key points: composition of key participants (section 4.7.1 Composition of Key 
Participants:131) 
 Key participants included the GoU peace team; the LRA peace team, 
appointed/elected political leaders, CSO representatives, the Acholi cultural 
institution and religious leaders. It is arguable as to whether or not the religious and 
cultural leaders truly represented the local communities. 
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Sometimes the LRA themselves said we want to talk to this person. Sometimes the 
community says, for example, the Bishop of the Catholic Church is the one we want to 
go and represent us because he talks what we want. Nobody from government came to 
select representatives, apart from government sending their own representatives (KI, 
CSO representative, Gulu District). 
 
The way they were choosing these people [representatives], even the community was 
complaining that, “why can’t they come up to the villages and maybe tell us to choose 
for ourselves who we think is best to represent us.” It was not done, not even for once. 
The people in the villages would only hear that so and so has been chosen to go. Who 
has chosen that person? We do not know (KI, radio programme host, Gulu 
District). 
 
Those [representatives] that went to Juba were clan heads, religious leaders, and 
ministers. Ruhakana Rugunda was there, Ochora Walter, and Rwot Acana was among 
them. We even did not understand the criteria for choosing them (Male FGD 
participant, Ocettoke Camp, Kitgum District). 
 
Community members did not even know who, or how many people, represented them during 
the peace talks: 
 
The community is the best representative [of themselves] because we are directly 
involved with the conflicts and we are the people who are suffering. So we are very 
vital in the peace agreement (Male FGD participant, Coope, Gulu District). 
 
The ordinary people were not asked to nominate who was supposed to go [to 
represent them at the Juba peace talks] (KI, opinion leader, Kitgum District). 
For us the ordinary people, we did not know how many people represented the 
community (Female FGD participant, Coope, Gulu District). 
 
Most ordinary people did not understand the selection criteria; they were not involved in 
developing the criteria, neither were they involved in selecting the participants, which casts 
doubt on the degree to which the population owned the peace process. In fact, a study by 
Oxfam International (2007:12-13) established that the vast majority of IDPs in Northern 
Uganda knew little about the composition of the respective peace teams, and most of them 
were uncertain as to whether they had a representative at the peace talks. Even in developed 
countries, marginalised groups are unlikely to participate meaningfully in decisions that 
affect them (Boyce, cited in Kilpatrick, 2009:40). In fact, Chambers (1998:xviii) makes the 
moot point that participation is never consensual. 
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Concerning the need for IDPs to represent themselves or to be effectively represented, Koser 
(2007) argues that the displaced people know their needs and concerns better than anyone 
else, and that, where their direct participation is neither possible nor desirable, it is important 
that representations on their behalf take place on the basis of detailed consultation with them. 
 
Not all participants felt that these representatives were not really reflecting their views. On 
the contrary, one KI argued that the peace process participants did effectively represent the 
local population: 
 
These actors [CSOs, etc] were together with the people [local population], they lived 
in the conflict, they felt it, and they knew it. I think what they presented, or their views, 
fairly reflected the situation people were in (KI, CSO representative, Kitgum 
District). 
 
In order to address the needs of the community effectively, the representatives needed to 
share in the community’s lives since this kind of representation ensures that community 
needs are accurately identified as there is an active and subjective role of representing the 
community (Phillips, cited in Frankish et al, 2002:1476). 
 
 No clear selection criteria and poor communication 
Because of the absence of clear selection criteria, community representatives ultimately 
selected themselves and did not give adequate feedback to the community: 
 
They [observers] sat and selected themselves, without knowing that they were actually 
working for that down-trodden individual. So, when they came back, what did you 
hear? Instead of coming out and going down there [to the grassroots]… Apart from 
radio talk shows, there was nothing like going to Amuru, to Pader to report (KI, 
cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
To them [LRA and GoU] they thought it [peace talks] was their own thing. I 
remember in one of the sessions during the Juba peace talks, we were asked to leave 
the [negotiation] room. One person from the LRA said: ‘when we are discussing our 
things, they should not be here’. Later on when things became hard, the two groups 
[GoU & LRA] now started looking for us (KI, CSO Representative, Kampala). 
 
It would appear that community representatives, to some degree, may not have accurately 
reflected the views and perspectives of the broader community. 
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Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
4.7.3 The Role of Community Representatives (Religious/Cultural Leaders) 
Religious and cultural leaders played a significant role. They resolved stalemates that had 
developed between the LRA and GoU peace teams. They also established appropriate 
structures for information gathering: 
 
At some point during the [Juba] peace process, there was a stalemate. We went to 
Juba for a conference, which we called The Acholi Conference. That conference was 
meant to bring the warring parties [back] to the negotiation table (KI, CSO 
representative, Kitgum District). 
 
The religious leaders played a big role right from the time of Betty Bigombe. They 
were very, very consistent. I would really say they did a phenomenal job. The cultural 
leaders also did a very good job (KI, women activist Kampala). 
 
For us […] we used to have what we call ‘women’s forums’ in the sub-counties, and 
then the women task forces in the parishes. They were forums that we were struggling 
to come up with so that they are able to gather issues from their communities and then 
put them together. We would have the women meet monthly and they would have their 
representatives come here (KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
 
Public participation can be critical when a formal process falters or breaks down. Civil 
society activists can bring key actors back into the peace process and help to create or 
maintain a climate conducive to negotiations. In South Africa, for example, the local and 
regional peace committee structures of the National Peace Accord were able to stabilize the 
situation in April 1993, after the assassination of the African National Congress (ANC) 
activist Chris Hani (Oliver, 2002:93). 
Key points: unclear criteria for selecting the participants (section 4.7.2
 Criteria for Selecting Participants in the Juba Peace Talks:134) 
 Unclear criteria and mandates for selecting participants caused problems of 
legitimacy. 
 Formal institutions, including religious and cultural ones, selected their 
representatives through   their internal structures. 
 CSO representatives were selected based on their expertise in conflict 
resolution. 
 Ordinary people were not given an opportunity to select their own 
representatives and were largely represented by the religious and cultural 
leaders. 
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Respondents explained how CSO leaders and community members were engaged in conflict 
resolution through NGO initiatives and traditional approaches: 
 
We [CSOs] were mobilizing [the] opinions of the local community in the peace 
building process. We carried out research to find out the perspectives of the common 
persons in the villages, in the camps (KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
NGOs were there to mediate and also initiate reconciliation among people. Another 
strategy that involved the ordinary community was the use of mato-oput whereby the 
people are gathered and the ritual for cleansing is performed (Male FGD 
participant, Kiteng, Pader District). 
 
When they [community representatives] came back [from Juba], we managed to 
organize what we call peace summits. There were two important peace summits here 
in Pader, organised by Pader NGO Forum. We even called the Minister of Internal 
Affairs (KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
If civil society organizations and the public are sufficiently prepared to engage in 
peacemaking, it can both create a climate conducive to negotiations and help to ensure that 
social infrastructure is developed for their voices to be heard at formal peace talks (Oliver, 
2002:91). 
 
Figure 14: Key Roles of Main Participants in the Northern Uganda Peace Process 
 
 
Source: KI & FGD Data 
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There was an assumption that every community member had been represented during the 
Juba peace talks since they were part of a political, cultural or religious constituency, and 
these participants were de facto representatives who did not need fresh mandates: 
 
I think these are assumptions - that because they are leaders of religious institutions, 
everybody belongs to a certain religion. So they think that if they [religious leaders] 
are there, then they are representing all of us, because they come to our churches, 
mosques, and because they belong to our cultural institution. But what does this 
representation entail? (KI, INGO official, Gulu District). 
 
I think that by virtue of [the] responsibility that these players [participants] had, they 
could be legitimate representatives of the voices of the people, especially the religious 
leaders and the cultural leaders. They did not need to seek for a new mandate. In their 
roles, they automatically would qualify to represent the people. But maybe the missing 
part was the consultation, so that they would have up-to-date information on the 
issues they were presenting in Juba (KI, CSO representative, Kitgum District). 
 
Every individual Acholi is connected to a particular chiefdom. So, the head of that 
chiefdom [automatically] represents every member of that chiefdom and does not 
need a new mandate to represent his subjects (KI, Cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
It appears that CSOs assumed that they represented ordinary community members because 
they knew what they were experiencing, and what the needs and experiences of their 
constituents were; this is what Prior et al (cited in Frankish, 2002:1476) refers to as 
‘experiential representation’. However, there was a lack of communication between the 
community representatives and the local citizens. Another point of contention was that some 
representatives suggested that no new mandate was needed whilst other thought differently. 
There was also differing perceptions as to whether ordinary citizens should participate 
directly in a peace process. 
 
One respondent argued that it is not necessary for individual community members to 
participate directly in the peace process, since it is implied that they are represented by Ker 
Kwaro Acholi (KKA), the Acholi cultural institution: 
 
KKA [The Acholi cultural institution] is built on a cultural system that is 
representative through clan leaders and clan chiefs. Because of the above structure, it 
is not necessary for individual community members to participate directly in the 
peace process. It is implied that they are represented by the KKA leadership (KI, 
Cultural leader, Gulu District). 
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Trusted leaders were well placed to negotiate peace and speak to LRA and GoU on behalf of 
the ordinary people: 
 
I would feel that a traditional leader is a leader respected and trusted by the people. 
An elected political leader is also one of that nature (KI, Local Government 
Official, Gulu District). 
 
We must know that at that time of the peace talks, it was like clinging to a crocodile 
when you have a capsized boat. Parties that were interested in the success of peace 
talks were able to fund anybody or any team that they thought the parties to conflict 
[GOU & LRA] would listen to (KI, women activist, Kampala). 
 
During peace processes, CSOs can have significant influence, which can be especially useful 
when there is a stalemate, or when one party seems to set unfavourable terms for continued 
dialogue. According to Muhereza et al (2009:29-31), CSOs played an important role during 
the Juba peace process, and they provided some kind of channel through which the people of 
Northern Uganda were able to communicate and express their desire for peace. Once again 
the communication/information channels could have been improved. According to Strange 
(1972:660), participation is a key mechanism for redistributing power and influence among 
citizens and the elite, and CSOs could have done much more in improving the flow of 
communication to the ordinary community members. 
 
4.7.4 Mandate of Representatives 
It would appear that the mandate of these representatives were not clear. 
 
 Questionable mandate of the CSOs as community representatives 
There was debate as to whether the community representatives possessed the mandate to 
represent the conflict-affected communities during the Juba peace process. In fact, some 
observers acknowledge that they lacked a strong mandate from the community, and they 
seemed to be unsure of what constituency they represented: 
 
Even as CSO representatives, religious leaders, cultural leaders and other observers, 
we were always wondering whether we had the mandate from those we represented; if 
we had any, it was weak (KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
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Whose interests do we [CSOs] represent? Are we sure that we are really talking for 
and on behalf of the people? Whose peace? Are we really sure that we are talking 
[about] their issues? Could we have they themselves also participating in this? (KI, 
CSO representatives, Kitgum District). 
 
It is a question as to whether civil society can represent fully the needs of any given 
community (Oliver, 2002). 
 
Some key informants felt that CSOs did not effectively represent the community, and did not 
provide them with feedback: 
 
I feel nobody represented me there [in Juba]. As a community member here, I know 
nobody represented me, because nobody sought my consent, nobody asked me for 
[my] input and nobody gave me feedback when they returned from Juba (KI, Local 
Government Official, Amuru District). 
 
Those supposedly representing war-affected communities [CSOs] were relegated to 
observer status; they did not have [the] space and [the] opportunity to present their 
opinions; if they had any idea to pass on, they could only do it over a cup of tea (KI, 
CSO representative, Gulu District). 
 
NGOs’ credibility as representatives of the poor and marginalised is often debated (Cleary, 
1995; Nyamugasira, 1998). It has been suggested that NGOs are not always accountable to 
the people that they claim to represent thus raising questions of legitimacy (Edwards, 1999; 
Nelson, 1997). 
 
People do not feel that they were represented because there was never any feedback 
mechanism – except for a few messages in the media. Even CSOs, which had 
relatively accurate information, never disseminated it to the affected communities 
(KI, CSO Representative, Gulu District). 
 
The Darfur peace process seems to have been bedevilled by the same challenges as women 
embarked on informal interactions outside the formal negotiations and did not have sufficient 
opportunity to help develop an agenda common to all (Institute for Inclusive Security [IIS], 
2009:13). 
 
Civil society informants however felt differently: 
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The issues we were picking [up] from the community were coming from our day-to-
day interface with the community. We were not assuming situations and then coming 
up with issues. So, mandate? Yes, it remained a question but still we thought that we 
were not really far from the people (KI, CSO representative, Kitgum District). 
 
This voice is similar to that of the chairman of the inter-religious council of Liberia who 
claimed that although they did not consult widely during the Liberia peace process, they 
knew what was happening all over the country (Zanker, 2013:8). 
 
After visiting Juba, they [CSOs] would have a radio program to account for what they 
said there and where the peace talks had reached. Two or three days after their 
return, they air a one-hour programme [on radio] trying to say what they have done, 
who was there, where they have reached and how it is going. Then the next time they 
are going back, they would tell the community (KI, CSO representative, Gulu 
District). 
 
One key informant suggested that existing leaders had a sufficient mandate to represent the 
community: 
 
The mandate, they [community representatives] had because as a religious leader, 
say in the protestant church, a Bishop has the mandate to speak on behalf of the 
people. Likewise, the MPs had the mandate because people elected them to 
parliament. The point is, the mandate they have, does it cover the sphere of peace 
talks representation? (KI, opinion leader, Kitgum District). 
 
Other key informants stressed the importance of community members choosing their own 
representatives: 
 
Representatives need to be chosen by community members. They [representatives] 
may be religious leaders, cultural leaders or ordinary peasant farmers, or other 
people who have community trust, but in principle they should be chosen through an 
opinion poll process owned by the community (KI, CSO representative, Gulu 
District). 
 
Let the people decide themselves, who are to represent them for such kind of things 
[peace talks]. Definitely, they will not leave the traditional chiefs. The community 
knows their resourceful persons amongst themselves (KI, Local Government 
Official, Amuru District). 
 
Drawing from the South African conflict resolution process, Marks (2000) argues that, if 
peacemakers are available, they are likely to be used. A peacemaker’s worth depends on the 
community’s recognition of that role. In societies affected by conflict, it is important to 
143 
involve community members actively in decision making. Koser (2007:13) argues that, 
whether community members willingly or unwillingly become party to a conflict, their 
inclusion is necessary for sustainable conflict resolution. Without firm roots that positively 
connect ordinary people to their leaders and across communities, peace processes are likely to 
wither and fail (Maney et al, 2006:184). 
 
 Legitimacy of the community representatives 
Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions (Suchman, cited in Hudson, 2000). It has been recognised as a core 
element in political regimes, dealing with the relationship between societal acceptance of 
regimes and institutions and their ability to exercise power and authority effectively (Weber, 
cited in Hudson, 2000). Linked to the context of peace making in Northern Uganda, 
legitimacy would refer to whether or not the community had any say in electing their own 
representatives and whether these representatives provided their constituencies with the 
necessary information about the peace process. 
 
In Northern Uganda, community leaders who had not been mandated by the population to 
represent them, did not have any obligation to provide them with feedback: 
 
Here in Lamogi, the only person who went and represented us was Rwot Otinga 
Atwama who even never briefed us of what took place in Rikwangba or Juba. I think 
this was largely because people were not gathered to appoint him in public (Male 
FGD participant, Pagak, Amuru District). 
 
They [representatives] should have reported back to the people they assumed elected 
them. My area of disappointment was the feedback. Feedback was not there, 
consultation was not there… It was the consultation and feedback that created all the 
problems. If those self-appointed people went and came back and reported to people, 
that would have been fine (KI, cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
Thus, the process and outcome of any peace agreement may not be viewed as legitimate by 
the grassroots if they have had very little say in who represents them or had very little access 
to information about the process. 
 
Furthermore, women appear to have been marginalised in the peace process: 
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These people went [to Juba], of course they were representing people, but were they 
representing them meaningfully? The cultural institution, for instance, is mainly made 
up of men. All heads of clans, the chiefs are men and the way the cultural institution 
works, I think is rigid. Most of the religious leaders are men. The main decision 
makers are all men; they are the ones that are consulted on peace, leaving out the 
women (KI, INGO Official, Gulu District). 
 
One respondent was of the view that politicians did not consult their constituencies 
adequately, and that they thus could have worked on the wrong assumptions: 
 
You know some of these politicians do not consult. They will assume that this [their 
own thinking] is the thinking of our people, yet that is his/her own way of thinking. So 
there was no proper consultation by the politicians. So I do not agree that their views 
were the views of the people (KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
The absence of community ownership of the peace process can have a bearing on the quality 
of outcomes of that process. To this end, Barnes (2002) asserts that in the absence of 
opportunities for participation, conflict-affected communities can lose trust and confidence in 
a peace process that does not solicit their input and where actors in the peace process do not 
consult with or inform them about progress. 
 
Many key informants stated that the consultative process by cultural and religious leaders 
seems to have been limited to their constituencies, with limited outreach to outside 
stakeholders: 
 
The actors needed to consult a lot with the people. I am not quite sure whether that 
was done or not. If some did, then that was fine. But I think we have not heard of an 
actor deliberately taking [the] trouble to consult on a particular issue with a view of 
going to present those issues in Juba (KI, CSO representative, Kitgum District). 
 
I think consultations, if they were carried out, they were indeed carried out selectively 
in terms of who is closer to which entity [and] in terms of either the positions of the 
Acholi religious leaders’ peace initiative or Rwot Achana (KI, women activist, 
Kampala). 
 
During the Juba peace process, I do not think they [cultural leaders] really went 
there [to the community] and consulted as much as they should have. They may have 
only consulted the people within the cultural institution, which may not have been 
representative enough. Likewise, the religious leaders, I do not think they consulted 
enough (KI, INGO official, Gulu District). 
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Even those who accompanied the peace team on the government side were people 
who did not consult with the people down here [in Northern Uganda]. So the extent to 
which their representation worked in the interest of the people, I would think that 
should be about 60% (KI, CSO representative, Kitgum District). 
 
The mere fact that you are a representative does not mean that you are complete. 
There must always be consultation and feedback for one to remain legitimate (KI, 
CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
Furthermore, the observer status of civil society leaders and also some politicians did not give 
them enough latitude to represent communities effectively: 
 
Although the community trusted cultural and religious leaders whom they regarded as 
their representatives, their voices were ignored because they were merely observers 
(KI, Religious Leader, Kitgum District). 
 
Politicians at the peace talks claimed that they were representing their people, but in 
the actual sense, they were also mere observers, not participants. They were also 
invited like CSOs, religious and cultural leaders (KI, Religious Leader, Kitgum 
District). 
 
Oxfam International (2007) reached similar conclusions as conveyed by these 
aforementioned respondents. 
 
The community’s ability to choose their own representatives is a critical matter, as it is a 
basic tenet of a democratic society. In this regard, Mac Ginty (2005) asserts that, during 
peace processes, representatives must have the mandate of those they claim to represent since 
the legitimacy of subsequent negotiated agreements is linked to this and could be a sticking 
point. In this connection, Koser (2007:68) cites the example of Sudan, where formal IDP 
representation at the negotiations towards Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
of 2005 was not considered to be necessary, since the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM), being a popular movement with a deep presence in the war-affected 
communities of the south, was their de facto representative. Although mandated community 
representation was seen as lacking by some respondents, it appears that generally a number of 
respondents believe that the community was effectively represented, particularly during the 
Juba peace talks. 
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Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
4.7.5 CSOs as Representatives of War-affected Communities 
Civil society provides a buffer that prevents the state from becoming too powerful and 
authoritarian. Together with the state and the market, civil society could be seen as one of the 
spheres of decision making in democratic societies (Kasaija, 2006:4). The UN has observed 
that the involvement of CSOs in peacemaking and conflict resolution is critical, as they are 
particularly suited for this, given their close connections to the grassroots (UN, 2004:3). 
 
Peacemaking efforts by various CSOs have been documented as being influential in the 
resolution of disputes, not only in the Northern Ugandan context. For example, Van Tongeren 
(2005) identifies a number of youth and women groups that have undertaken significant 
peace initiatives, albeit on a small and informal scale, which have provided bases for formal 
peacemaking. Such examples can be found in Cambodia, Fiji, Sudan, Burundi and Colombia. 
 
The aforementioned examples notwithstanding, in many peace processes, there is usually 
tension between the local people and those who are supposed to represent them. There are 
also tensions with external stakeholders who usually have self-interests that they are trying to 
protect (De Coning, 2013:1). Nevertheless, community participation is beneficial since it 
motivates communities to take responsibility for their own affairs, including their own 
development. It would appear that key informants in this study felt that religious and cultural 
leaders were in fact trusted by communities. 
 
 The Role of Religious and Cultural Institutions 
Because of the absence of direct participation by ordinary citizens in the conflict resolution 
process, religious and cultural leaders were presumed to be their legitimate representatives. In 
Key points: mandate/legitimacy of community representatives (section 4.7.4
 Mandate of Representatives:140) 
 Community representatives did not provide adequate feedback/consultation to 
the grassroots population. 
 Observers acknowledged that they may have lacked a strong mandate from the 
local community. 
 The government peace team did not consult with the local population. 
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fact, it was said that the idea of peaceful conflict resolution came from the CSOs, and 
particularly from religious and cultural leaders: 
 
The religious people [leaders] came up with the idea of negotiation. Government was 
also convinced that, rather than fight, they [would] try [peace talks]. They identified 
the mediators, the local leaders, the religious leaders and even government 
stakeholders (KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
The [Juba peace talks] initiative was born [from] the cultural institution and religious 
leaders. The two institutions worked very closely. When the peace talks failed, they 
were very instrumental in championing the process that brought the warring parties 
[back] together to the negotiating table (KI, CSO representative, Kitgum District). 
 
The paramount chief had to meet so many important people in the Juba process to 
balance [the] views of anybody who wants to take decisions: the head of state of 
Uganda, the head of state of South Sudan, the leader of the LRA, the leaders of the 
peace delegations and the UN Representatives. They all had to consult us, not only on 
facts, but also how it should be handled (KI, cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
Two key informants indicated that cultural and religious institutions were trusted by the 
community as well as by the LRA: 
 
We met Kony and all the commanders for two weeks. That means we were looked at 
as an informal mediator. Government intelligence never trailed us, never investigated 
us. LRA, up to now has never commented that we betrayed them (KI, cultural leader, 
Gulu District). 
 
People [in the community] know that the most substantial ones [representatives] were 
the Bishops. People had more trust in them, because at least for them they have the 
structures where they send even a piece of paper with statements they have got from 
the bush [after meeting the LRA rebels]. During the prayers or after the prayers, 
when they are making announcements, there is that communication given to the 
people. That communication moves so much in the community (KI, CSO 
representative, Pader District). 
 
For a peace process to be successful it is important to have impartial participants and actors, 
as these can more easily gain the trust and confidence of the key parties to a conflict. In 
Northern Uganda, Ker Kwaro Acholi, the Acholi cultural institution proved to be an impartial 
resource for all stakeholders during the peace process, gaining the confidence of both the 
GoU and the LRA. In addition, communities also trusted religious institutions which 
disseminated information effectively through their structures. 
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Over time, peace negotiations have evolved and become more inclusive, with better 
representation from civil society groups at informal stages (United Nations Development 
Fund for Women [UNIFEM], 2005). The involvement of CSOs is critical due to their deep 
knowledge of key regional and local issues, cultures, and relationships, and their ability to 
function in adverse circumstances – even, or perhaps especially – where governments cannot 
operate (UN, 2004:3). Moreover, their proximity to conflict situations allows them to respond 
in a timely manner, which is especially important for conflict resolution. 
 
Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
 The Role and Significance of the Media 
The media can play a key role in motivating people to enter into conflict, but they also have 
the power to promote peace. There are several examples to illustrate this, such as Rwanda, 
Bosnia and the Middle East (Bratic, 2006:1). In fact, Price & Thompson (cited in Bratic, 
2006:6) contend that, in most of the conflicts that occurred over the past fifteen years, there 
was a close linkage between media and violent conflict, and that the media had an important 
role in promoting the peace process through the messages they send out. 
 
Respondents explained how the media in Northern Uganda, particularly radio, played a key 
role as an informal medium for soliciting community views, and as an instrument for 
disseminating peace messages: 
 
Radio Mega played a great role, because there were so many messages that were 
appealing to the rebels. Their programme, dwog paco [come back home] really 
helped the rebels. That is why, whenever the abductees came back, they said it was 
because of this [radio program] that they made up their mind to come [back from the 
rebellion] (KI, Local Government Official, Amuru District). 
 
Radio was used to give feedback in terms of what was taking place during the 
negotiation process. It was the key medium of communication, transparent, reaching 
many people and even the LRA (KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
Key points: the role of religious and cultural institutions (section 4.7.5 CSOs as 
Representatives of War-affected Communities:146) 
 Religious and cultural leaders helped to initiate the peace process. 
 Religious and cultural leaders were the informal mediators because they were 
trusted by both the elite actors and the community at the grassroots. 
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Many respondents spoke of how the media gave war victims and the general population an 
opportunity to have their voices heard, in addition to enabling representatives to 
communicate with local people in the community: 
 
There were radio discussions through forums such as the one called “Te-yat”. It is an 
equivalent of The Capital Gang. The community members called in, notwithstanding 
the fact that not all the people could afford to call in and talk (KI, Local 
Government Official, Gulu District). 
 
Recordings were given to the concerned people who went with them [to Juba] in 
order [for negotiators] to listen to what the community was saying. The LRA victims, 
those whose lips, ears, or noses were cut off, those whose relatives were burnt to 
death, those whose relatives were cooked in pots, those who were formerly abducted, 
and child mothers had the chance to make their views heard [during peace talks] (KI, 
radio programme host, Gulu District). 
 
However, one key informant disclosed how, because of the security situation, media outreach 
was limited to urban and peri-urban areas, although this changed with improved security in 
the rural areas of the country: 
 
We [media houses] were not going very far deep into the villages because of the 
security situation but when the security situation improved, we started penetrating 
into the villages (KI, radio programme host, Gulu District). 
 
Although there are few studies that establish a direct causal link between the media and 
violent conflict due to the complexity of the relationship between these phenomena (Bratic, 
2006:3), it is acknowledged that the media plays a critical role in conflict. It can either 
promote violence or it can encourage positive and constructive efforts for conflict resolution. 
During armed conflict, radio broadcasts can connect combatants and the war-affected 
community, hence providing potential opportunities for communication and dialogue. The 
media can also be used to persuade combatants to abandon the rebellion and facilitate their 
return and reintegration into the community. 
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Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
 Women’s Peace Efforts 
Some of the causes of the armed conflict are linked to discrimination and social inequality 
and thus women’s participation in conflict resolution and peace building is paramount. 
Women’s participation in conflict resolution is globally recognized and called for in the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008). 
However, according to the UNIFEM (2010:1), there has been little appreciable increase in the 
numbers of women who participate in formal negotiations over the past years in conflicts 
around the world, not only on the African continent. 
 
In Northern Uganda, women strategically mobilized themselves to get involved in advocacy 
at the grassroots level. Women’s advocacy efforts provided a significant platform for the 
continued involvement of women in post-conflict peace building in Northern Uganda: 
 
Women mobilized themselves into a coalition. It was a sort of pressure group at that 
point in time and they managed to go on the ground to consult the women in Northern 
Uganda (KI, INGO official, Gulu District). 
 
As women, we came together and identified our objectives. Why did we really want to 
participate in the Juba peace talks? What difference would it make if we were present 
physically at the peace talks? We then had to do a lobby and advocacy strategy to try 
and have as many women on the two negotiating parties, that is, the GoU and the 
LRA (KI, women activist, Kampala). 
 
We [women activists] came up with video clips; we also came up with the women’s 
protocol, which was a small document that influenced agenda item No 3 on 
accountability whereby those parties now agreed, included and even signed that 
UNSC Resolution 1325 under article 2 of agenda item No3. It stated that ‘in any post-
Juba processes, all the women’s concerns will be addressed in accordance with the 
provisions under the UNSCR 1325’ (KI, women activist, Kampala). 
Key points: the role and significance of the media (section 4.7.5 CSOs as 
Representatives of War-affected Communities:146) 
 The media provided opportunity for ordinary people to participate in the peace 
process, albeit indirectly. 
 The media linked the elite actors, to the grassroots population as well as the 
protagonists (LRA) through radio programmes. 
 Abductees were encouraged to return as a result of the radio programmes. 
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Contrary to popular opinion and cultural stereotyping, women played a critical role in the 
peace process and were instrumental in bringing about the relative peace prevailing in 
Northern Uganda. However, it should be noted that the typical ‘male gendering’ of peace 
processes is both reflected in, and reinforced by the relative absence of women from these 
processes around the world (Bell, 2013:2). 
 
The majority of the respondents said that most of the efforts of women were informal. This 
suggests that, while the efforts of their elite counterparts were recognized, women – and rural 
women in particular – did not have much significant input in the peace process: 
 
Although there were several individual and collective efforts by women, most of these 
were informal and located at household and community level. However, generally, 
women were totally left out of the formal peace processes (KI, CSO representative, 
Gulu District). 
 
The question was, ‘were women really represented?’ The answer was No. The 
grassroots women were not fully engaged. They were resolving community level 
conflicts but they were not represented at that high level. They were missing from the 
negotiation table. The elite women were the ones mostly being consulted (KI, INGO 
official, Gulu District). 
 
Although women at the grassroots level appear to have been left out of the Northern Uganda 
peace process, women from other countries had a different experience. For example, in 
Cambodia and Sierra Leone, special efforts were made to reach out beyond urban centres and 
to include the participation of rural women’s groups (Conciliation Resources, 2013:6). 
 
Women representatives, however, only participated as observers in the Juba peace talks, and 
were not given an opportunity to present their views: 
 
Because it [consultation] was not well grounded, it was boardroom women, if I may 
say. We got some few women from the districts, not really the grassroots, to be part of 
the taskforce to draft [the resolutions]. We needed translations to be done. We needed 
advance preparation of these people [negotiators]. We just kept moving in fleets of 
vehicles and so on and so forth. It kind of lost, to some extent, the grassroots driven 
face of it (KI, women activist, Kampala). 
 
Referring to gender issues in Nepal, Rai (2008) reveals that people do not trust women's 
capacity, and 'rulers' are still not ready to give leadership positions to women or have them 
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participate in state restructuring. Similarly, the Institute for Inclusive Security (IIS) (2009:5) 
reports that, women and other CSOs in Guatemala were given non-binding observer status 
during the 1994 peace negotiations. 
 
In Northern Uganda, too, women’s efforts were neither acknowledged nor documented. Most 
respondents said that, during the Juba peace talks, women groups were given observer status, 
but it was nearly too late to influence the process: 
 
Concerning the level of involvement of women, nobody acknowledged it, it was not 
documented and when the formal peace process started, they were further relegated 
to observer status (KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
 
During the Darfur Peace Talks, the Darfur women had a semi-official status, which meant 
that they were neither delegates nor observers – but they were still privileged to provide 
counsel to the delegates, the AU mediation team and other partners (IIS, 2009:10). 
 
Following stiff resistance but with consistent lobbying, we [women groups] got an 
observer status [at the Juba peace talks] three months to the end of the peace talks, it 
was nearly too late to influence anything (Female KI, CSO Representative, Gulu 
District). 
 
Thus, it seems that women’s voices were brought in at a point in the process when the key 
issues have already been framed or after the decisions have already been made by those in 
power (Yang & Pandey, 2011:880). 
 
It is acknowledged that, although informal or ‘Track II’ conflict resolution mechanisms have 
provided women with more entry-points for engagement, these processes are even less 
clearly documented than formal mechanisms (UNIFEM, 2010:1). Further, Belloni (cited in 
Koser, 2007:21) argues that although ‘Track II’ peace processes in DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Sudan involved women, these peace processes still 
failed to incorporate the gender issues at the top level. 
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Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
 Community Members and Grassroots Peace Efforts 
It emerged from the FGDs and KI interviews that community members, including religious 
leaders, volunteered to initiate peaceful engagement with LRA rebels, although government 
was initially reluctant to embrace peaceful conflict resolution. These initiatives were later 
embraced by other stakeholders too. Also, citizens were instrumental in the successful 
reintegration of ex-combatants: 
 
The Bigombe initiative came when the idea of peace talks came in. In the initial 
stages, government did not support peace talks; they wanted a military solution, so 
some people with the help of the religious leaders, who opened the way for the peace 
talks, volunteered to go and talk to the rebels (KI, opinion leader, Kitgum District). 
 
In Mali, similar experiences were documented. Political negotiations were not in themselves 
able to provide the foundations for peace. It was only when communities took responsibility 
for resolving the conflicts affecting their regions that peace was achieved and the conflict 
transformed (Oliver, 2002:93). 
 
The community initiated the peace making process, but were later not consulted when GoU 
decided to talk peace with the LRA. The community also played a key role in reconciling 
with former LRA combatants: 
 
At first, the community came up with the idea of making peace with the rebels but 
when the government started engaging the LRA for peace, they didn’t consult the 
community. The community later came up with mato-oput system, the Acholi 
traditional justice system (FGD participant, Layibi, Gulu District). 
 
Key points: women’s peace efforts (section 4.7.5 CSOs as Representatives of War-
affected Communities:146) 
 Women, particularly those from rural areas, were left out of the formal peace 
process. 
 Most women’s peace initiatives were informal and not documented. 
 The representation and participation of women in the peace process was 
relegated to that of ‘observer status’ and they had no direct influence on the 
final decision making process. 
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The community has done a very good thing to forgive, reconcile and incorporate the 
former rebels among them. For example, in our community here in Layibi we have 
many ex-rebels who are living among us (FGD Participant, Trader in Layibi, Gulu 
District). 
 
The involvement of conflict-affected communities, in particular, could trigger the start of the 
reconciliation phase, effectively changing the attitudes and perceptions of the actors (Azar, 
1986:29). 
 
4.7.6 Limitations of Community Representatives 
Respondents revealed the lack of adequate feedback from some of the representatives, 
including sufficient information about the Juba peace talks: 
 
I actually remember when people [representatives] returned the last time they went to 
Garamba [LRA’s base in the DRC], on their arrival nobody wanted to share what 
had happened there. People were hearing rumours, until the local people started 
probing them on radios (KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
They [ordinary people] did not even understand that Kony himself was not even 
physically at the peace talks. One of them said, ‘if you knew Kony was not there, with 
whom were you talking? To whom did you take our recommendations? (KI, women 
activist, Kampala). 
 
Some respondents bemoaned the fact that so few community members took part in the peace 
talks and that they were not properly informed about the developments of the peace process: 
 
The community was not involved [in the peace talks in Juba], and this was a big 
mistake. We even waited for the feedback in vain (Male FGD participant, Pagak, 
Amuru District). 
 
Feedback concerning the agenda they discussed on our behalf, was not brought back. 
Nobody from our village in Kiteng here represented us. This means that our voices 
were not heard and yet people were dying day and night (Female FGD participant, 
Kiteng, Pader District). 
 
There was no forum where they [community representatives] organized to go to the 
villages, gather the people, and tell them what took place in Juba. I only experienced 
it before the insurgency escalated, when they would move in the villages mobilizing 
people, sensitizing people and talking about the problem of insurgency, discussing 
ways of avoiding more problems (KI, radio programme host, Gulu District). 
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The exclusion of community members means that their perspectives were lost during the 
peace talks: 
 
There are certain details that were not being discussed by the leaders [during the 
Juba peace talks]. These are the details that we really needed the community to bring 
out [raise]. They have their own way of thinking apart from the one being represented 
by the leaders (KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
One respondent spoke of how the community was concerned about prolonged peace talks and 
the motivations of the representatives: 
 
To some extent, they [the community] were satisfied but there were dissatisfactions, 
especially when the process was taking longer than they [community] expected. The 
people were also now trying to say that the representatives wanted to prolong the 
process because of allowances (KI, CSO representative, Pader). 
 
The exclusion of community members, coupled with the lack of feedback from the Juba 
peace talks most likely meant that CSO officials and other representatives did not raise all the 
issues that the community would have wished to raise during the Juba peace process. 
 
Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
4.7.7 Section Summary 
Earlier studies assert that citizen participation is bound up with issues of power, privilege and 
resources. Participation is only likely to be effective when there is a favourable balance of 
power between communities and the elite. Such power is rarely realized in practice, though, 
as incumbent holders of power often feel threatened by successful involvement of other 
stakeholders (Bowen, 2008:76). The ‘elite’ did not involve local citizens sufficiently, 
suggesting evident power imbalances. Genuine community participation without 
redistribution of power can be frustrating for local people (Arnstein, 1969). Local levels of 
Key points: limitations of community representatives (section 4.7.6 Limitations 
of Community Representatives:154) 
 Community representatives did not provide feedback to the grassroots 
population. 
 There was low representation of the grassroots during the Juba peace talks. 
 There were inadequate mechanisms for community engagement in conflict 
resolution. 
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representation can play an important role in providing citizens with channels of participation, 
consultation and accountability (Rakodi, 2004:261). 
 
Compared with other peace processes, it is clear that the Juba peace process was non-
inclusive. For example, in Northern Ireland, the peace process obtained community opinions 
through opinion polls conducted by means of five sequenced polls, which coincided with the 
major milestones of the peace talks. These opinion polls informed the peace process. In fact, 
the opinions of the citizens of Northern Ireland gave impetus to negotiators and shaped some 
of the opinions of the peacemakers (Irwin, 1999:305-313). 
 
4.8 Community Capacity, Potential, Opportunities and Community Participation in 
Conflict Resolution 
 
This broad theme addresses objectives Two and Three (see section 4.6 Outline for 
Discussing the Study Findings:130) for an integrated outline for the two objectives. 
 
Whilst peacemaking and conflict resolution are often carried out by political and military 
persons (Lederach, 1997) with  little or no inclusion of ordinary community members (Darby 
& Mac Ginty, 2000:13),Van Tongeren (2005:7) contends that people from the grassroots 
have to be drawn in so that the peace that is negotiated is part of a ‘bottom-up’ process. 
 
The Northern Uganda peace process seemed to favour the elite at the cost of ordinary people 
in the peace process. One of the explanations for this is that ordinary citizens have less access 
to resources that translate into political power and decision-making authority (Checkoway, 
1981; Morone & Marmor, 1981). Further, opening up to citizens’ participation takes more 
time than it would for ‘elite representatives’ who are prone to making unilateral decisions 
(Creighton, cited in Yang & Pandey, 2011:885). Those against community participation 
argue that participation can place an additional burden on an already vulnerable population 
(Sawyer, 1995:18). Finally, Dudley (1993:7) suggests that the success of community 
participation beyond the rhetoric, is less evident and that part of the problem lies in vested 
interests and the power of the elite. 
 
The study findings indicate that the overall level of community participation in the Northern 
Uganda peace process was minimal. Accordingly, the study respondents had opposing views 
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regarding the nature and level of community participation, with the majority saying that the 
level of participation was low. Also, the majority of participants argued that there were no 
deliberate mechanisms to ensure the participation of community members. 
 
4.8.1 Community Capacity for Participation in Conflict Resolution 
The issue of community ‘capacity’ remains highly contested, with arguments for and against 
community participation in conflict resolution processes. Those against it argue that ordinary 
community members lack the requisite capacity to participate effectively, that their 
participation may be costly and inefficient because the effectiveness of community 
participation is linked to their ability to participate. Frankish et al (2002:1471) contend that 
discussions about the roles and responsibilities of citizens should focus on their capacity to 
make decisions. It is suggested by Brownlea (1987) that the desire to have community 
representation in conflict resolution processes may compromise the quality of processes, 
partly because the people involved may have limited skills or knowledge compared to those 
responsible for making the decisions. Also, participation may involve people who are less 
accountable for outcomes than are professional decision-makers. 
 
Conversely, those in favour of community participation contend that any community has the 
inherent capacity to participate in the conflict resolution process. Those in favour of 
community participation further argue that it is only inclusive peacemaking that will lead to 
sustainable peace (Barnes, 2002; Mac Ginty, 2005). To this end, the study findings indicate 
that the community did have some capacities as well as opportunities for participation in the 
conflict resolution process, but that these capacities needed to be enhanced to enable the 
grassroots citizens to participate more effectively in the conflict resolution process, notably 
the Juba peace talks (2006-2008). 
 
 Community capacity: respondents’ opposing views 
Study respondents held opposing views regarding the community’s capacity to participate in 
conflict resolution processes. While most of the respondents held the view that the 
community had sufficient capacity, others felt that the community did not have the requisite 
capacity to effectively participate in the conflict resolution process at the top level. This is in 
keeping with present day conflict resolution practices where the grassroots are often 
empowered to engage in peace processes in their own communities where their 
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considerations are channelled through middle range leaders to the top level negotiations 
(Lederach, 1997; O’Brien, 2005). 
 
 Perceptions that the community had the necessary capacity for participation 
Several key informants as well as an FGD participant suggested that the community in 
Northern Uganda had the necessary capacity to participate effectively in the conflict 
resolution process. In part, this capacity was obtained from the capacity building programmes 
provided by NGOs, coupled with community members’ direct knowledge and experiences of 
the conflict: 
 
I do not share that opinion [that local people lack capacity]. I do not see any 
limitation because they [ordinary people] have ears, they have mouths, they have 
brains and they have experiences. They have been in the [conflict] situation, so that 
issue of limitations is just denying them [ordinary people] participation. In any case, 
what capacity did the LRA have? When they were negotiating was their capacity any 
better than the people in the community? (KI, cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
Our community here has relatively high capacity to participate in conflict resolution 
as a result of training and capacity building provided by NGOs. Youth groups in this 
community were trained by NGOs to undertake community sensitization meetings 
focusing on peace efforts as a contribution to the conflict resolution process (Male 
FGD participant, Ongako Sub-county, Gulu District). 
 
I think they [community members] have the capacity because many of them have been 
collaborators [of LRA] and have the history of how the war started. Given a chance, 
they will be able to narrate how it started and also suggest the way forward (KI, 
Local Government Official, Amuru District). 
 
Key informants said: 
 
People from the villages, the very victims [of the conflict], some whose children are 
still there [in the bush], some whose parents are still in captivity, they need those 
close relatives of theirs to be released [so they would have participated effectively] 
(KI, radio programme host, Gulu District). 
 
Most of the people who were connecting us to LRA, giving us the phone contacts to 
talk to Kony were ordinary people. They were those women and men of that category. 
You may see them with the [Acholi] paramount chief and wonder what they have 
come to do. But you will be told these are the people assisting us (KI, cultural 
leader, Gulu District). 
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Some respondents indicated that social cues such as the way community members spoke or 
looked may convey their level of poverty or lack of education but that this did not necessarily 
mean that they did not have the capacity to participate or lacked essential skills: 
 
Some of the people in the villages have the skills. People are gifted differently. The 
way somebody speaks, you can know that this person is only poor or has missed the 
opportunity. There are some people in the villages who did not go far in education but 
they have the natural skills (KI, radio programme host, Gulu District). 
 
They [community] are impoverished, but they speak English. They clutch newspapers. 
They are on radio every time, but poverty has made them look the way they are. Not 
that they have failed or that they cannot explain, convince people, articulate the 
situation, or give views on what they see. So there is nothing like they have no 
capacity (KI, cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
These aforementioned perceptions indicate a need to recognize the value of community 
participation especially those who have been directly affected by the conflict. However there 
is some ambiguity as to the nature of that participation. 
 
 Perceptions that the community did not have the necessary capacity 
There may be a perception that in societies emerging from conflict, local capacity may be 
weakened, making it difficult for locals to govern themselves and in extreme cases, they may 
not know what they need and would require external assistance (Botes & Van Rensburg, 
2000:51; De Coning, 2013:2). However, this notion, often adopted by the elite, leads to the 
silencing of the voices of the ordinary citizens who could play a crucial role at the grassroots. 
 
Some key informants’ perceptions were that community members lacked the capacity to 
analyse and articulate complex issues, as well as being limited in contributing meaningfully 
to critical debate: 
 
The community members do not have the minimum capacity to participate effectively, 
especially in formal peace and conflict resolution processes. They have the ideas, but 
may not have adequate capacity to articulate them (KI, CSO representative, Gulu 
District). 
 
You may need to transform a local problem and analyse it, and articulate it to the 
level that would make it appropriate for lobbying and advocacy to different 
audiences, and usually the ordinary community members lack the ability to do that 
(KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
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If we should be more serious, do they [ordinary citizens] understand modern peace 
negotiations? That [Juba peace process] was a modern peace negotiation. Do you 
think any Tom, Dick and Harry there in Koc will go and talk the peace we are talking 
about, not what they are thinking? (KI, Local Government Official, Gulu District). 
 
I witnessed debate progressing in Juba. I witnessed the actual negotiations going on. 
It will be hard for me to imagine that someone from the village would even be given a 
minute, unless it is deliberately done. The level of that discussion was so high that it 
would take a lot of effort to interpret, to bring the mind of the common person here to 
understand and substantially give his input (KI, CSO representative, Kitgum 
District). 
 
These perceptions may be reality based but at the same time may justify the ongoing 
exclusion of community from participation at other levels of the debates. One such 
explanation is the lack of capacity, or the so-called ‘deficit model’ (Rowe & Frewer, 2000:5). 
Advocates of this model argue that human inadequacies (such as ignorance, attitudes, beliefs, 
and motivations) limit the public’s capacity to be effectively involved in complex decision 
making. Such proponents express doubts about whether the public understands significant 
concepts. Even those who support community participation acknowledge that most local 
community members lack the requisite level of education, political skills, technical skills and 
influence (Bowen, 2008:76). 
 
A significant challenge to effective community participation is the issue of power 
imbalances. Unequal power relations between ordinary people and the elite is one of the 
major determinants of the level and nature of community participation. In this regard, Werner 
(cited in Zakus & Lysack, 1998:3) asserts that a community’s level of participation reflects 
the underlying level of power in its possession. Polletier (cited in Kilpatrick, 2009:40) thus 
advocates for the need to redistribute power, because those who have the power in the 
community are likely to influence the agenda at the expense of disadvantaged groups. 
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Source: FGD &KI Qualitative Data 
 
 Enhancing community capacity 
Study findings reveal that, while there was some community capacity for participation in the 
conflict resolution process, there remains a need for strategies to enhance this capacity further 
so that community members are able to relate to, and engage more favourably with their elite 
counterparts. 
 
Most of the key informants highlighted the need for an intermediary who could help with 
translations and to tap into the potential of community members. 
 
People definitely could have capacity, [but] only if their capacities were tapped, and 
this needed a leader: a leader who could go down to them, talk the language they 
understand and they would come out with really good contributions (KI, cultural 
leader, Gulu District). 
 
There is a need to build their [community’s] confidence [so] that they are able to 
participate, much as they have been marginalised. Their confidence needs to be built 
(KI, Local Government Official, Amuru District). 
 
It is clear that this community can really help the peace team to sort out certain 
things. They only need to be guided, like say, if the negotiations are going on in 
English, it should be translated to them (KI, Local Government Official, Pabbo 
Sub-County, Amuru District). 
 
True, the community members do not have the minimum capacity to participate 
effectively, especially in formal peace and conflict resolution processes. They have the 
ideas but may not have adequate capacity to articulate them (KI, CSO 
representative, Gulu District). 
 
Key points: community capacity for participation in conflict resolution (section 
4.8.1 Community Capacity for Participation in Conflict Resolution:157) 
 Some perceptions reflect that ordinary community members do have the 
capacity to participate effectively in peace processes whilst other perceptions 
contradict this notion. 
 It is clear that community members do have a role in conflict resolution 
processes but it is questionable as to whether ordinary community members 
would be taken seriously in top level negotiations unless they are specially 
empowered to carry out this role. 
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In this regard, Bowen (2008) suggests that ordinary citizens need to receive appropriate 
training and support so that they can become more knowledgeable and competent. This 
applies particularly to women, who needed skills to address gender issues: 
 
Because they [women] normally have little or no formal education, there is a need to 
build confidence and upgrade the skills of women, since they usually deal with 
domestic and local issues (KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
 
They [ordinary citizens] may need some form of training to bring out these issues, so 
they need some kind of capacity building, including basic lobbying and advocacy 
skills (KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
 
Source:  FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
4.8.2 Community Opportunities Not Exploited 
The community’s knowledge and experience of the conflict; the voices of victims of the 
conflict; the social networks of families with children among LRA combatants; the existing 
links between community members and the LRA top leaders; opportunities for the LRA 
negotiators to meet their victims during the Juba peace process; the community setting, 
particularly the IDP camps; and the use of the Acholi cultural resources for peace were not 
fully exploited. 
 
One key informant felt that the situation in the IDP camps lent itself to community 
involvement in the peace process: 
 
It was easier [to involve people] when they were in the [IDP] camps because they 
were in groups. The camps had camp leaders. That was the war time, the time people 
were united. There were so many informal arrangements for survival. It was only 
because nobody bothered about it [involving them] (KI, cultural leader, Gulu 
District). 
 
Key points: enhancing community capacity (section 4.8.1 Community 
Capacity for Participation in Conflict Resolution:157) 
 Ordinary citizens did not have the critical capacity to participate in formal peace 
processes alongside elite negotiators. 
 Community capacity needed to be enhanced through training and skills 
development and their ideas could be passed on. 
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Some perceptions included the notion that those directly affected by the war did not have an 
opportunity to speak directly with the perpetrators of violence and with other actors since 
they were excluded from the Juba Peace talks: 
 
They [mediators] picked the cultural leaders, political leaders and some technical 
staff. These were people who were not directly affected by the war because during the 
war many of them ran away and none of their children were abducted. But if really 
they picked [participants] from the grassroots, they would have had the chance to talk 
directly. Of course, they [victims] were neglected, so they sat down on their good 
views and knowledge that they should have given to the peace team (KI, Political 
Leader, Amuru District). 
 
It was a missed opportunity not to have representatives of ordinary people who know 
all the atrocities committed during the conflict; this would have been the best (KI, 
Religious Leader, Kitgum District). 
 
The community has been a victim of this conflict. The victims should have been given 
opportunities to speak out their minds. What is their feeling? Because now, when 
leaders are talking, the victims are quiet (KI, Political Leader, Amuru District). 
 
Furthermore, it was asserted that a possible reason why the LRA did not take the peace 
agreement seriously (by not signing it) was because the victims of the conflict were not ‘at 
the table’ but instead they negotiated with GoU who were not directly affected by the 
conflict: 
 
The LRA did not take the peace process seriously because they did not negotiate with 
victims of the conflict. Those who have ‘forgiven’ them [GoU] are not directly 
affected by the conflict (KI, CSO Representative, Gulu District). 
 
Of particular interest is the underutilization of the Acholi traditional practices for conflict 
resolution. These practices place emphasis on truth telling and confession as the basis for 
reconciliation and restoration: 
 
The Acholi community is endowed with a strong traditional structure of cultural 
leaders and elders, who are instrumental in the resolution of conflicts, particularly 
using the indigenous approach. However, very unfortunately, this was not adequately 
utilised (Female FGD participant, Ongako Sub-county, Gulu District). 
 
It is argued that the special insights, needs and experiences of war-affected communities 
could best be identified and used if there had been genuine community participation (Strange, 
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1972:659-660). Lederach’s three tier pyramid (1997) which clearly depicts the possibility for 
effective channelling of information up and down the pyramid from the grassroots through to 
the middle range leaders and through to the elite confirms this possibility for greater 
participation from the bottom–up.  In the case of Northern Uganda, the failure to involve 
community members was a missed opportunity, and it might have significant implications for 
the outcome of the conflict resolution efforts. It is possible that the outcome will not represent 
the opinions and aspirations of the majority of the population since their voices have not been 
heard and sufficiently taken into account. This poses challenges for the actual implementation 
of peace accords. In Northern Ireland, as well as in South Africa, there was significant 
investment in getting the grassroots communities involved in peacemaking, and this paid 
dividends (to a certain extent) (O’Brien, 2005). Nonetheless, peace processes remain ‘work in 
progress’ as the recent unrests in South Africa, Northern Ireland as well as South Sudan 
show, and much work still needs to be done in addressing community concerns. 
 
Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
4.8.3 Section Summary 
The study findings show that the voices of the citizens could have made a significant 
contribution to the negotiated settlement of the conflict. The GoU and the LRA, both 
considered perpetrators by the majority of the community, were the only parties to the 
negotiations. Further, the study findings seem to suggest that there was inadequate use of the 
Acholi indigenous process of conflict resolution, which would have enabled the LRA to 
interface with the community members as victims of the conflict. 
 
4.8.4 Nature of Community Participation in Conflict Resolution 
Some respondents indicated that the community was involved in the early initiatives to 
resolve the conflict through dialogue and during the Juba peace talks: 
Key points: community opportunities not exploited during conflict resolution 
(section 4.8.2 Community Opportunities Not Exploited:162) 
 Despite the leadership structure of IDP camps being ideal for facilitating 
community involvement, it was not used. 
 The Acholi traditional practices, such as reconciliation, were not optimally 
utilized. 
 The community’s knowledge and experience of the conflict was not tapped 
into. 
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During the Betty Bigombe talks in 1994, participants were mostly villagers, mostly 
elders, religious leaders and traditional leaders. The government people who were 
there were mostly military personnel (KI, CSO representative, Kampala). 
 
Save the Children came up with an idea that children should be taken there [to Juba] 
so that they [LRA] see the impact of the war on children. At least 4 children aged 15-
16 years were taken; two boys and two girls (KI, CSO representative, Pader 
District). 
 
People from different regions of Uganda were involved in the Juba peace talks: 
 
Even people in Lira and Teso region were involved. Everyone was going to Juba. 
Different people were involved this time [2006-2008] giving different opinions. I think 
this time very many people were really engaged (KI, CSO representative, Gulu 
District). 
 
Some respondents spoke of how the ordinary citizens became involved in the peacemaking 
processes after realizing how much the conflict was affecting them: 
 
People [peace teams] learnt and asked why they cannot involve the traditional 
leaders and why they cannot seek the opinion of the people down there [at 
grassroots]. Other people were eventually taken. The women that were abducted, the 
child mothers as we call them, were eventually involved in talking, asking their 
husbands to come back. So I think this time the community members were involved 
(KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
 
The conflict became worse and [was] recognized as a [major] conflict in 1996 after 
the abduction of the Aboke girls [students from a Catholic Girls’ Boarding School]. 
That became a big event and an eye opener for the government and religious leaders. 
That is the time everyone started working towards peace (KI, CSO representative, 
Gulu District). 
 
There was delayed involvement of community members in the peace processes partly 
because at the start of the war, the conflict was perceived to be between the LRA and the 
GoU. Also, it was partly because people at the grassroots focused on leaving the IDP camps 
and rebuilding their lives after the war. Further, domination of the peace process by the elite 
discouraged community participation: 
 
The conflict you are talking about is not a home-based conflict between the Acholi as 
a whole and the government. It is a conflict between the LRA and the government. So 
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we the ordinary people cannot be involved in resolving it (Female FGD participant, 
Ocettoke Camp, Kitgum District). 
 
When the peace process commenced in Juba, the primary focus of the people was 
[on] leaving IDP camps. They did not focus on participating in the [peace] process. 
Their immediate focus was [on] starting to rebuild their lives, so whatever was taking 
place in Juba did not really take a lot of people’s time and effort (KI, CSO 
representative, Kitgum District). 
 
Perceptions about the nature of the conflict may have impeded the level of community 
participation but it seems that the IDP community were deliberately marginalised. This view 
is in line with Kälin’s assertion (in Koser, 2007) that IDPs are rarely consulted or represented 
in peace processes; that their particular circumstances are often overlooked in the language of 
peace agreements; and that peace building initiatives often overlook them. 
 
Many respondents’ perceptions included the following: that the community members 
participated in the peace process in a number of ways, ranging from advocacy and 
influencing their leaders, to establishing direct contact with the LRA, to facilitating the return 
and reintegration of LRA ex-combatants, to participation in warfare: 
 
The issue of influencing the local leaders, traditional leaders and church leaders to 
go and negotiate with Joseph Kony started from the local community. That is how 
they were involved in the activities through radio announcement, telephone calls and 
local gatherings within the community (Male FGD participant, Coope, Gulu 
District). 
 
Col. Ochora and other Acholi leaders – religious leaders, elders, parents of the rebel 
child fighters – all went to the bushes before government. They are the ones that 
paved the way. They went all the way to [the] DRC and met Joseph Kony. They [local 
leaders] would first open the way then they would ask for government and donor 
support (KI, local government official, Gulu District). 
 
There are other people [former combatants] who came quietly and stayed at home 
until now. They are not even known by the Amnesty [Commission]. The community 
gave them space to stay and they are there living with the people (KI, CSO 
representative, Pader District). 
 
Respondents spoke of how the community contributed both in terms of peaceful efforts to 
resolve the conflict, and in terms of the provision of personnel to fight the LRA: 
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There was an elder from the royal clan of Koc who was known as Olanya and his 
colleague who was a royal guard called Ogoni. After the 1994 peace talks flopped, 
these two elders followed Kony and they wanted to revive negotiations. Unfortunately, 
they have not been seen until today. They died in the process. They were part of the 
civilian community (KI, local government official, Gulu). 
 
At a certain point, the energetic youths started volunteering and joining the 
[government] forces so that they would fight these people [rebels]. We call these 
people [volunteer] vigilantes. Here we had 227, and they were all armed. They would 
go to fight these rebels (KI, local government official, Amuru District). 
 
At the initial stage, the community tried to organize themselves and fight the rebels 
with bows and arrows and this led to massive killings, limb cutting, removing of ears, 
and cutting of hands by rebels because of the bad images portrayed by the community 
(FGD participant & female war-victim, Unyama, Gulu District). 
 
One key informant stated that during the Juba peace talks, both the LRA and the GoU 
consulted with the community on the ICC question: 
 
When the ICC question came up in the Juba talks, the representatives referred the 
matter back home. They said you go and ask them [the people]. The government team 
came and the rebels’ team came, to find out whether Joseph Kony and his colleague 
indictees should be prosecuted by the ICC. They traversed the country and went back 
[to Juba]. That was still community participation (KI, local government official, 
Gulu District). 
 
Although a number of respondents said that there was some degree of community 
participation, it appears that citizens only became involved after elite-led processes had failed 
or if they needed support from grassroots. 
 
Many key informants reported that ordinary people did not play a direct role in the Juba 
peace talks; they played indirect and sometimes peripheral roles, often as passive observers: 
 
Ordinary people did not directly play a role in the Juba peace process. They created 
conditions that necessitated peace; they were demanding peace and they were 
expressing their worries, which went to government through their representatives. 
Their political representatives stood for them, but also civil society representatives 
from here, including religious leaders, traditional leaders and elders (KI, local 
government official, Gulu District). 
 
Ordinary people, and many of the civil society groups, played more of a peripheral 
role than actually direct participation in the negotiations. Although they were playing 
peripheral roles, in my view they were equally important. They [community] played a 
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big role in confidence building, even if they were not necessarily directly in the talks 
(KI, CSO representative, Kampala). 
 
It could be concluded that the nature of participation in conflict resolution by the Acholi 
population was minimal in nature, since they were often viewed as victims of the conflict. 
The peace process in Northern Uganda failed to take into consideration the political agency 
of the Acholi population and their relationship with government on the one hand, and with 
the LRA on the other (Branch, 2005:1). In such elite-level peace process, there is a failure to 
connect with the everyday experience of citizens (Mac Ginty, 2005). It should, however, be 
acknowledged that the peripheral role played by the community leaders (religious/cultural) 
and CSOs was also critical for the peace process. 
 
Respondents shared their views on how they were excluded from the Juba peace process: 
 
For us in this village we had very little chance to participate in the Juba peace 
process, and our needs were inadequately catered for (Female FGD participant, 
Laroo, Gulu District). 
 
They [peace teams] collected views, yes, but I think they were not considering the 
local communities. The people who came [to the consultative meetings], for example 
in Gulu, were about five people, those who were working in the NGO sector. There 
was somebody from Acholi Religious Peace Initiative giving their views. There were 
district officials as well. I did not see any local community member (KI, INGO 
official, Gulu District). 
 
Respondents spoke of how previous peace processes failed because of the exclusion of 
community members: 
 
We learn lessons from the Pece and Bigombe peace talks [1988 and 1994 
respectively]. These peace talks failed because the community was not involved. It 
was the top people. It was mainly one person trying to negotiate, assisted by some top 
people. The community members were either just looking on or [they] were not there 
(KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
 
At the same time, it was not realistic to consider community members’ direct participation at 
the highest levels of negotiation: 
 
Of course, not everyone can go into the room and say I want also to talk. Where will 
you sit? So for them [the community] going directly, they did not (KI, local 
government official, Gulu District). 
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They [the citizens] did not really contribute to the [Juba] peace process (KI, local 
government official, Gulu District). 
 
The voices above seem to validate Oxfam International's (2007:13) findings that during the 
Juba peace talks, the closest action to bringing in a semblance of community representation 
occurred in October 2006 when the Chief Mediator invited civil society leaders and members 
of the Ugandan parliament representing Acholi to join the talks, but the LRA delegation 
rejected their participation. 
 
Further, it appears that community participation had an urban bias, with the urban elite (NGO 
representatives, religious leaders, cultural leaders) being elected to the near exclusion of rural 
people. Although community participation is neither a panacea for all community problems, 
nor the missing ingredient at top level negotiations, it is essential for identifying and 
dismantling the political, economic and social arrangements that foster increasing disparities 
between the elite and the grassroots (Morgan, 2001:229). 
 
Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
4.8.5 Level of Community Participation 
Many respondents reported that the level of community participation in the Juba peace 
process was low, and that the community did not contribute adequately to resolving the 
conflict because leaders in established positions were identified to ‘represent’ communities: 
 
I feel the community has not contributed much in getting solutions to the LRA 
insurgency (KI, radio programme host, Gulu). 
 
Key points: the nature of community participation in conflict resolution (section 
4.8.4 Nature of Community Participation:164) 
 Local people were involved in the early conflict resolution efforts. 
 The community participated in conflict resolution through advocating via 
influential leaders; establishing direct contact with the LRA; and facilitating the 
return and reintegration of LRA combatants. 
 The community was largely excluded from the top-level Juba peace 
negotiations. 
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Community members did not directly participate. Leaders in known positions were 
automatically identified when the need for civil representation came (KI, local 
government official, Gulu District). 
 
Those who went to Juba were top politicians; civilians didn’t go. What was happening 
in Juba was so politicized or seeking for personal wealth. Those who went 
represented their personal interests. Not a single ordinary person was included on the 
Juba list, but you would hear LC5, Major, or RDC46 (Female FGD participant, 
former abductee, Unyama, Gulu District). 
 
A major attempt to solicit input from the community occurred when the negotiating teams in 
Juba were discussing the agenda item on responsibility and national reconciliation: 
 
They [peace teams] consulted at different levels; at national level, Kampala level and 
also the local level, where they had opportunity to directly interface with the people 
(KI, CSO representative, Kitgum District). 
 
The most significant phase where people [the local population] had their input 
directly incorporated was on Agenda Item No.3 [accountability and reconciliation] 
yet we had up to five items on the agenda. The first one and the second one did not 
really get the views of the people. The third one, yes. The fourth one, no. If I was to 
rate it, community participation was about 20–30% (KI, CSO representative, 
Kitgum District). 
 
One respondent said that the general question about Kony put to Ugandan people by the two 
peace teams was regarded as a form of participation: 
 
We [LRA and GoU peace teams] toured the whole of Uganda, consulting. In the 
consultation, the question to the people was: “do you want Kony to be taken to court, 
or do you want to forgive him?” The whole of Uganda said they want Kony to come 
back to reconcile with government (KI, member of the LRA Peace Team). 
 
The consultation process and its outcome were poorly planned and implemented: 
 
In terms of [the consultation] process, I think it was like feedback to people on what 
was going on [in Juba]; [it was] met with resentment and emotion. In the end, the 
aims of the consultation were not achieved. The community who should have taken 
advantage of that was not guided on how they should have presented their issues. The 
presentations were full of emotions and expressions of disappointment. Even the 
                                                 
46 The LC5 chairperson is the elected political head of a district; the RDC is the central government 
representative in a district; Major is a military rank assigned to mid-level Senior Officers. 
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consulting team did not have any idea on how to move the process [forward] and how 
to deal with the shock (KI, CSO representative, Kitgum District). 
 
Community members went to the consultation meetings out of curiosity: 
 
Some members of the community went [to consultative meetings] out of curiosity to 
see these people [the LRA negotiators]; there were some who originated from the 
very communities they were facing, so there was excitement and emotion. People had 
never seen Matsanga [head of LRA peace team] for example (KI, CSO 
representative, Kitgum District). 
 
Regarding the question of whether to prosecute or forgive the LRA leader, one respondent in 
a study by Agger (2012:4) argued thus: 
 
We cannot forgive Kony. He is the mastermind behind the LRA, and the one 
responsible. He should be prosecuted. 
 
The exclusion of ordinary people from the process might mean that their needs were not 
properly represented: 
 
We lose a lot if we do not involve them [community members] and for me I think that 
is one of the reasons why the peace process failed. We do not know what they are 
facing; we cannot assume that because we have been reading in the newspapers, 
listening to radios, watching TVs, that we are representing them. No, we have to go 
and understand from them what they are going through and how they want their 
issues to be addressed (KI, INGO official, Gulu). 
 
One respondent spoke of how some of the community contributions came nearly too late to 
make a difference: 
 
Various consultations were made but these consultations did not quite feed [into] the 
peace process because the consultations that were made came towards the last 
agenda item, towards the end of the peace talks in Juba (KI, CSO representative, 
Kitgum District). 
 
In conclusion, it appears that there was minimal direct and some indirect participation by 
ordinary citizens in the Northern Uganda peace process. They participated directly in the 
initial stages of formal talks and in some cases initiated them, but also during the informal 
processes initiated by local leaders. Nonetheless, generally there was very little community 
involvement. This situation is not unique to the Northern Uganda peace process. In Northern 
172 
Ireland, too, the multi-party talks leading to the Belfast Agreement took place behind closed 
doors. Although the public was aware of the process, there were few official channels to 
allow input into the content of the agreement being drafted. This created a degree of concern 
amongst organized civil society, and it created a barrier to ‘bringing along’ the public in 
support of the Agreement. This was exacerbated by selective leaks amongst the actual 
participating parties to ‘spin’ their side of any particular argument in order to gain political 
advantage. This made the task of selling the Agreement to the public in the subsequent 
referendum, scheduled for only six weeks after the Agreement had been signed, all the more 
difficult (Oliver, 2002:92). 
 
Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
4.8.6 Impediments to Community Participation in Conflict Resolution 
The impediments to community participation in conflict resolution are rather nuanced with 
most impediments lying within the socio-economic fabric of the community. 
 
This study reveals a number of impediments to community participation in the Northern 
Uganda conflict resolution process: the highly formal and technical nature of the Juba peace 
process; inadequate citizen mobilization; fear to identify with either party in the conflict, 
hence a fear to articulate opinions and positions on contentious issues; and the absence of a 
structured channel for consultation, information dissemination and feedback. Some of the 
impediments were experienced during the armed conflict, while others were experienced after 
the end of the conflict. Some impediments were cross-cutting and were experienced during 
and after the conflict. 
Key points: the level of community participation in conflict resolution (section 
4.8.5 Level of Community Participation:169) 
 Local people and their leaders established the initial contact with the LRA long 
before the official teams & were involved in the early peace initiatives to some 
extent. 
 Community perceptions were that the conflict was between the LRA and the 
GoU. 
 The elite dominated the peace process. 
 During peace talks, community members did not interface with negotiators and 
observers. 
 The community consultation process was not successful due to a lack of 
planning and poor implementation. 
173 
Figure 15: The Major Impediments to Community Participation in Conflict Resolution 
 
Source: FGD & KI Data 
 
 Impediments during armed conflict 
During armed conflict, the major impediments were: the inadequate connections between 
communities; the demands of the formal peace process; the psychological and emotional 
effects of the war; the structural factors of violence, plus fear of reprisals, persecution and 
death. 
 
 Inadequate connection with the community 
The peace talks in Juba lacked meaningful connection with the community: 
 
The Juba peace process had no contact with the community. It became almost 
administrative – that something had to be done in Juba and the rest were expected to 
follow (KI, local government official, Gulu District). 
 
The planning process [of the peace talks] and the methodology did not [leave] room 
for the common man, those who actually lived and experienced every bit of the 
conflict, to participate in the [peace] process (KI, CSO representative, Kitgum 
District). 
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Respondents mentioned that the Juba peace process seems to have been an academic exercise 
with limited citizen participation, and with no clear strategy for taking in their contributions: 
 
People did not understand the Juba peace talks very well, not the ordinary people. I 
think it was some kind of academic discussion (KI, opinion leader, Kitgum 
District). 
 
There were only few [participants] who had the opportunity to be in the negotiation 
room. Most of them were having smaller meetings with the government of South 
Sudan, meeting the team from the rebels or meeting the team from the government 
(KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
Two key informants added: 
 
People participated by giving their support though not understanding the ingredients 
of the discussions (KI, opinion leader, Kitgum District). 
 
The challenge was that there was not a clear methodology put in place by the stake 
holders in the peace process to harness the contribution of the community (KI, CSO 
representative, Kitgum District). 
 
It appears that there was a definite absence of a clear strategy for including ordinary people in 
the Juba peace talks at several levels and not only at specific phases. This could be due to 
several factors: the complexity of the conflict may have made it difficult to bring in the 
voices of the ordinary people; and the ‘elite’ may have felt that the negotiations had to be 
handled at the ‘top level’ without the involvement of community members due to vested 
interests. A greater transparency would have been needed in explaining the peace process and 
the role of the main actors to the ordinary community members, but this was not forthcoming. 
The following diagram illustrates the peripheral roles adopted by community members in 
relation to other role-players. 
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Figure 16: The Marginalization of Community Members in the Peace Process 
 
Source: KI & FGD Data 
 
Key Informants explained that the exclusion of ordinary citizens was motivated by 
politicians’ need to protect their ‘political space’ and driven by some ‘economic motives’: 
 
You see, once somebody has a [political] position at stake, he will fight for it. 
Political leaders know they are elected, they have passed through competitive politics, 
so to increase his rating, he/she has to participate in those things [peace talks] alone. 
That is what makes them say that there was no need for grassroots leaders or 
representatives; they are protecting their space. That is the nature of politicians: they 
do not want to work in groups, unless that group is in their favour (KI, cultural 
leader, Gulu District). 
 
One respondent indicated financial gain as being the main incentive for politicians: 
 
When the issue of going to Juba came up, people began looking for how they can 
‘swell their stomachs’. The issue was diverted to “peace dollars” instead of peace 
talks. The issue of peace dollars caused selfishness among the leaders who never even 
wanted Kony to sign the peace agreement (Female FGD participant, Pagak, Amuru 
District). 
 
The respondent above claims that the limited role of ordinary citizens during the Juba peace 
process could partly be attributed to the monetary incentives given to the main actors. 
Contrary to the perceptions of respondents in this study, another study (Koser, 2007) reported 
that the IDPs did not have democratic structures in place to nominate representatives, so the 
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de facto leaders emerged with political goals that did not necessarily represent the interests of 
the majority of IDPs. 
 
 Demands of the formal peace processes 
Respondents reported that community participation in the peace talks was partly impeded by 
their lack of knowledge about formal peace processes, and the inaccessible location of the 
venue for peace talks: 
 
What made it difficult for us to select a representative is [a] lack of knowledge about 
the peace process and the distance to Garamba and Juba. There was also the fear of 
the rebels because some people thought that, if they talked too much, the rebels might 
harm them. The time frame given for the peace process was short and all the agenda 
items were not successfully discussed (Male FGD participant, Coope, Gulu 
District). 
 
The formal system of peacemaking was not appropriate for ordinary community 
members – informal mechanisms could have been better and more appropriate for 
peace building: technicalities and theoretical approaches to conflict resolution affect 
community involvement (KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
 
Several key informants spoke of how community participation was impeded by the long and 
extended formal peace process: 
 
The [peace] agreements were in phases. It was a lengthy agreement. What people 
were waiting for was the final agreement that would say Kony has stopped fighting 
and the government also stopped fighting (KI, opinion leader, Kitgum District). 
 
There was feedback coming [to the community] that the peace talks were going to be 
shifted to South Africa. Others were saying it should be taken to Italy. So people said, 
how long shall we really keep on waiting after two years of the negotiations? (KI, 
CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
Inadequate knowledge of procedures and processes of formal and structured peace talks can 
limit community participation. 
 
Many key informants said that community participation was impeded by low levels of civic 
consciousness; lack of skills and education; fears of being harmed by the LRA; participants’ 
lack of confidence, low self-esteem and inability to express themselves in the English 
language; and citizens’ confidence in their representatives: 
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Ignorance is one of them [the impediments], in a sense that community did not know 
their roles. What roles are they supposed to play in the process? (KI, local 
government official, Amuru District). 
 
People [negotiators] speak in English and yet these rural women articulate 
themselves best in their local languages. It is not just the women but even the men; 
[the] majority of them are illiterate. They cannot articulate [their] views in English. 
That is a very big stumbling block to the rural women and men (KI, INGO official, 
Gulu District). 
 
People think their views can best be sent through representatives, whether elected 
leaders or appointed leaders. They think “if the paramount chief is there, he is there 
on our behalf”, not knowing that the paramount chief as a person is just not enough. 
He needs your voices. You should hold him to account (KI, CSO representative, 
Kampala). 
 
In a study of decision-making groups and their role in devolved governance, Abelson and 
Lomas (cited in Frankish et al, 2002:1471) found that citizens indicated little interest in 
decision making, while elected officials were the most willing to get involved in decision 
making processes. 
 
One key informant stated that the community tended to assign authority to traditional 
decision makers such as elected officials, experts and government personnel: 
 
The lack of skills, education, etc among most ordinary community members are major 
challenges, so they [community] could not have effectively represented themselves 
(KI, cultural leader, Pader District). 
 
Several key informants spoke of how community participation was impeded by positions 
taken by influential leaders, and also stated that community members were more interested in  
the release of abducted children rather than being included in the peace process: 
 
Among the Acholi, once the paramount chief has pronounced himself on an issue, no 
other [Acholi] authority can challenge that position (KI, cultural leader, Gulu 
District). 
 
Some of them [ordinary people] would say for us we are not interested in being 
sponsored to go there [to Juba]. All we want is for Kony to release our children who 
are still in captivity, or we would like them to say sorry for what they have done to us 
the victims (KI, radio programme host, Gulu District). 
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Some respondents were sceptical, and expressed a lack of faith and trust in the peace process: 
 
People had become tired of the cat and mouse game; it was like some kind of a circus. 
I mean is it okay for us to participate? Aren’t we only wasting our time? Is it going to 
make sense? Is this guy [Kony] going to come out of the bush and we go back to our 
homes? So this [peace process] was like a good gamble, it had stopped making sense 
to people (KI, local government official, Gulu District). 
 
Another respondent added: 
 
Sometimes they [the population] say there is no trust in Museveni’s peace talks. 
Whatever is going on in the name of government is just a joke. He [Museveni] is not 
serious (KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
However, it should not be assumed that all people were interested in participation (Pilisuk et 
al, cited in Zakus & Lysack, 1998:8) since, according to Sawyer (1995:19), making such an 
assumption could lead to problems between professionals and community members. Because 
citizens tend to have varied interests, the demand for participation and an equal role in 
decision making is not as sustained as perceived by many scholars and practitioners 
(Checkoway, 1981; Morone & Marmor, 1981). 
 
One key informant explained how women had to undergo training as a prerequisite for 
effective participation in the peace talks, but they were never taken to Juba: 
 
We trained a cross-section of elite and ordinary women leaders with the expectation 
that some of them would participate in the Juba peace process, but they were never 
involved. Some of the trainees went to Juba in individual capacity hoping to influence 
official negotiators (Female KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
 
 Psychosocial and emotional effects of the conflict 
Key informants said that community participation in the Juba peace process was impeded by 
a number of psychological and emotional effects of the conflict; these included a lack of 
confidence, and severe emotions: 
 
The impediments I would think of are: lack of confidence, the inability to 
chronologically present issues, expound on the issues and act outside emotion. 
Psychologically, the impact of the war has been serious (KI, CSO representative, 
Kitgum District). 
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During discussions about the LRA, some people would end up crying. At times you 
would see them shaking with anger. At times, they would even mention that if they 
[LRA] were here, some of us would do even more harm than they have done to our 
people (KI, radio programme host, Gulu District). 
 
Another respondent added: 
 
We took some women from Kitgum. As soon as we reached Juba, they started to cry at 
the negotiation venue. All of a sudden, people said, ‘why did you bring these women 
to derail us?’ In fact, to some extent they blamed women, when there was a stalemate 
at that particular time. They said it is the women who came here to cry and to raise 
our emotions. Issues to do with negotiations sometimes do not need emotions (KI, 
women activist, Kampala). 
 
 Human security and human needs 
Focus group participants spoke about how community participation was impeded by 
structural and physical bottlenecks, such as the distance to the negotiation venue, the 
breakdown of IDPs’ social networks, the health status of citizens, widespread poverty and 
financial constraints: 
 
The physical distance between IDP camps and other settlements, coupled with 
widespread insecurity made it impossible for communities to interact and build 
grassroots networks for peace (Female FGD participant, Ongako Sub-county, 
Gulu District). 
 
There was a breakdown of social networks due to internal displacement – some 
families, and sometimes entire clans lost touch, hence their inability to continue 
engaging in conflict resolution initiatives (Male FGD participant, Ongako Sub-
county, Gulu District). 
 
Another focus group participant added: 
 
The extremely pathetic health conditions in IDP camps, including inadequate health 
services increased the disease burden on the community and perpetuated an 
unhealthy and unproductive population that could not meaningfully talk about peace 
and conflict resolution (Elder, FGD participant, Koch-Goma Sub-county, Amuru 
District). 
 
A key informant explained the difficulty of financing their participation in the Juba peace 
talks: 
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Even if the communities had wanted to participate, it was very difficult for anyone to 
come out openly and support their participation. Those of us [CSOs] who 
participated were sponsored. The UN facilitated a bigger part of the budget for the 
peace talks (KI, CSO representative, Kitgum District). 
 
The breakdown of social networks can lead to the breakdown of citizens’ engagement 
initiatives, social dislocation and a lack of social cohesion leading to violence, yet such social 
networks are essential for promotion of post-conflict recovery and reconciliation. In this 
regard, Nordstrom (2004:68) contends that violence and social dislocation can permeate into 
the entire fabric of everyday life of a society. 
 
Further, the aforementioned findings seem to validate Chambers’ (1983) deprivation trap 
theory. Chambers (1983:108-138) identifies five interlinked elements (clusters of 
disadvantage) that combine to form a ‘deprivation trap’, these are: poverty, physical 
weakness, vulnerability, powerlessness and isolation. Chambers (1983) argues that these 
clusters interact to trap people, mainly rural people, into clusters of disadvantage. 
 
 Fear of reprisals, persecution and death 
Both key informants and focus group participants explained how community participation in 
the Juba peace process was impeded by fear of reprisals, persecution and death: 
 
When rebels would identify you as somebody who wants to talk them out [of 
rebellion], they would kill you just like they killed the traditional chiefs. The killing of 
those chiefs created so much fear in people (KI, local government official, Pabbo 
Sub-county, Amuru District). 
 
Your involvement in talking with your son who is in the bush: if you do it without 
informing the government forces, they would take you for a rebel collaborator. When 
you get that permission, the rebels must not know (KI, local government official, 
Pabbo Sub-county, Amuru District). 
 
They [citizens] obviously feared going to meet Kony. If you had been here and they 
tell you that, tomorrow you are going to meet Kony, you would be uneasy! For 
instance, Kony said he wanted to behead the late Col. Ochora (KI, CSO 
representative, Gulu District). 
 
FGD participants said thus: 
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What I consider to be the most important [impediment] is fear of persecution from 
both LRA and Government of Uganda forces because we saw some people being 
killed at the hands of both the LRA and the government soldiers for supporting one 
side (Male FGD participant/former abductee, Layibi, Gulu District). 
 
The fear was both sided. Both sides were brutally and blatantly punishing people. For 
us the ordinary people, we were barehanded and our only weapon was a concerted 
voice (Male FGD participant, Coope, Gulu District). 
 
The fear factor was critical in determining the level of community involvement in the 
peacemaking process in Northern Uganda. The participation of community members in peace 
processes can expose individuals to risky situations. In Colombia, for instance, armed actors 
used threats, assassinations and disappearances to dissuade IDPs from pursuing peace (Koser, 
2007:24-25). Similarly in Liberia, CSO representatives and community members invited to 
participate in the Liberia peace process were threatened with death (Hayner, 2007:28). In 
Acholi, religious and cultural leaders collected the stories of ordinary community members 
thereby shielding these members from victimization by both LRA and GoU. 
 
 Impediments after armed conflict 
Conflict-affected communities in Northern Uganda continued to experience impediments to 
participation in the conflict resolution process even after cessation of direct hostilities. These 
included low levels of confidence, low self-esteem and socio-cultural changes, as explained 
by the FGD participants below: 
 
Because of this war, many of the community members here, particularly us the 
women, we have very low levels of confidence and self-esteem. We think that we 
cannot speak anything sensible in public. This is partly psychologically instilled in the 
minds of the population as a result of prolonged conflict (Female FGD participant, 
Atanga Sub-county, Pader District). 
 
You see this conflict has changed many socio-cultural aspects of the Acholi culture. 
Now there is a diminished role of elders and increased involvement of young people 
whose social profile is less significant in a society that attaches great importance to 
age and experience (Elder, FGD participant, Atanga Sub-county, Pader District). 
 
Another FGD participant explained how the resumption of hostilities affected community 
reconciliation initiatives: 
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There was resumption of hostilities between LRA and UPDF in the DRC and the CAR 
even when the peace talks were taking place in Juba; this seriously frustrated ongoing 
local community efforts to accelerate reconciliation at the micro level (Elder, FGD 
participant, Ongako Sub-county, Gulu District). 
 
After the cessation of direct hostilities, it could not be assumed that the conflict was over. At 
this stage, the conflict might only have changed form and might in fact continue to manifest 
in different forms while the community was beginning to experience negative peace; in other 
words, the structural and deep-seated root-causes and drivers of the conflict remained 
unchanged (Galtung, 1996). 
 
 Cross-cutting impediments to community participation 
The study reveals a number of cross-cutting impediments to community participation; these 
include social-cultural factors, perceptions and stereotypes, poor socio-economic conditions, 
plus poor mobilization, communication and feedback. 
 
 Social-cultural factors, perceptions and stereotypes 
Key Informants explained how perceptions and stereotypes about young people and women 
affected community participation, and how these could have contributed to the failure of 
some of the peace initiatives by a female mediator in Northern Uganda: 
 
Elders and men think women should not talk in public, and that the youth do not have 
any experience to share in public: they are simply young people (KI, CSO 
representative, Gulu District). 
 
The Betty Bigombe peace initiative of 1993-1994 was failed by her male counterparts. 
They wondered how “a mere woman” could bring peace to Acholi. She had made a 
major breakthrough for peace with LRA rebels but was grossly undermined by the 
men (KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
 
I think Bigombe did play a good part [in the peace process]. But as you know, in 
Acholi, in a matter of this nature, they will not take a woman seriously. Even the olum 
[LRA rebels] said, “madakadakamumwa”, which means, “this is just woman talk”. 
Does she understand? In Acholi, whoever it is, they say no. This matter? Not a 
woman. There are certain things women can do, yes, but not this one. So the LRA 
never took her seriously. More so the name Bigombe, “aman ma tikuja”, she is a wife 
of Bigombe, she is supporting her husband (KI, opinion leader, Kitgum District). 
 
From these quotes presented it would appear that, the Acholi generally do not take women 
seriously, especially in conflict resolution processes. In Nepal, Khakurel (2008) and Rai 
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(2008) found that women’s representation remains low, that their rights are violated, and that 
their role is negligible. But this gender bias is not entrenched in all societies. For example, 
there were some women participants during peacemaking processes in Sudan and Northern 
Ireland (Conciliation Resources, 2013:11). 
 
One key informant argued that gender was not an issue: 
 
I do not think [Bigombe’s] being a woman was a factor. People knew Bigombe; she 
was a very well educated person. She was already holding a responsible position [she 
was a Government Minister] (KI, opinion leader, Kitgum District). 
 
However it seems that the male domination at the Juba peace talks had worked against the 
active role of women. Women delegates to Juba were viewed more as wives, mothers and 
sisters, not as political representatives of the women constituency: 
 
In [terms of] influencing decisions [of the Juba peace teams], the majority of the 
people there were men. It is very hard for women to convince men to put forward 
their issues because the majority of the issues were those affecting women (KI, INGO 
official, Gulu District). 
 
When it came to the LRA, the chief spokesperson started by diluting and trivializing 
our presence and said, “Our dear sisters, wives and mothers...” I shot up and said, 
“Please, we are being on record, we are delegates. We are not here ‘house-wifing or 
mothering’. We have come here as delegates” (KI, women activist, Kampala). 
 
Even during ‘mato-oput’, which is a [traditional] conflict resolution mechanism, men 
are the ones who do it. The women play ceremonial roles of cleaning and cooking 
food (KI, INGO official, Gulu District). 
 
Some of the impediments to women participation are related to public perceptions 
(Conciliation Resources, 2013:14). For instance, Khakurel (2008) contends that women in 
Nepal are considered unsuitable for decision-making roles, since most institutions of society 
(government, judiciary, the civil service, security forces, and political parties) are dominated 
by men. It would appear that Acholi society is still very much entrenched in rigid patriarchy. 
 
The findings of this study show that there are still deep-seated and culturally constructed 
gender norms, attitudes, beliefs and practices, which need a sustained advocacy strategy and 
engagement. To respond to such issues, there is a need for an approach broadly known as 
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gender-transformative programming, which is crucial for understanding and systematically 
dialoguing on gender issues in conflict and post-conflict settings (Rottach et al, 2009). 
 
Nonetheless, regarding women peace activists in conflict contexts, their identity as women 
gives them qualities that bring something special to their work. The stereotyping is not 
without its uses though; the widespread perception of women as natural nurturers gives them 
some window of opportunity to achieve their goals if they are willing to deploy these 
advantages wherever they can (Conciliation Resources, 2013:12). 
 
 Poor socio-economic conditions 
Both KIs and FGD participants highlighted various socio-economic conditions that could 
have affected community participation; these include community members’ focus on survival 
and on ensuring livelihoods for their households instead of the peace process; the prevalence 
of poverty; the lack of facilitation by government; and a biased selection procedure: 
 
People were concentrating more on their livelihoods, more tangible things that would 
make them have life every day, [rather] than thinking about Joseph Kony, whom they 
totally believed was not even going to come out, or sign the peace agreement, [and] 
which he did not sign anyway (KI, local government official, Gulu District). 
 
Going there [to Juba] needed money yet for us our major problem was money. In fact, 
we are too poor to buy even a small radio to listen to what transpires around the 
world, so poverty was our major impediment. Also government did not facilitate the 
ordinary people to participate. If government wanted us to participate, they would 
have provided the logistics (Male FGD participant, Kiteng, Pader District). 
 
Lederach (1997:52) suggests that people in conflict situations are in ‘survival mode’ and that 
they may be preoccupied with meeting basic human needs (such as shelter, food and safety). 
In such a context, efforts directed at peace and conflict resolution can easily be seen as 
secondary concerns. And yet, in conflict situations, peace efforts are an absolute necessity, 
since there is interdependence between the presence of peace and meeting one’s basic needs. 
 
 Poor mobilization, communication and feedback 
Many respondents spoke about how community participation in conflict resolution could 
have been affected by poor mobilization, communication and feedback. In particular, 
representatives’ outreach activities seem to have had an urban bias. There were challenges in 
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sending people who truly represented the communities, and there does not seem to have been 
sufficient community ownership of the peace process: 
 
Communities do not own the peace process, and they remain confused. You ask the 
ordinary person deep in the village; they will not tell you anything about the Juba 
peace talks. That is a clear sign that there is no community ownership of the process 
(KI, local government official, Amuru District). 
 
The major problem was that, there was a communication gap between the district 
leaders and the peace teams themselves, because they at times communicated with 
district leaders only and due to the work load at the district, the district officials may 
not extend the same communication that they are given from the peace teams to the 
people at grassroots level (KI, local government official, Amuru District). 
 
Although there was enthusiasm at some point, with some civil society efforts to rally 
women groups, youth groups and so on, some of them had their own problems. You 
doubt also whether they were actually representing certain groups. Because if you 
come to Kampala, you are meeting in a posh hotel, you speak with a few people here 
and there, smart guys write the recommendations or the memorandum, and then [you] 
go to the plane. And you say we are sending the views of the women of Uganda? (KI, 
CSO representative, Kampala). 
 
The study findings thus suggest that Acholi local communities were victims of what 
Chambers (1983:13) describes as ‘urban bias’ – in this case the outcomes of the peace talks 
did not reach those in rural areas. 
 
Some key informants spoke of how they did not feel valued, because they were neglected. 
The attitude of LRA and GoU peace teams affected the involvement of local communities: 
 
There is the feeling that the community is less important in the process. This is a 
feeling by most leaders. And that is why the reporting [feedback] process is poor. It is 
not up-to-date because they feel, they [citizens] are not important in the process (KI, 
local government official, Amuru District). 
 
The GoU and the LRA thought that the conflict was their problem and that they could 
solve the problem by themselves. They did not think that the problem also concerned 
ordinary people (KI, religious leader, Kitgum District). 
 
Under the prescriptive model of conflict resolution, Lederach (1995:48) argues that the elite 
may consider themselves as experts about the peacemaking and conflict resolution process.  
Thus, in Northern Uganda, the leaders’ attitude was partly responsible for the limited 
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participation of ordinary community members. Barnes (in Van Tongeren, 2005:20) postulates 
that, if the community and organized civil society are excluded from the peace process, or if 
their real needs are not addressed, they are less likely to work actively towards its 
implementation. 
 
Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
4.8.7 Section Summary 
Citizen participation is limited in areas where elite actors dominate the local scene with little 
regard for representation and legitimacy. Elite domination is related to the relative power held 
by the different categories of participants. In such a case, the elite may use the information in 
their possession to further control the local communities. Women’s voices may remain 
marginalised and the impediments to local participation could be real but may not be 
addressed for a variety of reasons. 
Key points: 
Impediments to community participation during conflict (section 4.8.6
 Impediments to Community Participation in Conflict Resolution:172) 
 Lack of connection between elite negotiators and the grassroots population, 
 The grassroots population were limited in their capacity to take part in the 
formal negotiations The war affected the local population emotionally and 
psychologically, 
 During the peace process, hostilities resumed, 
 The grassroots population feared reprisals, persecution and death during the 
peace process, 
 
Impediments to community participation after conflict (section 4.8.6
 Impediments to Community Participation in Conflict Resolution:172) 
 Hostilities resumed  between the LRA and UPDF in DRC and CAR, 
 Low levels of confidence and self-esteem, particularly among women, were 
prevalent, 
 The elders are no longer given the acknowledgement and respect they had in 
the past, 
 
Cross-cutting impediments to community participation (section 4.8.6
 Impediments to Community Participation in Conflict Resolution:172) 
 Negative gender and cultural perceptions existed, especially against women and 
youth, 
 Lack of commitment was prevalent on the part of the elite representatives, 
 Poverty and lack of basic needs were primary concerns, 
 Poor communication existed between the elite and the masses, leading to 
exclusion of the grassroots especially the rural masses. 
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4.9 Appropriateness of Conflict Resolution Structures 
In order for the conflict resolution process to be effective, there must be effective 
mechanisms to facilitate community participation as a necessary precondition for sustainable 
peace. In this regard, the need for an inclusive and participatory peace process cannot be 
over-emphasized. It presents community members with an opportunity to contribute to 
peacemaking but where peace processes lack such mechanisms the grassroots may remain 
marginalised. In this regard, Richardson and Waddington (1996:314) contend that for true 
democratic participation and decision making to take place, there is a need to empower 
communities, while at the same time tempering the dominant role of professional groups. 
 
4.9.1 Appropriateness of Structures for Engaging Conflict-affected Communities in 
Conflict Resolution 
The study established that there was a lack of appropriate mechanisms for community 
participation in conflict resolution processes, particularly the Juba peace talks. The location 
of the peace talks, the multiple roles of the elite officials, and the inadequate information 
dissemination and feedback mechanisms that were used did not facilitate effective 
community participation in the peace process. 
 
The location of the venue for the peace talks was not suitable for the involvement of conflict-
affected communities: 
 
The physical location of the venue of the peace talks [Juba] was a hindrance. The 
location of the assembly areas for the LRA [Garamba in the DRC, and Rikwangba in 
South Sudan] did not facilitate or enable interaction between LRA rebels and the 
Acholi community (KI, CSO representative, Gulu District). 
 
Respondents highlighted how the absence of a clear communication, information 
dissemination and feedback strategy affected community participation in the peace process: 
 
There was poor dissemination of information from the peace talks to the ordinary 
citizens partly because of internal displacement – most people were in IDP camps. 
The use of ‘word-of-mouth’ for disseminating information was not very effective (KI, 
cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
The peace process is owned by us the community [only] to a little extent because what 
was discussed in Juba was not communicated to us, it was kept secret and those who 
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went [to Juba] did not come back to tell us the exact thing that took place in the Juba 
peace talks (Female FGD participant, Laroo Division, Gulu District). 
 
The lack or absence of proper information can give rise to what Moore (2003) describes as 
‘data conflict’ – that is to say, conflict arising out of information gaps, or misinformation. 
Further, confusion was generated by the legitimacy of the representatives: 
 
There was an assumption that religious leaders, cultural leaders and CSOs represented 
conflict-affected communities, yet some of them did not meet with the people and were 
inaccessible: 
 
The assumption by religious leaders, cultural leaders and CSOs that they [were] 
representing people was wrong. Because how do you represent me, and you fail to 
come to me, to find out my feelings? (KI, local government official, Amuru 
District). 
 
The leaders who went for the Juba peace talks like […] are very busy people and [it 
is] difficult to meet them (Female FGD participant, Laroo Division, Gulu District). 
 
One focus group participant emphasized how community members did not have opportunity 
to be represented by a person of their choice: 
 
For us the community we entrusted our political, religious and cultural leaders to 
represent us; some of them are government ministers who discussed on our behalf but 
there was no room given to the community to elect a direct representative (Male FGD 
participant, Laroo Division, Gulu District). 
 
Study findings point to a need for a structure that enables much more direct citizen 
participation. However, Strange (1972:657) has argued that, for such structures to work, they 
must have clear and direct access to the decision-making process, and they must also be 
empowered by strategies designed to enhance decision–making capacities. 
 
To address some of these challenges, there is a need to avoid selective participation, that is to 
say, involving only the vocal and more articulate middle range leaders and marginalizing 
those directly affected by the conflict. In fact, it is critical to identify leaders from conflict-
affected communities (Botes & Van Rensburg, 2000:45; Lederach, 1997:37). Also, unless the 
people are closely involved, through their representative organizations and through organized 
public opinion, any peace agreement reached remains on shaky foundations (Oliver, 2002). 
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Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
4.9.2 Suggestions for Future Structuring of Peace Processes 
Peace processes are more likely to be successful when they are structured in such a way that 
they present opportunities for all stakeholders to make meaningful contributions, and 
particularly where ordinary people have an instrumental role to play alongside the elite 
officials.  
 
The study found that there is a need to establish participatory structures and the need to adopt 
a culturally appropriate approach to conflict resolution. 
 
 Establish inclusive and participatory structures 
Majority of the respondents made a case for the inclusion of local people in peace processes, 
and emphasised that communities should be allowed to identify and select their own 
representatives, as this would improve the credibility of such peace processes: 
 
The community should elect someone they think can talk on their behalf about their 
interests on the resolution of the conflict. This person elected should be at the level of 
the villagers (Female FGD participant, Laroo Division, Gulu District). 
 
Ordinary people should select, by themselves, their representatives – whether they 
choose religious leaders, or cultural leaders, or even local government officials, as 
long as the selected representatives have the mandate of the people (KI, religious 
leader, Kitgum District). 
Key points: appropriateness of conflict resolution structures (section 4.9.1
 Appropriateness of Structures for Engaging Conflict-affected Communities in 
Conflict Resolution:187) 
 Accessibility to the venue for the peace talks was a problem for the local 
communities. 
 The absence of a clear communication and information dissemination strategy 
significantly affected the extent to which ordinary community members 
participated. 
 The high-level participants (elite) did not pass on the information to the 
grassroots. 
 There was an assumption that religious leaders, cultural leaders and CSOs 
represented conflict-affected communities 
 The community did not have opportunity to be represented by a person of their 
choice. 
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Affected communities should have full representation to take their voices directly to 
the peace talks. They should have the opportunity to speak directly in the face of 
perpetrators and actors at the peace talks (KI, religious leader, Kitgum District).  
 
A peace process that ensures participation of a wide range of stakeholders through an 
inclusive peace forum will give ordinary people the space to contribute to a peace agenda that 
represents their concerns. Such a forum will complement other formal paths to peace such as 
‘Track I’ negotiations among the elite. This opinion appears to support White’s (1996:8) 
assertion that participation should be a means of empowerment – i.e. that the practical 
experience of being involved in considering options, making decisions and taking collective 
action is transformative. 
 
Many respondents spoke of the need for ‘known’ leaders from cultural, religious and political 
institutions (the elite) to work alongside the local people ‘who own the problem’: 
 
There would have been some kind of demarcation, including the people who were at 
the grassroots [level] sending their representatives in addition to the MPs who 
represent a whole constituency, which is so large. Like Archbishop Odama represents 
the whole of Acholi. He would not be able to get all the information down there. He 
would need some people to come from the grassroots and together they would have 
formed a more representative force (KI, opinion leader, Kitgum District). 
 
If opportunity could be there for the next peace talks then the people who ‘own’ the 
problem should be taken, not those with big bellies, the rich from Kampala. There is a 
need to keep changing those going and not keeping the same people on all the trips 
(Male FGD participant, Ocettoke Camp, Kitgum District). 
 
Using participatory methodologies to engage these [war-affected] people in ensuring 
that there are credible people from within the communities, who have suffered from 
the same fate like the other members among the people, who are negotiating, is 
important (KI, INGO official, Gulu District). 
 
Key informants emphasized that it was important to establish a structure that was 
representative of all parties to the conflict. One of the responses was: 
 
When an opportunity opens up for peace talks, there should be a well-structured 
arrangement that takes into consideration every party to the conflict, even at 
grassroots level. That would mean creating another parallel structure of victims or 
community members who will participate in that peace process, without anybody 
doing it because he feels [more] concerned about it. Then that could give opportunity 
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for that structure to ask those questions: we need women; we need children; we need 
victims; we need grassroots leaders (KI, cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
The availability of mechanisms for public participation in peace processes can be extremely 
important, yet they do not occur unless people make them happen. This typically involves a 
substantial degree of both advocacy to ensure that their voices are heard, and mobilization to 
generate opportunities to enhance capacities (Oliver, 2002:92). 
 
To ensure adequate representation, one of the strategies is the inclusion of a community 
representative who would be tasked specifically to brief the wider community on the progress 
of the peace process. However, one respondent argued that existing community structures, 
both formal and informal, should be used to reach out to the community and to engage them 
in peace initiatives: 
 
Community structures, both formal and informal, must be engaged to support peace 
initiatives. So, rather than creating new structures, these structures just need 
transformation (KI, CSO representative, Kampala). 
 
Both key informants and focus group participants proposed that community peacemaking 
structures should be at clan level and at local government level where the different segments 
of society are likely to be more effectively represented: 
 
It [the peacemaking structure] would be at two levels. The first one is at clan level. At 
the clans, women must have their own space for them to discuss, tease out, 
interrogate and share [their] experiences as women. Two, the elders will have their 
places at the Wang’oo47 where they carry out their influential discussions. Then the 
youth must be reached. The second level is the local governments, which must have 
the capacity to oversee, to coordinate, and even serve (KI, women activist, 
Kampala). 
 
Once there is conflict among people, consultation must begin from the lower level up 
to the upper leaders and there must exist a channel through which matters are taken. 
This was not the case with the conflict resolution in Acholi land (Male FGD 
participant, Pagak, Amuru District). 
 
                                                 
47 Wang’oo is an Acholi traditional fireplace event used for teaching, storytelling and reflecting on past and 
current events; it was a forum for the socialization of the young ones. 
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One key informant proposed the inclusion of elite stakeholders even at grassroots level in 
order to add insights which the local community may not have: 
 
Grassroots engagement should be in terms of documentation, in terms of grounding 
with national and international standards, conventions and resolutions. It should be 
blended with boardroom activities and experiences; otherwise, they will also be just 
real grassroots (KI, women activist, Kampala). 
 
Thus there could be mutual complementarity when local people and the elite work together. 
Respondents suggested that clans and local governments needed to establish peace forums 
based on decentralized local government structures to create a space for citizens to engage in 
dialogue about peace. This would lead to the realization of the notion that sustainable peace 
structures needed to start from the grassroots level up to the top level, or what Lederach 
(1997) describes as ‘peace building from below’. 
 
Finding practical mechanisms for involving women and men, plus other key stakeholders in 
the peace process from the beginning would be a win-win strategy (Conciliation Resources, 
2013). 
 
One respondent proposed the establishment or utilization of existing structures that promoted 
information gathering and sharing at different levels: 
 
In Acholi, they have the district reconciliation and peace teams (DRPTs). Do you 
know who goes for the meetings? The likes of CARE [an International NGO]. The 
other [ordinary] person is not represented. We are talking on their behalf. But do we 
really stay there [in the community]? If strengthened, such a forum can help people to 
articulate their issues (KI, INGO official, Gulu District). 
 
Two key informants spoke about how local communities, particularly women, seemed to 
prefer informal processes to formal ones: 
 
Find innovative ways of handling dialogue in such a way that it should not be formal. 
If communities or community leaders are empowered to hold their own meetings, 
people can bring out their issues; that kind of informal and innovate way of thinking 
can be applied to many communities (KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
The workable way of ensuring that women participate is just creating a mechanism 
for information flow, creating linkages between the different stakeholders. You may 
not need the views of the local community now and then. You do not have to run down 
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there to consult everyone all the time, but there are few people within that place that 
you can call and get information from (KI, INGO official, Gulu District). 
 
Respondents proposed that community representatives should be prepared to participate in 
the peace process, with emphasis on women-led and women-specific peace initiatives: 
 
The peace process involves first of all capacity building, where one is prepared to 
negotiate or to participate in such a process. I think the ordinary community would 
require a lot of that preliminary preparation to have their capacity built in terms of 
building confidence (KI, CSO representative, Kitgum District). 
 
First, include women-led initiatives and women individuals in formal processes by 
documenting and celebrating their experiences. Second, ensure practical involvement 
of women from the grassroots, from the districts, in peace processes by building their 
capacities (KI, women activist, Kampala). 
 
Building the capacity of women and men, and enabling them to use and share their war-time 
experiences is vital for peace building and post-conflict recovery and development. Thus, 
women should particularly be provided with affirmative-action opportunities that include 
training, exposure and exchange visits to address and demystify cultural stereotypes. 
 
 Adopt a culturally appropriate approach to conflict resolution 
Cultural activities, such as traditional music, dance, drama, folklore, storytelling, and other 
cultural ceremonies, are socially accepted as appropriate vehicles for communicating peace 
messages and advocating for the end to violence. 
 
Respondents proposed the adoption of creative, innovative and culturally appropriate ways of 
giving the local people a voice in peace processes: 
 
The peace process needs some activities like songs and dances, which reflect peace. 
Those activities should be emphasized in all the Acholi communities so that the young 
generation learn [about] the danger of conflict and [so that they learn] how to 
resolve it (Male FGD participant, Coope, Gulu District). 
 
There are ways of telling how people themselves want to be represented, especially on 
critical issues like peace building. One of the ways is through music; just tell them to 
compose a song and that [this] is the theme. Let them understand the concept very 
well and they will come up with songs (KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
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Cultural activities like the aforementioned can preserve the legitimacy and importance of 
culture as a positive force that brings about social cohesion and harmony within conflict 
affected societies. 
 
One respondent revealed how citizens with reliable connections with the LRA could 
influence combatants and how they could easily contribute to resolving the conflict: 
 
People who are in the villages and have their sons and daughters in the bush could be 
involved directly, in helping to negotiate a peace agreement with people who have 
caused atrocities to them. If me, a mother, my husband is there in the bush or my son 
is there and if I am taken there and given a chance, maybe I can talk to my husband 
or son (KI, radio programme host, Gulu District). 
 
One respondent was of the view that adequate preparatory work to map out all key 
stakeholders should be undertaken to ensure meaningful inclusion of key stakeholders in the 
peace process: 
 
It is important to do adequate preparatory work which would include mapping key 
stakeholders, mapping interests, getting to understand who would be very important 
and therefore should not be left out from such a process once it commences (KI, CSO 
representative, Kitgum District). 
 
Total community participation is impossible, but such participation could take the form of 
legitimate representation (Soen, 1981:110). 
 
However, one respondent believes that there are difficulties and practical challenges in 
building consensus about selecting community representatives: 
 
What we should first understand is that the people are already disowning those they 
sent into positions, therefore, it may be difficult to have consensus where everybody 
will say yes, this is my representative. How many villages are there before you come 
to a parish, then the parishes and then the sub-counties? That is not very easy (KI, 
local government official, Gulu District). 
 
This respondent added: 
 
If they [organizers] needed to go to a sub-county and get us one person from the sub-
county, I do not know how. A sub-county is made up of parishes. I do not know how it 
would have been done anywhere. That could be their [citizens’] wish, yes, but the 
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practicality should also be considered (KI, local government official, Gulu 
District). 
 
Moreover, most communities are not homogenous entities, and thus the different community 
segments would have different interests. Also, there is a lack of community structures for 
selecting community representatives from grassroots; this is something that would have to be 
done prior to selecting community representatives. 
 
One Key Informant argued that, while local communities have a role to play in ensuring that 
leadership structures work for them, they themselves do not fulfil their ‘civic duty’ of holding 
their leaders accountable: 
 
Let the communities make the existing structures work for them. Let them put pressure 
[on their leaders] to work for them. If your LC [Local Council] system is failing you, 
get LCs who can work for you. We also have a challenge: once we put people in 
positions of responsibility, we neglect them. When they do not report back to us, we 
don’t hold them to account and then we complain (KI, CSO representative, 
Kampala). 
 
One KI is confident that because of their thorough understanding of issues and the context, 
local people could be more knowledgeable and persuasive than some of the elite: 
 
This local man you minimize understands the language and can persuade the LRA 
better than any elite or Minister or somebody in authority. There is a way they 
connect. They may not necessarily speak the English language, if that is what people 
mean by capacity, but they understand the issues and they can convey the message 
better than the so-called elite. If you want to pass on something, you have to use them 
(KI, CSO representative, Kampala). 
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Figure 17: A Feedback & Consultation Mechanism for Community & Their 
Leadership 
 
Source: Model based on Lederach (1997) 
 
In order to make citizen involvement more effective, a suitable formal organization (e.g. a 
committee, board, coalition or network) must be established and sustained. While there is no 
formula to guide this process, it is generally believed that such an organization should be 
developed with significant community input and that it should have positive links with local 
political and government structures (Vuori, cited in Zakus & Lysack, 1998:4). 
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Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
4.9.3 The Role of the Elite in Conflict Resolution 
The study established that there were mixed preferences among respondents regarding who 
should plan and facilitate community participation. While others preferred that government 
takes the lead through established statutory structures, others preferred CSOs and NGOs.  
 
One FGD participant proposed that Government should play its role in ensuring that people 
were involved in issues that concerned them: 
 
Government should take [the] lead in involving people and ensuring their 
participation. I know that the government doesn’t have adequate information about 
our problems, so the government should do its role (Female FGD participant, Laroo 
Division, Gulu District). 
 
Several respondents spoke of how NGOs were better placed to secure participation of 
communities: 
 
During the armed conflict, the community saw NGOs like Red Cross, World Vision, 
and UN Agencies bridging the [service delivery] gaps that resulted from the suffering 
of the people. They were even closer to us than the government so I think those NGOs 
can involve us better and ensure our participation in conflict resolution processes 
(Female FGD participant, Laroo Division, Gulu District). 
 
Key points: suggestions for future structuring (section 4.9.2 Suggestions for 
Future Structuring of Peace Processes:189) 
 
 There is a need for mechanisms for selecting local community representatives. 
 Ordinary citizens know credible peers who can represent them more 
effectively. 
 There is a need for a structure that is truly representative of all segments of 
society. 
 There is a need to use participatory and culturally appropriate methodologies to 
select community representatives. 
 Community members who support the LRA should be included in the peace 
process. 
 Before the peace process starts, community members should be trained in 
conflict resolution skills. 
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If the CSOs can be empowered with resources, and they are well facilitated to reach 
out, they are the ones I have more confidence in. Of course the [political] leaders will 
be involved [in the process], but CSOs should take [the] lead (KI, local government 
official, Amuru District). 
 
One respondent advocated for the networks amongst all interest groups: 
 
It would be important that you have networks of [all] important interest groups; 
politicians, cultural leaders, and religious leaders working hand-in hand. Having the 
same information and disseminating it the same way would be beneficial (KI, CSO 
representative, Kampala). 
 
Figure 18: A Model for Community Participation in Peacemaking/Conflict 
Resolution 
 
Source: KI & FGD Data 
 
There appears to have been no clear mechanisms established to involve local community 
members in the Northern Uganda conflict resolution process. However, the key concern is to 
ensure meaningful community participation in conflict resolution processes. Where ordinary 
communities are unable to participate, complementary strategies should be developed to 
represent their interests in the conflict resolution process. 
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4.9.4 Section Summary 
The level and effectiveness of community participation in peacemaking and conflict 
resolution is largely determined by the appropriateness of the conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Factors such as the venue for the peace talks; the suitability of the communication methods; 
the information dissemination strategy; the choice, legitimacy and credibility of community 
representatives, and how accountable they are to community members, are all critical factors 
that will significantly determine the extent to which ordinary community members participate 
in bringing about the peace that they will enjoy and sustain. As such, it is important to ensure 
that local citizens are part of the decision-making process for selecting their representatives, 
some of whom could be their peers, working together with their elite counterparts. 
 
Also, the use of existing community structures, in which local citizens already have a role, 
would be a good way to involve them. Where needed, it might be essential to establish 
parallel structures for the voiceless war victims as a means of promoting dialogue regarding 
issues affecting them. In addition, both state and non-state actors need to work together to 
provide for the inclusion of war victims. In short, there is a clear desire for a more 
participatory and democratic decision-making process in which technical officials and the 
elite no longer play a dominant role. In fact, Morone (1990:253) asserts that the call for 
citizen participation has not only been one of empowering an oppressed group, but of 
controlling the dominant role of the elite. The notion of empowerment is important because it 
helps people to become agents of change and transformation within their societies. 
 
Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
4.10 Traditional Mechanisms for Conflict Resolution 
This section will present respondents’ perceptions on traditional conflict resolution practices. 
Key points: the role of the elite in conflict resolution (section 4.9.3 The Role of 
the Elite in Conflict Resolution:197) 
 Government should ensure that people are involved in issues that concern 
them. 
 CSOs can involve communities better and ensure their participation. 
 A partnership between political leaders, religious leaders, cultural leaders and 
CSOs is needed. 
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4.10.1 Traditional Conflict Resolution Practices in Acholi 
Traditional or indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution are transitional justice processes 
that respect and draw on local traditions, social norms and values. In Northern Uganda, these 
practices have, for ages, been used by the local tribes to resolve conflicts and maintain social 
order in the region. They include mato-oput48 of the Acholi, Kayo Cuk of the Langi, Ailuc of 
the Iteso, Ajupe of the Kakwa, Ajufe of the Lugbara, Aja of the Alur, and the ToluKoka of the 
Madi, among others. Across Africa, similar traditional justice mechanisms include Inkundla 
in South Africa, Gacaca in Rwanda, Magambo in Mozambique and Bashingantahe in 
Burundi (Ogora, 2009:1). 
 
4.10.2 Relevance and Appropriateness of the Traditional Practices 
Indigenous mechanisms for conflict resolution have gained acceptance over the years due to 
their inclusive style. In this regard, advocates of inclusive peacemaking processes, such as 
Mac Ginty (2008:139) argue that such approaches to conflict resolution are participatory and 
relationship-focused, and that they are likely to result into peaceful outcomes that have a 
higher chance of community adherence than non-familiar approaches. 
 
Respondents spoke of how the traditional mechanisms in Northern Uganda, particularly 
mato-oput, were relevant and useful in resolving conflicts: 
 
They [GoU & LRA] tried dialogue as a method of resolving the conflict but it never 
bore fruit because of the technicalities involved in the dialogue. They later turned to 
the local people, us, and sought for the traditional methods, which is the “mato-oput” 
(Male FGD participant, Bardege Division, Gulu District). 
 
I see it [mato-oput] relevant with internal conflicts on land. I have seen on many 
occasions, it has helped. With most land conflicts, people tend to first go to elders for 
mediation. It has helped some of these returnees [to settle] peacefully in their areas 
(KI, local government official, Amuru District). 
 
Mato-oput delivers justice and promotes reconciliation in a socially acceptable manner 
because it gives opportunities to as many community members as possible to participate in 
                                                 
48 Mato-oput is defined as a traditional reconciliation process for a killing, whether intentional or unintentional. 
It results in justice, forgiveness, healing, restoration of broken relations, and, ultimately greater unity and 
harmony between the clans of the victim and the perpetrator. 
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the conflict resolution process (Muhereza et al, 2009:15). In fact, a study by Pham & Vinck 
(2010:3) found that 53% of the population in Northern Uganda viewed traditional 
mechanisms as useful in dealing with the LRA combatants and ex-combatants. 
 
One respondent explained that the Acholi cultural institution had put in place measures for 
resolving conflicts non-violently: 
 
We rejuvenated all the cultural leadership structures throughout Acholi. We put in 
place clan committees, clan leaders, elders’ councils. We trained them on how to 
handle various conflicts and disputes. We also went on to sensitize the community on 
where they can take their conflicts instead of picking axes and spears to kill one 
another (KI, cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
One key informant explained that due to recognition of the value of traditional justice, the 
Acholi cultural institution was the unofficial mediator during the Juba peace talks: 
 
We went to mediate [between LRA and GoU] only that we were not the authorized 
mediators. That is why in one of the protocols, the issue of traditional justice for 
accountability was put, because we explained it. We said there is a structure, there is 
a way of doing it (KI, cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
Conventional or modern peace processes that do not incorporate aspects of a community’s 
rich cultural practices and institutions can prove to be problematic. The traditional conflict 
resolution processes focus on restoring and/or building relationships, while the modern 
processes emphasise rules, regulations, procedures, laws or other formalities alongside 
content (Avruch et al, 1991). 
 
Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
Key points: relevance & appropriateness of mato-oput (section 4.10.2 Relevance 
and Appropriateness of the Traditional Practices:200) 
 
 Mato-oput yielded positive results during the Northern Uganda conflict. 
 Mato-oput has been useful in resolving community conflicts. 
 Due to its impartial role, the Acholi cultural institution could serve as an 
unofficial mediator. 
 The Acholi cultural institution has put in place measures for resolving 
conflicts. 
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4.10.3 Limitations of Traditional Practices of Conflict Resolution 
While traditional justice is the most effective means of conflict resolution, it may not be 
appropriate for some crimes, such as sexual and gender-based violence and criminal cases 
related to children. 
 
One key informant indicated that both the formal and the traditional justice system were not 
properly harmonized, and were still being applied in parallel: 
 
If you are sent to [prison] for seven years, on your return, you are to be subjected to 
mato-oput. In other words, one person is punished twice. One is by the state law, 
which is very quick and fast, and then the traditional justice system, which is based on 
the fact that you are to be spiritually re-integrated in the community (KI, cultural 
leader, Gulu District). 
 
One key informant highlighted the fact that the failure to standardize and codify traditional 
justice processes meant that they lacked national and international acceptance: 
 
If we look at the peace process of mato-oput, if we do not codify these processes, 
which are cultural and community based, it would have no bearing at national level. 
It can easily be rubbished because it is not codified, because it is not grounded within 
national and international standards and norms (KI, women activist, Kampala). 
 
Because both traditional and formal justice systems are still applied concurrently, and 
independently, there is a high risk of double jeopardy where suspects or offenders are tried 
under two independent justice systems for the same offence. 
 
One key informant explained that the traditional justice system in Acholi did not have an 
equivalent punishment to deal with the level of atrocities committed by the LRA: 
 
I don’t think there is an equivalent punishment for atrocities of LRA. Moving from a 
small village, to a whole district and then extending it to neighbouring districts and to 
neighbouring countries – the punishment for this kind of thing [atrocity] is not there 
in Acholi culture. It is very unique. There is nothing like a reference (KI, cultural 
leader, Gulu District). 
 
Although mato-oput has been credited for being a restorative and reconciliatory justice 
approach, Muhereza et al (2009:15) assert that it (and other traditional justice systems) 
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undermines the principle of complementarity to the Rome Statute49 and that it goes against 
the basic principles of criminal jurisprudence, where a penalty is intended to reflect the 
gravity of a crime committed. 
 
One respondent explained that in the Acholi culture, there is no precedent to guide the use of 
mato-oput in handling serious crimes, similar to those committed during the LRA conflict: 
 
Mato-oput has not previously handled mass killings, community killings and 
community violence, so there is no precedent to work with (KI, CSO representative, 
Gulu District). 
 
Based on today’s complex contemporary conflicts and the environments within which they 
operate, indigenous methods of conflict resolution may not be feasible to deal with some of 
the atrocities and the extent to which the conflict has escalated. In particular, Ogora (2009:2) 
argues that mato-oput is often presented as not being sufficiently effective. In a similar vein, 
some human rights campaigners have problems with traditional justice mechanisms that 
impact on the basic rights of others (Muhereza et al, 2009). 
 
One key informant emphasised that the application of traditional mechanisms is based on 
voluntary acceptance within a specific cultural setting: 
 
Most of these punishments are based on accepted culture of Acholi community. If we 
are to go in for paying blood compensation, will that be relevant to Teso culture, 
maybe not. What about Lango culture? What about to the Sudanese? Central Africa? 
Congo? (KI, cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
Traditional justice practices are often highly specific to, and have credibility within, specific 
ethnic groups, and they generally operate in traditional settings and are more appropriate for 
inter and intra-clan disputes and conflicts (Muhereza et al, 2009:15). Therefore, the 
application of such a system on a large scale, involving different ethnic groups or states, 
needs careful thought and investigation. 
 
                                                 
49 The [Rome] Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) was adopted on 17 July 1998 and ratified by 
Uganda on14 June 2002. 
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Two key informants spoke of how the mato-oput process was only applicable to the affected 
clans, i.e. for inter-clan conflict resolution and reconciliation: 
 
Mato-oput is between a particular clan or a person belonging to a particular clan 
taking responsibility to compensate a victim based upon acceptance that you wronged 
a particular clan. However, it is tricky in this context because [the] LRA was an army. 
As such, it brings so many clans together and others are not even from Acholi land 
(KI, CSO representative, Pader District). 
 
Mato-oput has been done at lower levels because it is done between the clan of 
someone who has killed and the clan of somebody who has been killed (KI, opinion 
leader, Kitgum District). 
 
Because the LRA is an army made up of different ethnic groups from Northern Uganda, and 
from various countries in the Great Lakes region, a regional and multi-ethnic traditional 
approach may be necessary for addressing the LRA conflict, but the question remains 
whether such a complicated undertaking would be possible in practice. 
 
Two key informants revealed that mato-oput is a very slow process that can take many years 
to conclude: 
 
Mato-oput is a very slow process. At times, it may take even fifty years. You see, you 
can kill quietly, and you do away with me. People raise questions, you deny and 
nobody forces you. Inwardly, you know that you did it, but you don’t confess (KI, 
cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
The mato-oput [process] is extremely slow and can take even one hundred years to 
complete. What I personally documented took ten years, from 1988-1998 (KI, CSO 
representative, Gulu District). 
 
Two key informants emphasized that mato-oput was purely based on confession and truth 
telling, and that it was thus only applicable to individuals who confessed their wrongdoing: 
 
Confession is all that is wanted. There is nothing like finger pointing anymore. No. 
Because of the fact that you have actually confessed, then individual responsibility 
goes away (KI, cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
Mato-oput could not easily be applied in this [Northern Uganda] context. However, 
on individual basis, it will be possible because there is common knowledge that so 
and so came and did this kind of atrocity. If that person could come out and face that 
challenge, the clan would take the responsibility of discussing [it] with the aggrieved 
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family or clan and then settle it in the traditional way (KI, CSO representative, 
Pader District). 
 
One key informant revealed that the traditional justice system had limited capacity to handle 
criminal cases that arose out of the war: 
 
There are still cases among the community that relate to justice and impunity; one 
clan is attacking another clan because the other clan had their son in the bush who 
misled the rebels, who carried out a massacre in the other clan (KI, CSO 
representative, Kitgum District). 
 
Mato-oput has limited feasibility in the Northern Uganda conflict largely because it relies on 
confession and truth telling by perpetrators, yet no particular Acholi clan has confessed, or 
has been identified as being responsible for the killings over the 23 years of violent conflict. 
Additionally, a study by Tufts University and Gulu University (2009) found that the issue of 
truth telling and confession is complicated by such factors as the inability of offenders to 
provide compensation, the nature of the conflict and unknown perpetrators or victims. 
 
Two key informants disclosed that there are some variations in the practice of mato-oput in 
order to adapt to changing circumstances, but these are minimal: 
 
Mato-oput has not been done in the actual traditional ways. Traditionally, if we were 
going for mato-oput in one sub-county, they gathered all [the] people. The concept 
has been that, you go to where the conflict has happened and you do it from there. So 
they tried to modernize it a bit, because of mainly logistics, they were not able to 
reach everyone (Local Government Official, Pabbo Sub-County, Amuru District). 
 
There may be some very minor differences in details, but basically the thing is 
spiritual cleansing and spiritual re-integration into the community, that’s what mato-
oput is all about. Pertaining to the venue, you find that in some areas, mato-oput 
takes place along a stream. In some areas, mato-oput takes place under a big tree. In 
some places, mato-oput takes place just in the open. These are the small variations 
(KI, cultural leader, Gulu District). 
 
In apparent agreement, Tufts University and Gulu University (2009:5-6) found that there 
seems to be a widespread perception in Acholi that there exists a variation in mato-oput 
practice between clans when dealing with varying degrees of war crimes and offences that 
did not result in death, such as rape, defilement, or mutilation. 
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Source: FGD & KI Qualitative Data 
 
Regarding the application of mato-oput in Northern Uganda, it is useful to ask whether the 
use of a set of unwritten laws will work for a major and violent conflict of this nature, and 
whether there is a real possibility for traditional rituals to bring justice to Northern Uganda. It 
might be helpful to examine the potential pitfalls in applying traditional models of justice to a 
modern conflict. Further, although law is a part of culture and that law cannot possibly be 
distinguished from culture, it might be necessary to establish whether the principles of the 
traditional approaches are akin to those of the formal justice system in Uganda, and whether 
there is a high possibility to incorporate traditional principles and practices into the formal 
justice in the spirit of complementarity. 
 
4.10.4 Chapter Summary 
The key findings show that the Northern Uganda conflict resolution process was dominated 
by the elite, notably the GoU peace team, the LRA peace team and the mediation team which 
were at the core; the observers at the periphery; and the ordinary community members who 
were involved in a minimal way. The study findings further illustrate the importance of 
community participation yet they also show minimal participation largely due to the lack of 
appropriate mechanisms and structures which excluded such participation (Lederach, 1997; 
Arnstein, 1969). In particular, ordinary people were denied the opportunity to participate 
directly in the Juba peace process due to the limited opportunities availed to them, and the 
impediments experienced. In fact, participation was negligible because the major sections of 
the grassroots community were significantly marginalised (Gidley et al, 2010; Commins, 
2004; Allan, 2003; Guilford, 2000). Also, community participation was impeded by the 
Key points: limitations of mato-oput in Acholi (section 4.10.3 Limitations of 
Traditional Practices of Conflict Resolution:202) 
 Mato-oput is not suitable for addressing serious crimes, such as war crimes. 
 Mato-oput is effective in specific cultural settings that accept its cultural 
practices. 
 The process of mato-oput takes time. 
 The very basis of the success of mato-oput is truth telling and confession, 
which in the Acholi conflict is problematic. 
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poverty and the denial of their basic human needs, which led to further deprivation and 
vulnerability (Sen, 2000; Max Neef, 1991; Maslow, 1954). 
 
Furthermore, the study findings indicate that capabilities of people were constrained by the 
socio-economic conditions prevailing during conflict and even after the conflict (Sen, 1999). 
More still, in relation to the particular situation IDPs, their plight and circumstances were not 
ameliorated in accordance with the African Union Convention on the Rights of IDPs and the 
universal declaration of human rights (AU, 2009; UN, 1948). Moreover , the human security 
needs of the IDPs, particularly the physical, economic and social needs, and generally the 
freedom from fear and freedom from want, were not sufficiently addressed (UN, 1994). 
Traditional practices have value in limited contexts and are not always suitable for certain 
transgressions that are better addressed through formal court procedures (Ogora, 2009). 
 
The following chapter presents the summary of key findings, conclusions, recommendations 
and final remarks. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS; CONCLUSIONS; 
RECOMENDATIONS AND FINAL COMMENTS 
 
5 Introduction 
This chapter will present a summary of the key findings linked to the specified objectives. 
The conclusions will be drawn from these findings, while the recommendations will be made 
based mostly on these conclusions. Finally, this report will end with some final comments. 
 
5.1 Key Findings Pertaining to the Study Objectives 
The key findings presented here reflect the perceptions of the study respondents, both the key 
informants and focus group participants. 
 
5.1.1 Key Findings Linked To Objective 1: Major Participants and Actors in the 
Conflict Resolution Process 
 
Various sub-themes or categories were evident. 
 
 Composition of key participants (section 4.7.1 Composition of Key Participants:131) 
The major finding for this sub-theme of ‘composition of participants’ was that key 
participants included the GoU peace team; the LRA peace team; appointed and elected 
political leaders; CSO representatives; the Acholi cultural institution, and religious leaders. 
There is some ambiguity amongst respondents as to whether or not the religious and cultural 
leaders truly represented the local communities. 
 
 Criteria for selection of participants (section 4.7.2 Criteria for Selecting 
Participants in the Juba Peace Talks:134) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that the unclear criteria and mandates for 
selecting participants caused problems of legitimacy. Also, formal institutions, including 
religious and cultural ones, selected their representatives through their internal structures. In 
addition, CSO representatives were selected based on their expertise in conflict resolution. 
Finally, ordinary people were largely represented by their religious and cultural leaders. 
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 Mandate and legitimacy of community representatives (section 4.7.4 Mandate 
of Representatives:140) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that community representatives did not provide 
adequate feedback to the grassroots population. In addition, observers acknowledged that 
they may have lacked a strong mandate from the local community. Finally, the government 
peace team did not consult with the local population. 
 
 The role and significance of the media (section 4.7.5 CSOs as Representatives of 
War-affected Communities:146) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that the media, particularly radio, provided an 
opportunity for ordinary people to participate in the peace process, albeit indirectly. In 
addition, the media, particularly radio, linked the elite actors to the grassroots population as 
well as the protagonists (LRA). Further, abductees were encouraged to return as a result of 
the radio programmes. 
 
 Women’s peace efforts (section 4.7.5 CSOs as Representatives of War-affected 
Communities:146) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that women, particularly those from rural areas, 
were left out of the formal peace process. In addition, most women’s peace initiatives were 
informal and not documented. Finally, the representation and participation of women in the 
peace process was relegated to that of ‘observer status’ and they had no direct influence on 
the final decision making. 
 
 The role of the community representatives (including religious and cultural leaders) 
(section 4.7.3 The Role of Community Representatives (Religious/Cultural 
Leaders):137) 
The major finding for this sub-theme was that religious and cultural leaders helped to initiate 
the peace process. They acted as informal mediators since they were trusted by both the elite 
actors and the community at the grassroots. 
 
 Limitations of the community representatives (section 4.7.6 Limitations of 
Community Representatives:154) 
The major finding for this sub-theme was that community representatives did not provide 
feedback to the grassroots population. 
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5.1.2 Key Findings Linked To Objectives 2 and 3: Community Capacity, Potential and 
Opportunities for Participation in Conflict Resolution Processes; The Nature 
and Level of Community Participation in Conflict Resolution Processes 
 
 Community capacity, potential and opportunities for participation in conflict 
resolution processes (section 4.8 Community Capacity, Potential, 
Opportunities and Community Participation in Conflict Resolution:156) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that ordinary community members did not have 
the capacity to participate effectively in the peace process. However, this is contrary to the 
United Nations (UN, 2011:3) observation that almost every conflict-affected community, 
however devastated, has some of the capacities needed for peace and resolution of conflicts 
which they are part of, which need to be protected and nurtured. 
 
Further, the community had the capacity to participate in the peace process but were excluded 
by the ‘elite’ for various reasons (language, ability to participate at a sophisticated level and 
protection of political space). Also they were not empowered to engage in such a process. 
However, until conflict-affected communities develop their own abilities to cope with 
conflict and post-conflict contexts, external, elite-led intervention will not succeed. 
 
 Enhancing community capacity (section 4.8 Community Capacity, Potential, 
Opportunities and Community Participation in Conflict Resolution:156) 
The major finding for this sub-theme was that community capacity needed to be enhanced 
through training and skills development and their ideas/inputs could be passed on to the next 
level. In fact, external stakeholders and the local elite need to nurture and support local 
capacities and mechanisms for conflict resolution rather than to impose their preferred 
approaches, which may dampen local initiative and frustrate the emergence of local strategies 
for dispute resolution. 
 
 Community opportunities not exploited during conflict resolution (section 4.8.2
 Community Opportunities Not Exploited:162) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that despite the leadership structure of IDP camps 
being ideal for facilitating community involvement, it was not used. The Acholi traditional 
practices, such as reconciliation, were not optimally utilized. Notwithstanding the fact that 
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local people at the grassroots level may be disempowered and fragmented by violent conflict, 
there will always be some form of community capacity for promoting peace and 
reconciliation, especially through indigenous approaches that have been transmitted through 
generations. 
 
In addition, the community’s knowledge and experience of the conflict was not tapped into. It 
should be noted, however, that conflict-affected communities may lose trust and confidence 
in a peace process that does not value their input and where actors in the peace process do not 
consult with them or give them feedback. 
 
 The nature of community participation in conflict resolution (section 4.8.4
 Nature of Community Participation:164) and the level of community 
participation in conflict resolution (section 4.8.5 Level of Community 
Participation:169) 
The major findings for these sub-themes were that local people and their leaders established 
the initial contact with the LRA long before the official teams and were involved in the early 
peace and conflict resolution initiatives to some extent. The community participated in 
conflict resolution through advocacy with influential leaders; they established direct contact 
with the LRA, and facilitated return and reintegration of LRA combatants. 
 
In addition, ordinary community members were largely excluded from the Juba peace 
process. Further, community perceptions were that the conflict was between the LRA and the 
GoU. Furthermore, the elite dominated the peace process. Also, the community consultation 
process was not productive because of poor planning and implementation. Finally, during 
peace talks, community members did not interface with negotiators and observers. 
 
 Impediments to community participation during the conflict (section 4.8.6
 Impediments to Community Participation in Conflict Resolution:172) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that there was a lack of 
connection/communication between elite negotiators and the grassroots population. The 
grassroots population were limited in their capacity to take part in the formal negotiations. In 
addition, the war affected the local population emotionally and psychologically. Finally, 
during the peace process, hostilities resumed and the grassroots population feared reprisals, 
persecution and death during the peace process. 
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 Impediments to community participation after conflict (section 4.8.6
 Impediments to Community Participation in Conflict Resolution:172) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that there was resumption of hostilities between 
the LRA and UPDF in DRC and CAR. There were also low levels of confidence and self-
esteem, particularly among women. Finally, the elders are no longer given the 
acknowledgement and respect they had in the past. 
 
 Cross-cutting impediments to community participation (section 4.8.6
 Impediments to Community Participation in Conflict Resolution:172) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that negative gender and cultural perceptions 
existed, especially against women and youth. In addition, lack of commitment was prevalent 
on the part of the elite representatives. Also, poverty was prevalent throughout Northern 
Uganda. Finally, poor communication existed between the elite and the masses, leading to 
exclusion of the grassroots population. 
 
5.1.3 Key Findings Linked To Objectives 4: Appropriateness of Conflict Resolution 
Structures 
 
Various sub-themes or categories were evident. 
 
 Appropriateness of structures for engaging conflict affected communities in conflict 
resolution (section 4.9.1 Appropriateness of Structures for Engaging Conflict-
affected Communities in Conflict Resolution:187) and suggestions for future 
structuring (section 4.9.2 Suggestions for Future Structuring of Peace 
Processes:189) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that the accessibility to the venue for the peace 
talks was a problem for the local communities. The absence of clear communication and 
information dissemination strategies significantly affected the extent to which ordinary 
community members participated. Also, the high-level participants (elite) and community 
representatives did not pass on the information to the grassroots. In addition, there was an 
assumption that religious leaders, cultural leaders and CSOs represented conflict-affected 
communities. 
 
213 
The community did not have opportunity to be represented by a person of their choice. In 
addition, there is a need for mechanisms for selecting local community representatives. 
Ordinary citizens know credible peers who can represent them more effectively. Furthermore, 
there is a need for a structure that is truly representative of all segments of society. In 
addition, there is a need to use participatory and culturally appropriate methodologies to 
select community representatives. Also, community members who support the LRA should 
be included in the peace process. Finally, before the peace process starts, community 
members should be trained in conflict resolution skills. 
 
 The role of the elite in conflict resolution (section 4.9.3 The Role of the Elite in 
Conflict Resolution:197) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that government should ensure that people are 
actively involved in issues that concern them. Also, CSOs are better placed to facilitate 
community participation. Finally, a strategic alliance among political leaders, religious 
leaders, cultural leaders and CSOs is needed in a peace process. 
 
5.1.4 Key Findings Linked to Objectives 5: Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict 
Resolution 
 
Various sub-themes or categories were evident. 
 
 Relevance and appropriateness of the Acholi traditional mechanisms of conflict 
resolution (section 4.10.2 Relevance and Appropriateness of the Traditional 
Practices:200) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that Mato-oput yielded positive results in 
resolving conflicts during the Northern Uganda conflict. In addition, due to its impartial role, 
the Acholi cultural institution served as an unofficial mediator. Finally, the Acholi cultural 
institution has put in place cultural measures for resolving conflicts. 
 
 Limitations of mato-oput as a mechanism of conflict resolution (section 4.10.3
 Limitations of Traditional Practices of Conflict Resolution:202) 
The major findings for this sub-theme were that Mato-oput is not suitable for addressing 
serious crimes, such as war crimes. In addition, Mato-oput is effective in specific cultural 
settings that accept its cultural practices, but it is also time consuming in its practice. Finally, 
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the very basis of the success of mato-oput is truth telling and confession, which in the Acholi 
conflict is as yet not possible. 
 
5.2 The Main Conclusions Emanating From the Findings 
The following are conclusions emanating from the findings, and are presented in relation to 
the research objectives for purposes of greater clarity: 
 
5.2.1: Major participants and actors in the conflict resolution process: 
The main conclusions drawn from the findings linked to this objective were: 
 
The elite actors in the peacemaking process, particularly GoU and LRA assumed that the 
conflict resolution process was about political and security matters and for which they were 
the main role players. In fact, it was assumed by the elite and some ordinary community 
members that the conflict in Northern Uganda was between the GoU and the LRA. This in 
effect disregards the role played by community members in the instigation, escalation, 
continuity, and de-escalation of the conflict. 
 
Regarding the legitimacy of community representatives, there was some ambiguity as to the 
legitimacy of the representatives at the peace process and this fed into further discontent 
among some respondents. Some respondents accepted the representation of the religious and 
cultural institutions as well as representatives of CSO whilst others bemoaned the fact that 
these representatives did not really represent them and/or did not pass on communication 
about the progress at the peace talks. Accordingly, the marginalisation of community 
members from the peace process meant that agreements reached by the ‘elite’ did not reflect 
their aspirations. Those who claimed to represent the community did not pass on 
communication about the peace process to the their constituencies hence creating further 
distance between what was happening at the Juba peace talks  and what was happening at the 
grassroots. The failure by community representatives to provide feedback to those they claim 
to represent further distanced the grassroots from participating albeit indirectly in the peace 
process, leading to alienation from what was taking place at the ‘top-level’. However, the 
media, particularly radio, proved crucial in providing the grassroots community with 
information about the peace process, and was successful in opening the dialogue for the 
return of abductees. 
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The key parties to the peace process did not include the local population in their 
consultations. Ordinary people were neither part of any government consultative forum, nor 
were they part of the LRA consultations. However, the religious and cultural institutions 
played an important role during the Juba peace process. They provided a channel through 
which the people of Northern Uganda could communicate and express their desire for peace. 
Similarly, the informal mediators are a valuable resource when there is a stalemate among 
key negotiating parties or when the credibility and authority of the official mediator is in 
dispute. 
 
There were structural and systemic gender-related challenges that did not enable women to 
maximise their potential and contribute to the conflict resolution process. Women were 
drawn into the peace process as ‘observers’ despite having played a mediating role at 
grassroots level. They were involved when it was too late for them to change anything. Some 
of these women mediators could have been drawn into the top-level discussions. Rural 
women were particularly marginalised with regards to the peace process. 
 
5.2.2: Community capacity, potential and opportunities for participation in conflict 
resolution processes, as well as the nature and level of community participation 
in conflict resolution processes. 
 
The main conclusions drawn from the findings linked to these two objectives were: 
 
It would appear that levels of participation need to be clarified. Ordinary community 
members do have a role in clarifying the nature of the conflict from their perspectives and 
how it impacted on them, and some of them could be empowered through training in conflict 
resolution skills /negotiation to be part of the observer group. In order to maximise their 
potential, it is important for the grassroots to be kept fully informed of the peace process 
since not all can take part in the actual, hammering out of the agreement. The danger of 
excluding the local population is that communities may lose trust and confidence in a peace 
process that does not value their input and where actors in the peace process do not consult 
with them or give them feedback. 
 
In fact, peace teams did not maximize the influence of local community elders and the Acholi 
indigenous practices /cultural resources for peace were not optimally explored and utilized; 
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the community’s knowledge and experience from the conflict was not utilised to inform the 
Juba peace process. While it is true that the complexity of decision making will often require 
specialised expertise, this should not be used as a justification for disregarding the inputs 
‘from below’. It is recognised that promoting community participation strategies means 
tackling the issue of power imbalances and could generate more conflict. However, this 
process is necessary for inclusivity and sustainability of the peace process. 
 
The community members played marginal roles in the peace process and could have been 
empowered in various ways to make a greater contribution, through establishment of visible 
and known channels for their inputs, legitimate representation and feedback about the 
process. Further, community representatives could have been more involved in the active 
monitoring and evaluating of the entire peace process and passing on this information. It is 
considered that if community participation in conflict resolution is not seen as a meaningful 
activity and taken seriously by the ‘elite’, then the acceptance of the outcome of the peace 
process will be in jeopardy. A fragile ‘peace’ may be the outcome. 
 
Regarding the security situation, during violent armed conflict, political and security 
considerations impede free movement of people, constraining participation. In particular, the 
resumption of direct hostilities can lead to a major setback in the peace making process, and 
can threaten to reverse the gains made at any level of the conflict resolution process. 
Furthermore, such hostilities are experienced firsthand ‘on the ground’ making it difficult for 
people to meaningfully participate when their lives are endangered. In essence, community 
participation can be impeded by a combination of socio-economic and political factors, 
including the absence of sufficient infrastructure for participation in post-conflict peace 
building and reconciliation. 
 
5.2.3: Appropriateness of conflict resolution structures 
The main conclusions drawn from the findings linked to this objective were: 
 
It would appear that the Juba Peace process was not all inclusive in that community members 
were not properly represented by people of their choice. They felt alienated from the process 
due to poor communication, the location of the peace talks (Juba) was not convenient and not 
being taken seriously by the high level participants at the talks (elite). It is considered that 
when local-level peace efforts, spearheaded by ordinary community members emerge and 
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their initiatives and processes grow into powerful grassroots movements, they will have a 
higher potential for creating sustainable peace at community and national level. Further, until 
conflict-affected communities develop their own abilities to cope with conflict and post-
conflict contexts, external, elite-led intervention will not succeed. These community abilities 
should be promoted by CSOs and Government. 
 
5.2.4: Traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution 
The main conclusions drawn from the findings linked to this objective were: 
 
Although local people at the grassroots level may be disempowered and fragmented by 
violent conflict, there will always be some form of community capacity for promoting peace 
and reconciliation, especially through indigenous approaches that have been transmitted 
through generations. In the Acholi context, traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution, 
and Mato Oput in particular, are useful for conflict transformation, as they utilize approaches 
and processes that are known and are socially appreciated by the majority of the community 
members. In fact, peacemaking and conflict resolution processes are more likely to be 
legitimate if they combine formal and indigenous approaches, hence benefiting from 
advantages and opportunities provided by the two approaches. 
 
Further, it should be noted that the parallel application of traditional as well as formal 
mechanisms for conflict resolution could be problematic. Hence a clear understanding is 
needed to clarify whether a particular crime could be resolved through a traditional approach 
or whether the nature of the crime warrants the formal approach. Case studies from elsewhere 
are useful in this regard. In Rwanda, there are cases where formal and traditional justice 
systems collide, hence illustrating the complex tensions between the concepts of peace and 
justice. There are cases where some prisoners are released by the national courts while they 
are simultaneously convicted and incarcerated by the Gacaca courts system (Fierens, 2005; 
Mutisi, 2009), 
 
Further, it is necessary to enact an appropriate legal and policy framework that enables the 
indigenous conflict resolution methods to operate. This happened in 2001 when Rwanda 
enacted the Gacaca law. The law gives indigenous courts the mandate to deal with cases of 
individuals who committed atrocities in their communities during the 1994 Genocide. In the 
context of Acholi, at the moment there is no clear framework on how mato-oput can be 
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constructed to include the Government of Uganda as a party to the conflict. It appears that 
any peace and justice process that focuses only on certain dimensions of the conflict or that 
ignores certain parties risks being inadequate (Wasonga, 2009:37). 
 
5.3 The Main Recommendations 
The following are the main recommendations emanating from the findings, and are presented 
in relation to the research objectives for purposes of greater clarity: 
 
5.3.1: Major participants and actors in the conflict resolution process: 
There should be a greater democratization of the peace process so as to include elite as well 
as local community members jointly in the entire process. The inclusion of all major 
segments of the Acholi community will go a long way in expanding opportunities for the 
Acholi people in making and sustaining peace. Further, there should be a stronger 
collaboration and dialogue among negotiators, community members and civil society, as this 
is more likely to ensure that the interests of all stakeholders are addressed and that the peace 
accords reached reflect the broad aspirations of the majority. 
 
Regarding community participation, the process should, ideally, be a feature throughout the 
conflict resolution process; for example, community peace councils could be formed at the 
grassroots. Further, there is a need for creativity and innovation in developing participatory 
mechanisms for selecting ordinary citizens to participate in peace processes, and for soliciting 
input from community members, with particular attention to obtaining the views of women, 
youth and other less represented or often marginalised sections of society. To this end, careful 
structures should be set up to ensure legitimate representation; these structures would take the 
form of representative committees established at every parish, sub-county and county within 
Acholi. Such a structure is effective and efficient as it increases opportunities for all 
community members to participate and contribute to the peace making process. 
 
In addition, there is need to establish local think-tanks. These think tanks will feed into 
consultative fora, and will be essential for a bottom up approach to peace-building; Northern 
Ireland and South Africa are excellent examples of this (O’Brien, 2005). Through 
representative peace committees and think tanks, the established communication channels 
will be essential to building up a peace dividend. Through these structures, representatives 
who are elected democratically should indicate how they will be passing on the information 
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to their constituencies. More still, the role of middle range leaders and ‘intermediaries’ 
(Lederach, 1997) are often underestimated and should be given much more leverage. 
 
Regarding the role of the media, key radio stations could be granted formal observer status 
during peace processes to ensure that they have access to first-hand, and accurate 
information. In addition, key personnel from radio stations should be trained or oriented in 
‘responsible’ peace journalism to ensure that what and how they report does not jeopardise 
the peace process, or does not jeopardise the safety of the negotiators. 
 
Gender issues were highlighted as critical. It is therefore important to be conscious of the 
need for inclusion of women, as women have particular strategic contributions to make in the 
peace process as peacemakers. Further, it is imperative that, during peacemaking processes, 
women take part in decision-making, as they are better suited to define what constitutes a fair 
process for a non-patriarchal society. There is need to appropriately modify cultural and 
patriarchal norms so as to address the structural and systemic challenges that limit the 
inclusion and participation of women, particularly in peacemaking processes. From a broader 
sense, the community representatives should plan and hold joint feedback sessions for the 
grassroots population as a strategy for more effective information sharing and obtaining more 
community input into the peace talks. 
 
5.3.2: Community capacity, potential and opportunities for participation in conflict 
resolution processes, as well as the nature and level of community participation 
in conflict resolution processes 
There is a need for grassroots training in conflict resolution and an understanding of the 
negotiation process. Civil society organisations could play a key role in this area by helping 
to set up the necessary structures/committees for peace work and peace training. Since the 
peace committees are grassroots based, they should be able to introduce and strengthen the 
use of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms alongside the more the more formal 
processes. The grassroots training should be complemented by the establishment of proper 
channels for open communication and feedback about the peace process which should be part 
of the planning strategy of any peace process. The grassroots population, especially the 
women and youth, should be active participants with proper mechanisms for their voices to 
be heard at the negotiation table. In effect, this will ensure that peacemakers, external or 
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internal, elite or non-elite, will build their efforts on existing local resources and capacities 
for conflict resolution as these are more likely to be more culturally relevant and sustainable. 
 
In order to ensure effective communication regarding peacemaking, various strategies could 
be adopted, including the establishment of channels such as community forums, peace 
committees holding representatives accountable and insisting on clear communication 
procedures, and various radio stations assisting with the dissemination of information. 
Further, during violent conflict, efforts should be made by stakeholders to promote 
community participation through improved protection and observance of human rights, in 
part to enable them to participate in the conflict resolution process. 
 
In addition, the government, with the assistance of ceasefire arrangements, should monitor 
the cessation of hostilities agreements reached between conflicting parties prior to 
engagement in formal talks. Any party to the conflict defaulting on this arrangement should 
be speedily dealt with so that the peace process is on track. In order to make participation 
effective and more meaningful, there is need for stakeholders to address impediments to 
community participation by addressing socio-economic and political factors that prevent the 
grassroots people from participating in conflict resolution processes, including post-conflict 
peace building and reconciliation processes and poverty relief. 
 
5.3.3: Appropriateness of conflict resolution structures 
The absence of proper communication channels needs to be emphasized so that community 
members’ voices can be heard at the ‘top level’ through proper representation. To this end, 
proper mechanisms should be set up for the democratic selection of representatives and 
observers at the peace talks.  Participatory and culturally sensitive approaches should be used. 
Additionally, there is a need for elite and non-elite representatives to work together, by 
setting up a structure that is truly representative of all segments of society. 
 
There is need for a joint and comprehensive strategy for involving ordinary citizens in 
peacemaking processes; this strategy should be developed through the joint efforts of the elite 
as well as CSOs and ordinary people. In addition, training, financial support and other costs 
of participation should be factored into the peace process as necessary for the peace dividend. 
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5.3.4: Traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution 
It could be possible to synchronize the two ‘justice systems’ – formal and traditional to 
ensure that they are mutually reinforcing. This can be done through the establishment of a 
legal and policy framework that harmonises the two systems as was the case with the Gacaca 
system in Rwanda in 2001 when the Gacaca law was enacted. In addition, aspects of relevant 
cultural practices could be absorbed into the formal judicial system. Accordingly, there is 
need to identify commonalities and differences between traditional methods of resolving 
conflicts among regional states affected by the LRA conflict, so that a joint traditional 
mechanism can be agreed upon and applied to all LRA combatants who are willing to submit 
to the traditional justice and conflict resolution mechanism. Finally, the traditional cultural 
system of conflict resolution should develop a referral mechanism for dealing with crimes 
that are beyond its capacity and jurisdiction. 
 
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
The study adopted a qualitative research design using a limited sample of respondents, as 
such it was limited in geographical coverage as well as scope. Subsequent studies, related to 
community participation, should explore and investigate more deeply, in other regions of 
Uganda and elsewhere, the issues considered by this study. A mixed methodology approach 
could be used adopting both large scale surveys as well as qualitative methodologies could 
offer  more nuanced findings especially after data has been triangulated and compared.  
 
Further, while there has been extensive research on the broad subject of participation, little 
research has been conducted on community participation in peacemaking and conflict 
resolution in general. Additionally, future research should be undertaken to derive principles 
of community participation that can be generalized and applied across a variety of political 
and national contexts. 
 
Also, questions such as whether community participation necessarily leads to a responsive 
governance environment or not and how to build responsive and mutually beneficial citizen-
state relations as a key to sustainable peace and prosperity, should be explored by future 
research. 
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5.5 Final Comments 
There is a need to promote an inclusive peace process that is owned by the conflict-affected 
population as this increases the chances of sustainable settlement of conflicts (Zanker, 2013; 
Donais, 2009; Ferris, 2009; Barnes, 2002). Whilst this is the ideal, the practical 
implementation is fraught with several challenges as highlighted by this study. 
 
The power dynamics between the elite and community members will remain a contentious 
issue. Both elite and community members will aspire to occupy the same political space, 
hence leading to further conflicts (Botes & Van Rensburg, 2000). A strategy for including 
community members would prove problematic as the elite feel threatened by their 
involvement at the same level (Bowen, 2008; Sawyer, 1995). 
 
Governments use their incumbency (legitimate or otherwise) to justify their presence at a 
negotiation table yet there remain groups in a conflict resolution process who lack the benefit 
of an electoral process from which to claim legitimacy (Mac Ginty, 2005). These actors, 
including CSOs, may need to obtain legitimacy in order to be more effective actors and 
representatives. Innovative strategies for inclusivity are needed. 
 
In democratic societies, CSOs should be reliable intermediaries between the state and the 
citizens, and have influence in the decision making process. Their involvement in conflict 
resolution is critical (Nilsson, 2012; Lanz, 2011; Kasaija, 2006; UN, 2004). 
 
A strong civil society is meant to keep the ‘political elite’ in check but sometimes even civil 
society can have their own agendas which are removed from the grassroots. In fact, the 
mandate and legitimacy of civil society can be challenged as it may be viewed as an 
extension of the elite structure in society, hence negating the role of ordinary community 
members (Zaker, 2013; McGghie & Wamai, 2011). 
 
Social movements consisting of the masses may be a possible solution to any co-operative 
strategies (the state may try to co-opt CSOs). Building a social movement for peace and 
social democracy from the grassroots could go a long way in securing greater leverage at the 
negotiation table. The work of middle range leaders, especially in regard to ‘shuttle 
diplomacy’ in stalemates, has much value to add to negotiated settlements (Lederach, 1997). 
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The civil society in Northern Uganda, especially religious and cultural leaders, played this 
role as they were trusted informal/unofficial mediators during the peace process. 
 
The role of the media in fostering violence as well as in promoting peace has been well 
documented. In war torn areas, radios/TV can play a positive role, although they are often 
limited to urban and peri-urban areas due to widespread insecurity in rural areas. Social 
movements, CSOs, middle range leaders should set up their own radio stations as ‘voices for 
peace’ and channels of communication reaching the masses. 
 
It is recommended that  deliberate mechanisms be set up to ensure that the community is 
deeply involved in processes for resolving conflict, because effective and sustainable 
peacemaking processes must be based on the empowerment of communities torn apart by war 
to build peace from below (McGghie & Wamai, 2011; Ramsbotham, et al, 2005). Womens’ 
groups need to lobby well beforehand in making sure that their voices will be heard at the 
highest levels in the peace process. 
 
The need for community representatives to give regular feedback should be structurally set 
up as part of the broader peacemaking process (Wanis-St.John & Kew, 2008; Wanis-St.John 
& Kew, 2008; Edwards, 1999). The absence of this means that there will be no clear strategy 
for providing feedback to the community and for harnessing community contributions. 
 
There is a greater likelihood of realizing durable peace if the peacemaking potentials of 
conflict-affected communities are enhanced (Barnes, 2002; Mac Ginty, 2005; UN, 2011). 
Citizens’ capacity could be enhanced through relevant training and skills development. This 
is a prerequisite for their successful inclusion and participation in peacemaking processes 
(Botes & Rensburg, 2000). 
 
Peacemaking strategies that give prominence to indigenous resources place the conflict-
affected communities at the centre of its resolution and accelerate post-conflict recovery and 
reconciliation (Barnes, 2002; Ferris, 2009; Darby & Mac Ginty, 2008;Barakat, 2005). Such 
strategies deliver justice in a socially acceptable manner; they promote justice and 
reconciliation, and give opportunity to as many community members as possible to 
participate in the conflict resolution process. 
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However the parallel application of traditional and formal justice mechanisms remains 
contested because the two are based on differing principles. While the indigenous 
mechanisms are restorative, participatory and inclusive and are based on local traditions and 
social values, formal processes emphasise retribution and adherence to a set of rules, 
regulations, procedures, laws and other formalities (Muhereza et al, 2009; Ogora, 2009; Mac 
Ginty, 2008; Pham & Vinck, 2010; Avruchet al, 1991). 
 
The inclusion of all stakeholders at all levels of the peacemaking process should be part of 
the design of the peace process (Ramsbotham et al, 2005). There is need for equality among 
stakeholders, as well as assuring that external actors do not overly influence decisions, 
disregard or sidestep opinions of conflict-affected communities. There is a need to identify 
leaders and representatives among conflict-affected communities at the lowest levels of the 
community in the peacemaking process, thereby complementing Track I and Track II 
processes. Finally, an inclusive peacemaking structure, including the people most affected by 
conflict, will be of great importance when it comes to the transformation of the conflict and 
the sustainability of the peace (Lederach, 1997). 
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APPENDIX 1: Interview Guide 
 
Key Informants’ perceptions on the major participants and actors in the Northern 
Uganda peace process: 
 
 Which Acholi community members participated in the Juba peace process, or other 
aspects of the Northern Uganda conflict resolution process? 
 How were participants in the peace process selected/identified? 
 Among the participants in the Juba peace process, whom do you regard to have been 
the legitimate representative of ordinary community members? 
 Why do you say so? 
 Do you think community members’ concerns, views and interests were effectively 
articulated during the Juba peace process? 
 
Key Informants’ perceptions of community members regarding their capacities, 
opportunities and potential to participate meaningfully in conflict resolution given their 
capacities and resources: 
 
 What is your opinion about the community’s capacity to participate in the Northern 
Uganda conflict resolution process? 
 The above notwithstanding, what strengths do community members bring (contribute) 
to the Northern Uganda peacemaking and conflict resolution process? 
 What do you consider to be the community members’ major impediments to 
participation in the Northern Uganda conflict resolution process? 
 Why do you consider the issues you have raised as impediments? 
 How did community members overcome these barriers? 
 If they did not overcome some of these barriers/challenges, why did you fail? 
 What opportunities existed during the conflict resolution process that community 
members did not exploit? 
 Why did community members fail to exploit these opportunities? 
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Key Informants’ perceptions about the nature and level of community participation in 
the conflict resolution process in Northern Uganda: 
 
 What do you have to say about the assertion that ‘IDPs and other community members 
know their needs better and that they would have represented themselves during the 
Juba peace talks, and during other parts of the conflict resolution process? 
 Did the community members themselves consider that they should have had a direct 
role in the peacemaking and conflict resolution process? If yes, what role did they wish 
to play during the Juba peace process? 
 How do you think community participation in conflict resolution should happen? 
 Who should facilitate community participation, including setting the agenda? 
 
Key Informants’ perceptions about the appropriateness of mechanisms for engaging 
conflict-affected communities in conflict resolution: 
 
 What alternative or complementary mechanism should have been established to solicit 
opinions of community members and other stakeholders? 
 What conflict resolution mechanisms/ structures were used in the Northern Uganda 
conflict resolution process? 
 How were these mechanisms/structures formed or established? 
 How appropriate were these structures/mechanisms for community involvement? 
 
Key Informants’ perceptions about the traditional mechanisms that are already in use 
by the conflict-affected communities: 
 
 What traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution have been used/are currently being 
used in resolution of the Northern Uganda conflict? 
 In your opinion, how effective have they been? 
 What were the limitations/failures of these mechanisms, especially in light of modern 
times? 
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APPENDIX 2: Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Guide 
 
Community perceptions on the major participants and actors in the Northern Uganda 
peace process: 
 
 Which Acholi community members participated in the Juba peace process, or other 
aspects of the Northern Uganda conflict resolution process? 
 Among the participants in the Juba peace process, whom do you regard to have been 
your representative? 
 How effectively were community members represented by the above 
participants/actors? 
 How were participants in the peace process selected/identified? 
 Do you consider those who represented you during the peace process to have been 
legitimate representatives of the community, and the IDPs in particular? 
 Do you think your concerns, views and interests as community leaders or IDPs were 
effectively articulated during the Juba peace process? 
 Since you were not directly involved in the Juba peace process, how did you ensure that 
your interests were catered for? 
 What do you have to say about the assertion that ‘IDPs and other community members 
know their needs better and that they would have represented themselves during the 
Juba peace talks, and during other parts of the conflict resolution process? 
 
Community perceptions of community members regarding their capacities, 
opportunities and potential to participate meaningfully in conflict resolution given their 
capacities and resources: 
 
 What is your opinion about the community’s capacity to participate in the conflict 
resolution process? 
 As a member of a community that has been affected by armed conflict for more than 20 
years, what are those unique circumstances that could have had a bearing on the 
community’s ability to participate in the conflict resolution process? 
 What do you consider to be the community members’ major impediments to 
participation in the Northern Uganda conflict resolution process? 
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 Why do you consider the issues you have raised as impediments? 
 How did community members overcome these barriers? 
 If you did not overcome some of these barriers/challenges, why did you fail? 
 What opportunities existed during the conflict resolution process that community 
members did not exploit? 
 Why did community members fail to exploit these opportunities? 
 The above notwithstanding, what strengths do community members bring (contribute) 
to the Northern Uganda peacemaking and conflict resolution process? 
 
Community perceptions about the nature and level of community participation in the 
conflict resolution process in Northern Uganda: 
 
 Did you consider that you should have had a more direct role in the Northern Uganda 
conflict resolution process, including the Juba peace talks? If yes, what role did you 
wish to play? 
 How do you think community participation in conflict resolution should happen? 
 Who should initiate community participation? 
 Who should facilitate community participation? 
 Since you were not directly involved in the Juba peace process, to what extent do you 
own or share in the outcomes of the peace process? 
 To what extent are community members committed to participate in implementation of 
the Juba Peace accords? 
 
Community perceptions about the appropriateness of mechanisms for engaging 
conflict-affected communities in conflict resolution: 
 
 What conflict resolution mechanisms/ structures were used in the Northern Uganda 
conflict resolution process? 
 How were these mechanisms/structures formed or established? 
 How appropriate were these structures/mechanisms for community involvement? 
 If the peace process were to resume, how would you want your concerns, interests and 
opinions to be represented? What alternative or complementary mechanism should 
have been established to solicit your opinion? 
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Community perceptions about the traditional mechanisms that are already in use by the 
conflict-affected communities: 
 
 What traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution have been used/are currently being 
used in resolution of the Northern Uganda conflict? 
 How do they work? 
 In your opinion, how effective have they been? 
 What were the limitations/failures of these mechanisms, especially in light of modern 
times? 
